Daily Papers

Current image captioning systems lack the ability to link descriptive text to specific visual elements, making their outputs difficult to verify. While recent approaches offer some grounding capabilities, they cannot track object identities across multiple references or ground both actions and objects simultaneously. We propose a novel ID-based grounding system that enables consistent object reference tracking and action-object linking, and present GroundCap, a dataset containing 52,016 images from 77 movies, with 344 human-annotated and 52,016 automatically generated captions. Each caption is grounded on detected objects (132 classes) and actions (51 classes) using a tag system that maintains object identity while linking actions to the corresponding objects. Our approach features persistent object IDs for reference tracking, explicit action-object linking, and segmentation of background elements through K-means clustering. We propose gMETEOR, a metric combining caption quality with grounding accuracy, and establish baseline performance by fine-tuning Pixtral-12B. Human evaluation demonstrates our approach's effectiveness in producing verifiable descriptions with coherent object references.

A Controller Area Network (CAN) bus in the vehicles is an efficient standard bus enabling communication between all Electronic Control Units (ECU). However, CAN bus is not enough to protect itself because of lack of security features. To detect suspicious network connections effectively, the intrusion detection system (IDS) is strongly required. Unlike the traditional IDS for Internet, there are small number of known attack signatures for vehicle networks. Also, IDS for vehicle requires high accuracy because any false-positive error can seriously affect the safety of the driver. To solve this problem, we propose a novel IDS model for in-vehicle networks, GIDS (GAN based Intrusion Detection System) using deep-learning model, Generative Adversarial Nets. GIDS can learn to detect unknown attacks using only normal data. As experiment result, GIDS shows high detection accuracy for four unknown attacks.

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are critical components in safeguarding 5G/6G networks from both internal and external cyber threats. While traditional IDS approaches rely heavily on signature-based methods, they struggle to detect novel and evolving attacks. This paper presents an advanced IDS framework that leverages adversarial training and dynamic neural networks in 5G/6G networks to enhance network security by providing robust, real-time threat detection and response capabilities. Unlike conventional models, which require costly retraining to update knowledge, the proposed framework integrates incremental learning algorithms, reducing the need for frequent retraining. Adversarial training is used to fortify the IDS against poisoned data. By using fewer features and incorporating statistical properties, the system can efficiently detect potential threats. Extensive evaluations using the NSL- KDD dataset demonstrate that the proposed approach provides better accuracy of 82.33% for multiclass classification of various network attacks while resisting dataset poisoning. This research highlights the potential of adversarial-trained, dynamic neural networks for building resilient IDS solutions.

Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) has been a hot research topic because of its ability to detect new threats rather than only memorized signatures threats of signature-based IDS. Especially after the availability of advanced technologies that increase the number of hacking tools and increase the risk impact of an attack. The problem of any anomaly-based model is its high false-positive rate. The high false-positive rate is the reason why anomaly IDS is not commonly applied in practice. Because anomaly-based models classify an unseen pattern as a threat where it may be normal but not included in the training dataset. This type of problem is called overfitting where the model is not able to generalize. Optimizing Anomaly-based models by having a big training dataset that includes all possible normal cases may be an optimal solution but could not be applied in practice. Although we can increase the number of training samples to include much more normal cases, still we need a model that has more ability to generalize. In this research paper, we propose applying deep model instead of traditional models because it has more ability to generalize. Thus, we will obtain less false-positive by using big data and deep model. We made a comparison between machine learning and deep learning algorithms in the optimization of anomaly-based IDS by decreasing the false-positive rate. We did an experiment on the NSL-KDD benchmark and compared our results with one of the best used classifiers in traditional learning in IDS optimization. The experiment shows 10% lower false-positive by using deep learning instead of traditional learning.

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in flying ad-hoc networks (FANETs) face security challenges due to the dynamic and distributed nature of these networks. This paper presents the Federated Learning-based Intrusion Detection System (FL-IDS), an innovative approach designed to improve FANET security. FL-IDS leverages federated learning to address privacy concerns of centralized intrusion detection systems. FL-IDS operates in a decentralized manner, enabling UAVs to collaboratively train a global intrusion detection model without sharing raw data. Local models are assigned to each UAV, using client-specific data, and only updated model weights are shared with a central server. This preserves privacy while utilizing collective intelligence for effective intrusion detection. Experimental results show FL-IDS's competitive performance with Central IDS (C-IDS) while mitigating privacy concerns. The Bias Towards Specific Clients (BTSC) method further enhances FL-IDS performance, surpassing C-IDS even at lower attacker ratios. A comparative analysis with traditional intrusion detection methods, including Local IDS (L-IDS), provides insights into FL-IDS's strengths. This study significantly contributes to FANET security by introducing a privacy-aware, decentralized intrusion detection approach tailored to the unique challenges of UAV networks.

The rapid expansion of low-altitude economy Internet of Things (LAE-IoT) networks has created unprecedented security challenges due to dynamic three-dimensional mobility patterns, distributed autonomous operations, and severe resource constraints. Traditional intrusion detection systems designed for static ground-based networks prove inadequate for tackling the unique characteristics of aerial IoT environments, including frequent topology changes, real-time detection requirements, and energy limitations. In this article, we analyze the intrusion detection requirements for LAE-IoT networks, complemented by a comprehensive review of evaluation metrics that cover detection effectiveness, response time, and resource consumption. Then, we investigate transformative potential of agentic artificial intelligence (AI) paradigms and introduce a large language model (LLM)-enabled agentic AI framework for enhancing intrusion detection in LAE-IoT networks. This leads to our proposal of a novel multi-agent collaborative intrusion detection framework that leverages specialized LLM-enhanced agents for intelligent data processing and adaptive classification. Through experimental validation, our framework demonstrates superior performance of over 90\% classification accuracy across multiple benchmark datasets. These results highlight the transformative potential of combining agentic AI principles with LLMs for next-generation LAE-IoT security systems.

With the growing use of information technology in all life domains, hacking has become more negatively effective than ever before. Also with developing technologies, attacks numbers are growing exponentially every few months and become more sophisticated so that traditional IDS becomes inefficient detecting them. This paper proposes a solution to detect not only new threats with higher detection rate and lower false positive than already used IDS, but also it could detect collective and contextual security attacks. We achieve those results by using Networking Chatbot, a deep recurrent neural network: Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) on top of Apache Spark Framework that has an input of flow traffic and traffic aggregation and the output is a language of two words, normal or abnormal. We propose merging the concepts of language processing, contextual analysis, distributed deep learning, big data, anomaly detection of flow analysis. We propose a model that describes the network abstract normal behavior from a sequence of millions of packets within their context and analyzes them in near real-time to detect point, collective and contextual anomalies. Experiments are done on MAWI dataset, and it shows better detection rate not only than signature IDS, but also better than traditional anomaly IDS. The experiment shows lower false positive, higher detection rate and better point anomalies detection. As for prove of contextual and collective anomalies detection, we discuss our claim and the reason behind our hypothesis. But the experiment is done on random small subsets of the dataset because of hardware limitations, so we share experiment and our future vision thoughts as we wish that full prove will be done in future by other interested researchers who have better hardware infrastructure than ours.

Intrusion detection system (IDS) is an important part of enterprise security system architecture. In particular, anomaly-based IDS has been widely applied to detect abnormal process behaviors that deviate from the majority. However, such abnormal behavior usually consists of a series of low-level heterogeneous events. The gap between the low-level events and the high-level abnormal behaviors makes it hard to infer which single events are related to the real abnormal activities, especially considering that there are massive "noisy" low-level events happening in between. Hence, the existing work that focus on detecting single entities/events can hardly achieve high detection accuracy. Different from previous work, we design and implement GID, an efficient graph-based intrusion detection technique that can identify abnormal event sequences from a massive heterogeneous process traces with high accuracy. GID first builds a compact graph structure to capture the interactions between different system entities. The suspiciousness or anomaly score of process paths is then measured by leveraging random walk technique to the constructed acyclic directed graph. To eliminate the score bias from the path length, the Box-Cox power transformation based approach is introduced to normalize the anomaly scores so that the scores of paths of different lengths have the same distribution. The efficiency of suspicious path discovery is further improved by the proposed optimization scheme. We fully implement our GID algorithm and deploy it into a real enterprise security system, and it greatly helps detect the advanced threats, and optimize the incident response. Executing GID on system monitoring datasets showing that GID is efficient (about 2 million records per minute) and accurate (higher than 80% in terms of detection rate).

Major cloud providers have employed advanced AI-based solutions like large language models to aid humans in identifying the root causes of cloud incidents. Despite the growing prevalence of AI-driven assistants in the root cause analysis process, their effectiveness in assisting on-call engineers is constrained by low accuracy due to the intrinsic difficulty of the task, a propensity for LLM-based approaches to hallucinate, and difficulties in distinguishing these well-disguised hallucinations. To address this challenge, we propose to perform confidence estimation for the predictions to help on-call engineers make decisions on whether to adopt the model prediction. Considering the black-box nature of many LLM-based root cause predictors, fine-tuning or temperature-scaling-based approaches are inapplicable. We therefore design an innovative confidence estimation framework based on prompting retrieval-augmented large language models (LLMs) that demand a minimal amount of information from the root cause predictor. This approach consists of two scoring phases: the LLM-based confidence estimator first evaluates its confidence in making judgments in the face of the current incident that reflects its ``grounded-ness" level in reference data, then rates the root cause prediction based on historical references. An optimization step combines these two scores for a final confidence assignment. We show that our method is able to produce calibrated confidence estimates for predicted root causes, validate the usefulness of retrieved historical data and the prompting strategy as well as the generalizability across different root cause prediction models. Our study takes an important move towards reliably and effectively embedding LLMs into cloud incident management systems.

Intrusion detection systems (IDS) for the Internet of Things (IoT) systems can use AI-based models to ensure secure communications. IoT systems tend to have many connected devices producing massive amounts of data with high dimensionality, which requires complex models. Complex models have notorious problems such as overfitting, low interpretability, and high computational complexity. Adding model complexity penalty (i.e., regularization) can ease overfitting, but it barely helps interpretability and computational efficiency. Feature engineering can solve these issues; hence, it has become critical for IDS in large-scale IoT systems to reduce the size and dimensionality of data, resulting in less complex models with excellent performance, smaller data storage, and fast detection. This paper proposes a new feature engineering method called LEMDA (Light feature Engineering based on the Mean Decrease in Accuracy). LEMDA applies exponential decay and an optional sensitivity factor to select and create the most informative features. The proposed method has been evaluated and compared to other feature engineering methods using three IoT datasets and four AI/ML models. The results show that LEMDA improves the F1 score performance of all the IDS models by an average of 34% and reduces the average training and detection times in most cases.

Signature-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) detect malicious activities by matching network or host activity against predefined rules. These rules are derived from extensive Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI), which includes attack signatures and behavioral patterns obtained through automated tools and manual threat analysis, such as sandboxing. The CTI is then transformed into actionable rules for the IDS engine, enabling real-time detection and prevention. However, the constant evolution of cyber threats necessitates frequent rule updates, which delay deployment time and weaken overall security readiness. Recent advancements in agentic systems powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) offer the potential for autonomous IDS rule generation with internal evaluation. We introduce FALCON, an autonomous agentic framework that generates deployable IDS rules from CTI data in real-time and evaluates them using built-in multi-phased validators. To demonstrate versatility, we target both network (Snort) and host-based (YARA) mediums and construct a comprehensive dataset of IDS rules with their corresponding CTIs. Our evaluations indicate FALCON excels in automatic rule generation, with an average of 95% accuracy validated by qualitative evaluation with 84% inter-rater agreement among multiple cybersecurity analysts across all metrics. These results underscore the feasibility and effectiveness of LLM-driven data mining for real-time cyber threat mitigation.

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) play a crucial role in ensuring the security of computer networks. Machine learning has emerged as a popular approach for intrusion detection due to its ability to analyze and detect patterns in large volumes of data. However, current ML-based IDS solutions often struggle to keep pace with the ever-changing nature of attack patterns and the emergence of new attack types. Additionally, these solutions face challenges related to class imbalance, where the number of instances belonging to different classes (normal and intrusions) is significantly imbalanced, which hinders their ability to effectively detect minor classes. In this paper, we propose a novel multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) architecture, enabling automatic, efficient, and robust network intrusion detection. To enhance the capabilities of the proposed model, we have improved the DQN algorithm by implementing the weighted mean square loss function and employing cost-sensitive learning techniques. Our solution introduces a resilient architecture designed to accommodate the addition of new attacks and effectively adapt to changes in existing attack patterns. Experimental results realized using CIC-IDS-2017 dataset, demonstrate that our approach can effectively handle the class imbalance problem and provide a fine grained classification of attacks with a very low false positive rate. In comparison to the current state-of-the-art works, our solution demonstrates a significant superiority in both detection rate and false positive rate.

The increasing integration of AI agents into cyber-physical systems (CPS) introduces new security risks that extend beyond traditional cyber or physical threat models. Recent advances in generative AI enable deepfake and semantic manipulation attacks that can compromise agent perception, reasoning, and interaction with the physical environment, while emerging protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP) further expand the attack surface through dynamic tool use and cross-domain context sharing. This survey provides a comprehensive review of security threats targeting AI agents in CPS, with a particular focus on environmental interactions, deepfake-driven attacks, and MCP-mediated vulnerabilities. We organize the literature using the SENTINEL framework, a lifecycle-aware methodology that integrates threat characterization, feasibility analysis under CPS constraints, defense selection, and continuous validation. Through an end-to-end case study grounded in a real-world smart grid deployment, we quantitatively illustrate how timing, noise, and false-positive costs constrain deployable defenses, and why detection mechanisms alone are insufficient as decision authorities in safety-critical CPS. The survey highlights the role of provenance- and physics-grounded trust mechanisms and defense-in-depth architectures, and outlines open challenges toward trustworthy AI-enabled CPS.

Frontier language model capabilities are improving rapidly. We thus need stronger mitigations against bad actors misusing increasingly powerful systems. Prior work has shown that activation probes may be a promising misuse mitigation technique, but we identify a key remaining challenge: probes fail to generalize under important production distribution shifts. In particular, we find that the shift from short-context to long-context inputs is difficult for existing probe architectures. We propose several new probe architecture that handle this long-context distribution shift. We evaluate these probes in the cyber-offensive domain, testing their robustness against various production-relevant shifts, including multi-turn conversations, static jailbreaks, and adaptive red teaming. Our results demonstrate that while multimax addresses context length, a combination of architecture choice and training on diverse distributions is required for broad generalization. Additionally, we show that pairing probes with prompted classifiers achieves optimal accuracy at a low cost due to the computational efficiency of probes. These findings have informed the successful deployment of misuse mitigation probes in user-facing instances of Gemini, Google's frontier language model. Finally, we find early positive results using AlphaEvolve to automate improvements in both probe architecture search and adaptive red teaming, showing that automating some AI safety research is already possible.

Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) in large enterprises can generate hundreds of thousands of alerts per hour, overwhelming analysts with logs requiring rapidly evolving expertise. Conventional machine-learning detectors reduce alert volume but still yield many false positives, while standard Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipelines often retrieve irrelevant context and fail to justify predictions. We present CyberRAG, a modular agent-based RAG framework that delivers real-time classification, explanation, and structured reporting for cyber-attacks. A central LLM agent orchestrates: (i) fine-tuned classifiers specialized by attack family; (ii) tool adapters for enrichment and alerting; and (iii) an iterative retrieval-and-reason loop that queries a domain-specific knowledge base until evidence is relevant and self-consistent. Unlike traditional RAG, CyberRAG adopts an agentic design that enables dynamic control flow and adaptive reasoning. This architecture autonomously refines threat labels and natural-language justifications, reducing false positives and enhancing interpretability. It is also extensible: new attack types can be supported by adding classifiers without retraining the core agent. CyberRAG was evaluated on SQL Injection, XSS, and SSTI, achieving over 94\% accuracy per class and a final classification accuracy of 94.92\% through semantic orchestration. Generated explanations reached 0.94 in BERTScore and 4.9/5 in GPT-4-based expert evaluation, with robustness preserved against adversarial and unseen payloads. These results show that agentic, specialist-oriented RAG can combine high detection accuracy with trustworthy, SOC-ready prose, offering a flexible path toward partially automated cyber-defense workflows.

Modern vehicles, including connected vehicles and autonomous vehicles, nowadays involve many electronic control units connected through intra-vehicle networks to implement various functionalities and perform actions. Modern vehicles are also connected to external networks through vehicle-to-everything technologies, enabling their communications with other vehicles, infrastructures, and smart devices. However, the improving functionality and connectivity of modern vehicles also increase their vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks targeting both intra-vehicle and external networks due to the large attack surfaces. To secure vehicular networks, many researchers have focused on developing intrusion detection systems (IDSs) that capitalize on machine learning methods to detect malicious cyber-attacks. In this paper, the vulnerabilities of intra-vehicle and external networks are discussed, and a multi-tiered hybrid IDS that incorporates a signature-based IDS and an anomaly-based IDS is proposed to detect both known and unknown attacks on vehicular networks. Experimental results illustrate that the proposed system can detect various types of known attacks with 99.99% accuracy on the CAN-intrusion-dataset representing the intra-vehicle network data and 99.88% accuracy on the CICIDS2017 dataset illustrating the external vehicular network data. For the zero-day attack detection, the proposed system achieves high F1-scores of 0.963 and 0.800 on the above two datasets, respectively. The average processing time of each data packet on a vehicle-level machine is less than 0.6 ms, which shows the feasibility of implementing the proposed system in real-time vehicle systems. This emphasizes the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed IDS.

As contemporary microservice systems become increasingly popular and complex-often comprising hundreds or even thousands of fine-grained, interdependent subsystems-they are facing more frequent failures. Ensuring system reliability thus demands accurate root cause localization. While traces and metrics have proven to be effective data sources for this task, existing methods either heavily rely on pre-defined schemas, which struggle to adapt to evolving operational contexts, or lack interpretability in their reasoning process, thereby leaving Site Reliability Engineers (SREs) confused. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive study on how SREs localize the root cause of failures, drawing insights from multiple professional SREs across different organizations. Our investigation reveals that human root cause analysis exhibits three key characteristics: recursiveness, multi-dimensional expansion, and cross-modal reasoning. Motivated by these findings, we introduce RCLAgent, an adaptive root cause localization method for microservice systems that leverages a multi-agent recursion-of-thought framework. RCLAgent employs a novel recursion-of-thought strategy to guide the LLM's reasoning process, effectively integrating data from multiple agents and tool-assisted analysis to accurately pinpoint the root cause. Experimental evaluations on various public datasets demonstrate that RCLAgent achieves superior performance by localizing the root cause using only a single request-outperforming state-of-the-art methods that depend on aggregating multiple requests. These results underscore the effectiveness of RCLAgent in enhancing the efficiency and precision of root cause localization in complex microservice environments.

Machine Learning has been steadily gaining traction for its use in Anomaly-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems (A-NIDS). Research into this domain is frequently performed using the KDD~CUP~99 dataset as a benchmark. Several studies question its usability while constructing a contemporary NIDS, due to the skewed response distribution, non-stationarity, and failure to incorporate modern attacks. In this paper, we compare the performance for KDD-99 alternatives when trained using classification models commonly found in literature: Neural Network, Support Vector Machine, Decision Tree, Random Forest, Naive Bayes and K-Means. Applying the SMOTE oversampling technique and random undersampling, we create a balanced version of NSL-KDD and prove that skewed target classes in KDD-99 and NSL-KDD hamper the efficacy of classifiers on minority classes (U2R and R2L), leading to possible security risks. We explore UNSW-NB15, a modern substitute to KDD-99 with greater uniformity of pattern distribution. We benchmark this dataset before and after SMOTE oversampling to observe the effect on minority performance. Our results indicate that classifiers trained on UNSW-NB15 match or better the Weighted F1-Score of those trained on NSL-KDD and KDD-99 in the binary case, thus advocating UNSW-NB15 as a modern substitute to these datasets.

The current intrusion detection systems have a number of problems that limit their configurability, scalability and efficiency. There have been some propositions about distributed architectures based on multiple independent agents working collectively for intrusion detection. However, these distributed intrusion detection systems are not fully distributed as most of them centrally analyze data collected from distributed nodes which may lead to a single point of failure. In this paper, a distributed intrusion detection architecture is presented that is based on autonomous and cooperating agents without any centralized analysis components. The agents cooperate by using a hierarchical communication of interests and data, and the analysis of intrusion data is made by the agents at the lowest level of the hierarchy. This architecture provides significant advantages in scalability, flexibility, extensibility, fault tolerance, and resistance to compromise. A proof-of-concept prototype is developed and experiments have been conducted on it. The results show the effectiveness of the system in detecting intrusive activities.

As large language models (LLMs) evolve into autonomous agents, their real-world applicability has expanded significantly, accompanied by new security challenges. Most existing agent defense mechanisms adopt a mandatory checking paradigm, in which security validation is forcibly triggered at predefined stages of the agent lifecycle. In this work, we argue that effective agent security should be intrinsic and selective rather than architecturally decoupled and mandatory. We propose Spider-Sense framework, an event-driven defense framework based on Intrinsic Risk Sensing (IRS), which allows agents to maintain latent vigilance and trigger defenses only upon risk perception. Once triggered, the Spider-Sense invokes a hierarchical defence mechanism that trades off efficiency and precision: it resolves known patterns via lightweight similarity matching while escalating ambiguous cases to deep internal reasoning, thereby eliminating reliance on external models. To facilitate rigorous evaluation, we introduce S^2Bench, a lifecycle-aware benchmark featuring realistic tool execution and multi-stage attacks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Spider-Sense achieves competitive or superior defense performance, attaining the lowest Attack Success Rate (ASR) and False Positive Rate (FPR), with only a marginal latency overhead of 8.3\%.

Vehicles today comprise intelligent systems like connected autonomous driving and advanced driving assistance systems (ADAS) to enhance the driving experience, which is enabled through increased connectivity to infrastructure and fusion of information from different sensing modes. However, the rising connectivity coupled with the legacy network architecture within vehicles can be exploited for launching active and passive attacks on critical vehicle systems and directly affecting the safety of passengers. Machine learning-based intrusion detection models have been shown to successfully detect multiple targeted attack vectors in recent literature, whose deployments are enabled through quantised neural networks targeting low-power platforms. Multiple models are often required to simultaneously detect multiple attack vectors, increasing the area, (resource) cost, and energy consumption. In this paper, we present a case for utilising custom-quantised MLP's (CQMLP) as a multi-class classification model, capable of detecting multiple attacks from the benign flow of controller area network (CAN) messages. The specific quantisation and neural architecture are determined through a joint design space exploration, resulting in our choice of the 2-bit precision and the n-layer MLP. Our 2-bit version is trained using Brevitas and optimised as a dataflow hardware model through the FINN toolflow from AMD/Xilinx, targeting an XCZU7EV device. We show that the 2-bit CQMLP model, when integrated as the IDS, can detect malicious attack messages (DoS, fuzzing, and spoofing attack) with a very high accuracy of 99.9%, on par with the state-of-the-art methods in the literature. Furthermore, the dataflow model can perform line rate detection at a latency of 0.11 ms from message reception while consuming 0.23 mJ/inference, making it ideally suited for integration with an ECU in critical CAN networks.

LLM agents increasingly act on users' personal information, yet existing privacy defenses remain limited in both design and adaptability. Most prior approaches rely on static or passive defenses, such as prompting and guarding. These paradigms are insufficient for supporting contextual, proactive privacy decisions in multi-step agent execution. We propose Contextualized Defense Instructing (CDI), a new privacy defense paradigm in which an instructor model generates step-specific, context-aware privacy guidance during execution, proactively shaping actions rather than merely constraining or vetoing them. Crucially, CDI is paired with an experience-driven optimization framework that trains the instructor via reinforcement learning (RL), where we convert failure trajectories with privacy violations into learning environments. We formalize baseline defenses and CDI as distinct intervention points in a canonical agent loop, and compare their privacy-helpfulness trade-offs within a unified simulation framework. Results show that our CDI consistently achieves a better balance between privacy preservation (94.2%) and helpfulness (80.6%) than baselines, with superior robustness to adversarial conditions and generalization.

The rapid advancement of large models, driven by their exceptional abilities in learning and generalization through large-scale pre-training, has reshaped the landscape of Artificial Intelligence (AI). These models are now foundational to a wide range of applications, including conversational AI, recommendation systems, autonomous driving, content generation, medical diagnostics, and scientific discovery. However, their widespread deployment also exposes them to significant safety risks, raising concerns about robustness, reliability, and ethical implications. This survey provides a systematic review of current safety research on large models, covering Vision Foundation Models (VFMs), Large Language Models (LLMs), Vision-Language Pre-training (VLP) models, Vision-Language Models (VLMs), Diffusion Models (DMs), and large-model-based Agents. Our contributions are summarized as follows: (1) We present a comprehensive taxonomy of safety threats to these models, including adversarial attacks, data poisoning, backdoor attacks, jailbreak and prompt injection attacks, energy-latency attacks, data and model extraction attacks, and emerging agent-specific threats. (2) We review defense strategies proposed for each type of attacks if available and summarize the commonly used datasets and benchmarks for safety research. (3) Building on this, we identify and discuss the open challenges in large model safety, emphasizing the need for comprehensive safety evaluations, scalable and effective defense mechanisms, and sustainable data practices. More importantly, we highlight the necessity of collective efforts from the research community and international collaboration. Our work can serve as a useful reference for researchers and practitioners, fostering the ongoing development of comprehensive defense systems and platforms to safeguard AI models.

The evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) has resulted in a paradigm shift towards autonomous agents, necessitating robust security against Prompt Injection (PI) vulnerabilities where untrusted inputs hijack agent behaviors. This SoK presents a comprehensive overview of the PI landscape, covering attacks, defenses, and their evaluation practices. Through a systematic literature review and quantitative analysis, we establish taxonomies that categorize PI attacks by payload generation strategies (heuristic vs. optimization) and defenses by intervention stages (text, model, and execution levels). Our analysis reveals a key limitation shared by many existing defenses and benchmarks: they largely overlook context-dependent tasks, in which agents are authorized to rely on runtime environmental observations to determine actions. To address this gap, we introduce AgentPI, a new benchmark designed to systematically evaluate agent behavior under context-dependent interaction settings. Using AgentPI, we empirically evaluate representative defenses and show that no single approach can simultaneously achieve high trustworthiness, high utility, and low latency. Moreover, we show that many defenses appear effective under existing benchmarks by suppressing contextual inputs, yet fail to generalize to realistic agent settings where context-dependent reasoning is essential. This SoK distills key takeaways and open research problems, offering structured guidance for future research and practical deployment of secure LLM agents.

Effective cyber threat recognition and prevention demand comprehensible forecasting systems, as prior approaches commonly offer limited and, ultimately, unconvincing information. We introduce Simplified Plaintext Language (SPLAIN), a natural language generator that converts warning data into user-friendly cyber threat explanations. SPLAIN is designed to generate clear, actionable outputs, incorporating hierarchically organized explanatory details about input data and system functionality. Given the inputs of individual sensor-induced forecasting signals and an overall warning from a fusion module, SPLAIN queries each signal for information on contributing sensors and data signals. This collected data is processed into a coherent English explanation, encompassing forecasting, sensing, and data elements for user review. SPLAIN's template-based approach ensures consistent warning structure and vocabulary. SPLAIN's hierarchical output structure allows each threat and its components to be expanded to reveal underlying explanations on demand. Our conclusions emphasize the need for designers to specify the "how" and "why" behind cyber warnings, advocate for simple structured templates in generating consistent explanations, and recognize that direct causal links in Machine Learning approaches may not always be identifiable, requiring some explanations to focus on general methodologies, such as model and training data.

New Attacks are increasingly used by attackers everyday but many of them are not detected by Intrusion Detection Systems as most IDS ignore raw packet information and only care about some basic statistical information extracted from PCAP files. Using networking programs to extract fixed statistical features from packets is good, but may not enough to detect nowadays challenges. We think that it is time to utilize big data and deep learning for automatic dynamic feature extraction from packets. It is time to get inspired by deep learning pre-trained models in computer vision and natural language processing, so security deep learning solutions will have its pre-trained models on big datasets to be used in future researches. In this paper, we proposed a new approach for embedding packets based on character-level embeddings, inspired by FastText success on text data. We called this approach FastPacket. Results are measured on subsets of CIC-IDS-2017 dataset, but we expect promising results on big data pre-trained models. We suggest building pre-trained FastPacket on MAWI big dataset and make it available to community, similar to FastText. To be able to outperform currently used NIDS, to start a new era of packet-level NIDS that can better detect complex attacks.

Effective incident management in large-scale IT systems relies on troubleshooting guides (TSGs), but their manual execution is slow and error-prone. While recent advances in LLMs offer promise for automating incident management tasks, existing LLM-based solutions lack specialized support for several key challenges, including managing TSG quality issues, interpreting complex control flow, handling data-intensive queries, and exploiting execution parallelism. We first conducted an empirical study on 92 real-world TSGs, and, guided by our findings, we present StepFly, a novel end-to-end agentic framework for troubleshooting guide automation. Our approach features a three-stage workflow: the first stage provides a comprehensive guide together with a tool, TSG Mentor, to assist SREs in improving TSG quality; the second stage performs offline preprocessing using LLMs to extract structured execution DAGs from unstructured TSGs and to create dedicated Query Preparation Plugins (QPPs); and the third stage executes online using a DAG-guided scheduler-executor framework with a memory system to guarantee correct workflow and support parallel execution of independent steps. Our empirical evaluation on a collection of real-world TSGs and incidents demonstrates that StepFly achieves a ~94% success rate on GPT-4.1, outperforming baselines with less time and token consumption. Furthermore, it achieves a remarkable execution time reduction of 32.9% to 70.4% for parallelizable TSGs.

Real-time detection and mitigation of technical anomalies are critical for large-scale cloud-native services, where even minutes of downtime can result in massive financial losses and diminished user trust. While customer incidents serve as a vital signal for discovering risks missed by monitoring, extracting actionable intelligence from this data remains challenging due to extreme noise, high throughput, and semantic complexity of diverse business lines. In this paper, we present TingIS, an end-to-end system designed for enterprise-grade incident discovery. At the core of TingIS is a multi-stage event linking engine that synergizes efficient indexing techniques with Large Language Models (LLMs) to make informed decisions on event merging, enabling the stable extraction of actionable incidents from just a handful of diverse user descriptions. This engine is complemented by a cascaded routing mechanism for precise business attribution and a multi-dimensional noise reduction pipeline that integrates domain knowledge, statistical patterns, and behavioral filtering. Deployed in a production environment handling a peak throughput of over 2,000 messages per minute and 300,000 messages per day, TingIS achieves a P90 alert latency of 3.5 minutes and a 95\% discovery rate for high-priority incidents. Benchmarks constructed from real-world data demonstrate that TingIS significantly outperforms baseline methods in routing accuracy, clustering quality, and Signal-to-Noise Ratio.

This paper studies the integration off Large Language Models into cybersecurity tools and protocols. The main issue discussed in this paper is how traditional rule-based and signature based security systems are not enough to deal with modern AI powered cyber threats. Cybersecurity industry is changing as threats are becoming more dangerous and adaptive in nature by levering the features provided by AI tools. By integrating LLMs into these tools and protocols, make the systems scalable, context-aware and intelligent. Thus helping it to mitigate these evolving cyber threats. The paper studies the architecture and functioning of LLMs, its integration into Encrypted prompts to prevent prompt injection attacks. It also studies the integration of LLMs into cybersecurity tools using a four layered architecture. At last, the paper has tried to explain various ways of integration LLMs into traditional Intrusion Detection System and enhancing its original abilities in various dimensions. The key findings of this paper has been (i)Encrypted Prompt with LLM is an effective way to mitigate prompt injection attacks, (ii) LLM enhanced cyber security tools are more accurate, scalable and adaptable to new threats as compared to traditional models, (iii) The decoupled model approach for LLM integration into IDS is the best way as it is the most accurate way.

The emergence of drones has added new dimension to privacy and security issues. There are little or no strict regulations on the people that can purchase or own a drone. For this reason, people can take advantage of these aircraft to intrude into restricted or private areas. A Drone Detection and Identification (DDI) system is one of the ways of detecting and identifying the presence of a drone in an area. DDI systems can employ different sensing technique such radio frequency (RF) signals, video, sounds and thermal for detecting an intruding drone. In this work, we propose a machine learning RF-based DDI system that uses low band RF signals from drone-to-flight controller communication. We develop three machine learning models using the XGBoost algorithm to detect and identify the presence of a drone, the type of drones and the operational mode of drones. For these three XGBoost models, we evaluated the models using 10-fold cross validation and we achieve average accuracy of 99.96%, 90.73% and 70.09% respectively.

Reliability is essential for ensuring efficiency in LLM training. However, many real-world reliability issues remain difficult to resolve, resulting in wasted resources and degraded model performance. Unfortunately, today's collective communication libraries operate as black boxes, hiding critical information needed for effective root cause analysis. We propose Mycroft, a lightweight distributed tracing and root cause analysis system designed to address previously hidden reliability issues in collective communication. Mycroft's key idea is to trace collective communication states and leverage internal control and data dependencies to resolve reliability problems in LLM training. Mycroft has been deployed at ByteDance for over six months to debug collective communication related issues at runtime. It detected anomalies within 15 seconds in 90% of cases and identified the root cause within 20 seconds in 60% of cases. We also conducted extensive fault injection experiments to demonstrate Mycroft's capability and efficiency.

Evaluating retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) pipelines requires corpora where ground truth is knowable, temporally structured, and cross-artifact properties that real-world datasets rarely provide cleanly. Existing resources such as the Enron corpus carry legal ambiguity, demographic skew, and no structured ground truth. Purely LLM-generated synthetic data solves the legal problem but introduces a subtler one: the generating model cannot be prevented from hallucinating facts that contradict themselves across documents.We present OrgForge, an open-source multi-agent simulation framework that enforces a strict physics-cognition boundary: a deterministic Python engine maintains a SimEvent ground truth bus; large language models generate only surface prose, constrained by validated proposals. An actor-local clock enforces causal timestamp correctness across all artifact types, eliminating the class of timeline inconsistencies that arise when timestamps are sampled independently per document. We formalize three graph-dynamic subsystems stress propagation via betweenness centrality, temporal edge-weight decay, and Dijkstra escalation routing that govern organizational behavior independently of any LLM. Running a configurable N-day simulation, OrgForge produces interleaved Slack threads, JIRA tickets, Confluence pages, Git pull requests, and emails, all traceable to a shared, immutable event log. We additionally describe a causal chain tracking subsystem that accumulates cross-artifact evidence graphs per incident, a hybrid reciprocal-rank-fusion recurrence detector for identifying repeated failure classes, and an inbound/outbound email engine that routes vendor alerts, customer complaints, and HR correspondence through gated causal chains with probabilistic drop simulation. OrgForge is available under the MIT license.

Security Operations Centers (SOCs) are overwhelmed by tens of thousands of daily alerts, with only a small fraction corresponding to genuine attacks. This overload creates alert fatigue, leading to overlooked threats and analyst burnout. Classical detection pipelines are brittle and context-poor, while recent LLM-based approaches typically rely on a single model to interpret logs, retrieve context, and adjudicate alerts end-to-end -- an approach that struggles with noisy enterprise data and offers limited transparency. We propose CORTEX, a multi-agent LLM architecture for high-stakes alert triage in which specialized agents collaborate over real evidence: a behavior-analysis agent inspects activity sequences, evidence-gathering agents query external systems, and a reasoning agent synthesizes findings into an auditable decision. To support training and evaluation, we release a dataset of fine-grained SOC investigations from production environments, capturing step-by-step analyst actions and linked tool outputs. Across diverse enterprise scenarios, CORTEX substantially reduces false positives and improves investigation quality over state-of-the-art single-agent LLMs.

Multi-agent systems powered by Large Language Models excel at complex tasks through coordinated collaboration, yet they face high failure rates in multi-turn deep search scenarios. Existing temporal attribution methods struggle to accurately diagnose root causes, particularly when errors propagate across multiple agents. Attempts to automate failure attribution by analyzing action sequences remain ineffective due to their inability to account for information dependencies that span agents. This paper identifies two core challenges: (i) distinguishing symptoms from root causes in multi-agent error propagation, and (ii) tracing information dependencies beyond temporal order. To address these issues, we introduce GraphTracer, a framework that redefines failure attribution through information flow analysis. GraphTracer constructs Information Dependency Graphs (IDGs) to explicitly capture how agents reference and build on prior outputs. It localizes root causes by tracing through these dependency structures instead of relying on temporal sequences. GraphTracer also uses graph-aware synthetic data generation to target critical nodes, creating realistic failure scenarios. Evaluations on the Who\&When benchmark and integration into production systems demonstrate that GraphTracer-8B achieves up to 18.18\% higher attribution accuracy compared to state-of-the-art models and enables 4.8\% to 14.2\% performance improvements in deployed multi-agent frameworks, establishing a robust solution for multi-agent system debugging.

Autonomous AI agents now transact at production scale -- 69,000 bots executing 165 million transactions across 50 million USDC in cumulative volume on a single marketplace -- without any shared trust layer between participants. Regulatory frameworks (Singapore IMDA, NIST CAISI, EU AI Act) and major AI laboratories (Anthropic, Google) have independently converged on the same structural requirement: an open, portable, cryptographically verifiable trust infrastructure for autonomous agents that no single vendor can deliver alone. This paper presents MolTrust, a production-deployed implementation of such an infrastructure built on W3C Verifiable Credentials 2.0 and Decentralized Identifiers v1.0, with on-chain anchoring on Base Layer 2. The system architecture is organized around four primitives (identity, authorization, behavioral record, portability), a five-party accountability chain, and the Agent Authorization Envelope (AAE) -- a machine-evaluable authorization structure enforced at three layers: cryptographic signatures, API-level credential lifecycle management, and kernel-level syscall monitoring via Falco eBPF integration. The paper documents three distinguishing capabilities: kernel-layer AAE enforcement below the agent process boundary; cross-protocol interoperability through five reproducible test vectors verified against independent implementations; and layered Sybil resistance combining dual-signature interaction proofs, cross-vertical endorsement diversity gating, and principal-DID-linked violation persistence. The reference implementation has been operational since March 2026 across eight credential verticals. Empirical validation at adversarial scale is pending. The contribution is deployment-first evidence that the trust infrastructure regulators and industry have converged on is implementable today using W3C-standardized primitives.

Autonomous AI agents powered by large language models (LLMs) with structured function-calling interfaces have dramatically expanded capabilities for real-time data retrieval, complex computation, and multi-step orchestration. Yet, the explosive proliferation of plugins, connectors, and inter-agent protocols has outpaced discovery mechanisms and security practices, resulting in brittle integrations vulnerable to diverse threats. In this survey, we introduce the first unified, end-to-end threat model for LLM-agent ecosystems, spanning host-to-tool and agent-to-agent communications, formalize adversary capabilities and attacker objectives, and catalog over thirty attack techniques. Specifically, we organized the threat model into four domains: Input Manipulation (e.g., prompt injections, long-context hijacks, multimodal adversarial inputs), Model Compromise (e.g., prompt- and parameter-level backdoors, composite and encrypted multi-backdoors, poisoning strategies), System and Privacy Attacks (e.g., speculative side-channels, membership inference, retrieval poisoning, social-engineering simulations), and Protocol Vulnerabilities (e.g., exploits in Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), Agent Network Protocol (ANP), and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol). For each category, we review representative scenarios, assess real-world feasibility, and evaluate existing defenses. Building on our threat taxonomy, we identify key open challenges and future research directions, such as securing MCP deployments through dynamic trust management and cryptographic provenance tracking; designing and hardening Agentic Web Interfaces; and achieving resilience in multi-agent and federated environments. Our work provides a comprehensive reference to guide the design of robust defense mechanisms and establish best practices for resilient LLM-agent workflows.

Text-to-image diffusion models, e.g. Stable Diffusion (SD), lately have shown remarkable ability in high-quality content generation, and become one of the representatives for the recent wave of transformative AI. Nevertheless, such advance comes with an intensifying concern about the misuse of this generative technology, especially for producing copyrighted or NSFW (i.e. not safe for work) images. Although efforts have been made to filter inappropriate images/prompts or remove undesirable concepts/styles via model fine-tuning, the reliability of these safety mechanisms against diversified problematic prompts remains largely unexplored. In this work, we propose Prompting4Debugging (P4D) as a debugging and red-teaming tool that automatically finds problematic prompts for diffusion models to test the reliability of a deployed safety mechanism. We demonstrate the efficacy of our P4D tool in uncovering new vulnerabilities of SD models with safety mechanisms. Particularly, our result shows that around half of prompts in existing safe prompting benchmarks which were originally considered "safe" can actually be manipulated to bypass many deployed safety mechanisms, including concept removal, negative prompt, and safety guidance. Our findings suggest that, without comprehensive testing, the evaluations on limited safe prompting benchmarks can lead to a false sense of safety for text-to-image models.

Agentic systems consisting of multiple LLM-driven agents coordinating through tools and structured interactions, are increasingly deployed for complex reasoning and problem-solving tasks. At the same time, emerging low-code and template-based agent development platforms (e.g., Dify) enable users to rapidly build and orchestrate agentic systems, which we refer to as platform-orchestrated agentic systems. However, these systems are also fragile and it remains unclear how to systematically identify their potential failure root cause. This paper presents a study of root cause identification of these platform-orchestrated agentic systems. To support this initiative, we construct a dataset AgentFail containing 307 failure logs from ten agentic systems, each with fine-grained annotations linking failures to their root causes. We additionally utilize counterfactual reasoning-based repair strategy to ensure the reliability of the annotation. Building on the dataset, we develop a taxonomy that characterizes failure root causes and analyze their distribution across different platforms and task domains. Furthermore, we introduce a benchmark that leverages LLMs for automatically identifying root causes, in which we also utilize the proposed taxonomy as guidance for LLMs. Results show that the taxonomy can largely improve the performance, thereby confirming its utility. Nevertheless, the accuracy of root cause identification reaches at most 33.6%, which indicates that this task still remains challenging. In light of these results, we also provide actionable guidelines for building such agentic systems. In summary, this paper provides a reliable dataset of failure root cause for platform-orchestrated agentic systems, corresponding taxonomy and benchmark, which serves as a foundation for advancing the development of more reliable agentic systems.

Traditional static cybersecurity models often struggle with scalability, real-time detection, and contextual responsiveness in the current digital product ecosystems which include cloud services, application programming interfaces (APIs), mobile platforms, and edge devices. This study introduces autonomous goal driven agents capable of dynamic learning and context-aware decision making as part of an adaptive cybersecurity architecture driven by agentic artificial intelligence (AI). To facilitate autonomous threat mitigation, proactive policy enforcement, and real-time anomaly detection, this framework integrates agentic AI across the key ecosystem layers. Behavioral baselining, decentralized risk scoring, and federated threat intelligence sharing are important features. The capacity of the system to identify zero-day attacks and dynamically modify access policies was demonstrated through native cloud simulations. The evaluation results show increased adaptability, decreased response latency, and improved detection accuracy. The architecture provides an intelligent and scalable blueprint for safeguarding complex digital infrastructure and is compatible with zero-trust models, thereby supporting the adherence to international cybersecurity regulations.

Monitoring is an important aspect of safely deploying Large Language Models (LLMs). This paper examines activation probes for detecting ``high-stakes'' interactions -- where the text indicates that the interaction might lead to significant harm -- as a critical, yet underexplored, target for such monitoring. We evaluate several probe architectures trained on synthetic data, and find them to exhibit robust generalization to diverse, out-of-distribution, real-world data. Probes' performance is comparable to that of prompted or finetuned medium-sized LLM monitors, while offering computational savings of six orders-of-magnitude. These savings are enabled by reusing activations of the model that is being monitored. Our experiments also highlight the potential of building resource-aware hierarchical monitoring systems, where probes serve as an efficient initial filter and flag cases for more expensive downstream analysis. We release our novel synthetic dataset and the codebase at https://github.com/arrrlex/models-under-pressure.

The auto-management of vehicle entrance and parking in any organization is a complex challenge encompassing record-keeping, efficiency, and security concerns. Manual methods for tracking vehicles and finding parking spaces are slow and a waste of time. To solve the problem of auto management of vehicle entrance and parking, we have utilized state-of-the-art deep learning models and automated the process of vehicle entrance and parking into any organization. To ensure security, our system integrated vehicle detection, license number plate verification, and face detection and recognition models to ensure that the person and vehicle are registered with the organization. We have trained multiple deep-learning models for vehicle detection, license number plate detection, face detection, and recognition, however, the YOLOv8n model outperformed all the other models. Furthermore, License plate recognition is facilitated by Google's Tesseract-OCR Engine. By integrating these technologies, the system offers efficient vehicle detection, precise identification, streamlined record keeping, and optimized parking slot allocation in buildings, thereby enhancing convenience, accuracy, and security. Future research opportunities lie in fine-tuning system performance for a wide range of real-world applications.

Anomaly detection in cloud environments remains both critical and challenging. Existing context-level benchmarks typically focus on either metrics or logs and often lack reliable annotation, while most detection methods emphasize point anomalies within a single modality, overlooking contextual signals and limiting real-world applicability. Constructing a benchmark for context anomalies that combines metrics and logs is inherently difficult: reproducing anomalous scenarios on real servers is often infeasible or potentially harmful, while generating synthetic data introduces the additional challenge of maintaining cross-modal consistency. We introduce CloudAnoBench, a large-scale benchmark for context anomalies in cloud environments, comprising 28 anomalous scenarios and 16 deceptive normal scenarios, with 1,252 labeled cases and roughly 200,000 log and metric entries. Compared with prior benchmarks, CloudAnoBench exhibits higher ambiguity and greater difficulty, on which both prior machine learning methods and vanilla LLM prompting perform poorly. To demonstrate its utility, we further propose CloudAnoAgent, an LLM-based agent enhanced by symbolic verification that integrates metrics and logs. This agent system achieves substantial improvements in both anomaly detection and scenario identification on CloudAnoBench, and shows strong generalization to existing datasets. Together, CloudAnoBench and CloudAnoAgent lay the groundwork for advancing context-aware anomaly detection in cloud systems. Project Page: https://jayzou3773.github.io/cloudanobench-agent/

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has rapidly emerged as a universal standard for connecting AI assistants to external tools and data sources. While MCP simplifies integration between AI applications and various services, it introduces significant security vulnerabilities, particularly on the client side. In this work we conduct threat modelings of MCP implementations using STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege) and DREAD (Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected Users, Discoverability) frameworks across five key components: (1) MCP Host and Client, (2) LLM, (3) MCP Server, (4) External Data Stores, and (5) Authorization Server. This comprehensive analysis reveals tool poisoning-where malicious instructions are embedded in tool metadata-as the most prevalent and impactful client-side vulnerability. We therefore focus our empirical evaluation on this critical attack vector, providing a systematic comparison of how seven major MCP clients validate and defend against tool poisoning attacks. Our analysis reveals significant security issues with most tested clients due to insufficient static validation and parameter visibility. We propose a multi-layered defense strategy encompassing static metadata analysis, model decision path tracking, behavioral anomaly detection, and user transparency mechanisms. This research addresses a critical gap in MCP security, which has primarily focused on server-side vulnerabilities, and provides actionable recommendations and mitigation strategies for securing AI agent ecosystems.

Anomaly detection plays an important role in modern data-driven security applications, such as detecting suspicious access to a socket from a process. In many cases, such events can be described as a collection of categorical values that are considered as entities of different types, which we call heterogeneous categorical events. Due to the lack of intrinsic distance measures among entities, and the exponentially large event space, most existing work relies heavily on heuristics to calculate abnormal scores for events. Different from previous work, we propose a principled and unified probabilistic model APE (Anomaly detection via Probabilistic pairwise interaction and Entity embedding) that directly models the likelihood of events. In this model, we embed entities into a common latent space using their observed co-occurrence in different events. More specifically, we first model the compatibility of each pair of entities according to their embeddings. Then we utilize the weighted pairwise interactions of different entity types to define the event probability. Using Noise-Contrastive Estimation with "context-dependent" noise distribution, our model can be learned efficiently regardless of the large event space. Experimental results on real enterprise surveillance data show that our methods can accurately detect abnormal events compared to other state-of-the-art abnormal detection techniques.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) replaces static, developer-controlled API integrations with more dynamic, user-driven agent systems, which also introduces new security risks. As MCP adoption grows across community servers and major platforms, organizations encounter threats that existing AI governance frameworks (such as NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001) do not yet cover in detail. We focus on three types of adversaries that take advantage of MCP s flexibility: content-injection attackers that embed malicious instructions into otherwise legitimate data; supply-chain attackers who distribute compromised servers; and agents who become unintentional adversaries by over-stepping their role. Based on early incidents and proof-of-concept attacks, we describe how MCP can increase the attack surface through data-driven exfiltration, tool poisoning, and cross-system privilege escalation. In response, we propose a set of practical controls, including per-user authentication with scoped authorization, provenance tracking across agent workflows, containerized sandboxing with input/output checks, inline policy enforcement with DLP and anomaly detection, and centralized governance using private registries or gateway layers. The aim is to help organizations ensure that unvetted code does not run outside a sandbox, tools are not used beyond their intended scope, data exfiltration attempts are detectable, and actions can be audited end-to-end. We close by outlining open research questions around verifiable registries, formal methods for these dynamic systems, and privacy-preserving agent operations.

Agentic AI systems built around large language models (LLMs) are moving away from closed, single-model frameworks and toward open ecosystems that connect a variety of agents, external tools, and resources. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a standard to unify tool access, allowing agents to discover, invoke, and coordinate with tools more flexibly. However, as MCP becomes more widely adopted, it also brings a new set of security and privacy challenges. These include risks such as unauthorized access, tool poisoning, prompt injection, privilege escalation, and supply chain attacks, any of which can impact different parts of the protocol workflow. While recent research has examined possible attack surfaces and suggested targeted countermeasures, there is still a lack of systematic, protocol-level security improvements for MCP. To address this, we introduce the Secure Model Context Protocol (SMCP), which builds on MCP by adding unified identity management, robust mutual authentication, ongoing security context propagation, fine-grained policy enforcement, and comprehensive audit logging. In this paper, we present the main components of SMCP, explain how it helps reduce security risks, and illustrate its application with practical examples. We hope that this work will contribute to the development of agentic systems that are not only powerful and adaptable, but also secure and dependable.

This paper presents the FlowTransformer framework, a novel approach for implementing transformer-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs). FlowTransformer leverages the strengths of transformer models in identifying the long-term behaviour and characteristics of networks, which are often overlooked by most existing NIDSs. By capturing these complex patterns in network traffic, FlowTransformer offers a flexible and efficient tool for researchers and practitioners in the cybersecurity community who are seeking to implement NIDSs using transformer-based models. FlowTransformer allows the direct substitution of various transformer components, including the input encoding, transformer, classification head, and the evaluation of these across any flow-based network dataset. To demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the FlowTransformer framework, we utilise it to provide an extensive evaluation of various common transformer architectures, such as GPT 2.0 and BERT, on three commonly used public NIDS benchmark datasets. We provide results for accuracy, model size and speed. A key finding of our evaluation is that the choice of classification head has the most significant impact on the model performance. Surprisingly, Global Average Pooling, which is commonly used in text classification, performs very poorly in the context of NIDS. In addition, we show that model size can be reduced by over 50\%, and inference and training times improved, with no loss of accuracy, by making specific choices of input encoding and classification head instead of other commonly used alternatives.

The rapid advancement of ML models in critical sectors such as healthcare, finance, and security has intensified the need for robust data security, model integrity, and reliable outputs. Large multimodal foundational models, while crucial for complex tasks, present challenges in scalability, reliability, and potential misuse. Decentralized systems offer a solution by distributing workload and mitigating central points of failure, but they introduce risks of unauthorized access to sensitive data across nodes. We address these challenges with a comprehensive framework designed for responsible AI development. Our approach incorporates: 1) Zero-knowledge proofs for secure model verification, enhancing trust without compromising privacy. 2) Consensus-based verification checks to ensure consistent outputs across nodes, mitigating hallucinations and maintaining model integrity. 3) Split Learning techniques that segment models across different nodes, preserving data privacy by preventing full data access at any point. 4) Hardware-based security through trusted execution environments (TEEs) to protect data and computations. This framework aims to enhance security and privacy and improve the reliability and fairness of multimodal AI systems. Promoting efficient resource utilization contributes to more sustainable AI development. Our state-of-the-art proofs and principles demonstrate the framework's effectiveness in responsibly democratizing artificial intelligence, offering a promising approach for building secure and private foundational models.

Aligned large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adversarial manipulation, and their reliance on web-scale pretraining creates a subtle but consequential attack surface. We study Stealth Pretraining Seeding (SPS), a threat model in which adversaries distribute small amounts of poisoned content across stealth websites, increasing the likelihood that such material is absorbed into future training corpora derived from sources such as Common Crawl. Because each individual payload is tiny, diffuse, and superficially benign, the attack is difficult to detect during dataset construction or filtering. The result is a latent form of poisoning that remains largely invisible under standard evaluation, yet can later be activated by a precise trigger such as <00TRIGGER00>. We call this attack PermaFrost, reflecting its latent and reactivatable nature. We study it through PermaFrost-Attack, a controlled framework for latent conceptual poisoning, together with three geometric diagnostics: Thermodynamic Length, Spectral Curvature, and the Infection Traceback Graph. Across multiple model families and scales, we show that this controlled SPS proxy can induce persistent unsafe behavior that often remains hidden under standard evaluation. Our results identify SPS as a practical and underappreciated threat to future foundation models. This paper introduces a novel geometric diagnostic lens for systematically examining latent model behavior, providing a principled foundation for detecting, characterizing, and understanding vulnerabilities that may remain invisible under standard evaluation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can comply with harmful instructions, raising serious safety concerns despite their impressive capabilities. Recent work has leveraged probing-based approaches to study the separability of malicious and benign inputs in LLMs' internal representations, and researchers have proposed using such probing methods for safety detection. We systematically re-examine this paradigm. Motivated by poor out-of-distribution performance, we hypothesize that probes learn superficial patterns rather than semantic harmfulness. Through controlled experiments, we confirm this hypothesis and identify the specific patterns learned: instructional patterns and trigger words. Our investigation follows a systematic approach, progressing from demonstrating comparable performance of simple n-gram methods, to controlled experiments with semantically cleaned datasets, to detailed analysis of pattern dependencies. These results reveal a false sense of security around current probing-based approaches and highlight the need to redesign both models and evaluation protocols, for which we provide further discussions in the hope of suggesting responsible further research in this direction. We have open-sourced the project at https://github.com/WangCheng0116/Why-Probe-Fails.

In this paper, we propose a novel approach where agents can form swarms to produce high-quality responses effectively. This is accomplished by utilizing agents capable of data inference and ranking, which can be effectively implemented using LLMs as response classifiers. We assess existing approaches for trustless agent inference, define our methodology, estimate practical parameters, and model various types of malicious agent attacks. Our method leverages the collective intelligence of swarms, ensuring robust and efficient decentralized AI inference with better accuracy, security, and reliability. We show that our approach is an order of magnitude faster than other trustless inference strategies reaching less than 125 ms validation latency.

The same arguments often need to be evaluated under different external regimes. An agent with influence over the regime has a strategic lever that standard formalisms do not directly capture. We introduce context-dependent argumentation frameworks (CDAFs), an extension of Dung's theory in which a defeat function determines, per context, which attacks succeed. A perspective-labeled specialisation derives the defeat function from a relevance set ρ and a priority π. The relevance set is the agent's action space. In a small worked example, the agent's target argument is rejected under every full-relevance injective priority, yet accepted under partial activations, one of which no VAF audience can mirror. We define the corresponding decision problem, ACTIVATION-MANIPULATION, and record baseline complexity bounds. Tight bounds and multi-agent variants are left open.

With the proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoT) and the rising interconnectedness of devices, network security faces significant challenges, especially from anomalous activities. While traditional machine learning-based intrusion detection systems (ML-IDS) effectively employ supervised learning methods, they possess limitations such as the requirement for labeled data and challenges with high dimensionality. Recent unsupervised ML-IDS approaches such as AutoEncoders and Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) offer alternative solutions but pose challenges in deployment onto resource-constrained IoT devices and in interpretability. To address these concerns, this paper proposes a novel federated unsupervised anomaly detection framework, FedPCA, that leverages Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and the Alternating Directions Method Multipliers (ADMM) to learn common representations of distributed non-i.i.d. datasets. Building on the FedPCA framework, we propose two algorithms, FEDPE in Euclidean space and FEDPG on Grassmann manifolds. Our approach enables real-time threat detection and mitigation at the device level, enhancing network resilience while ensuring privacy. Moreover, the proposed algorithms are accompanied by theoretical convergence rates even under a subsampling scheme, a novel result. Experimental results on the UNSW-NB15 and TON-IoT datasets show that our proposed methods offer performance in anomaly detection comparable to nonlinear baselines, while providing significant improvements in communication and memory efficiency, underscoring their potential for securing IoT networks.

Recent studies have revealed that self-sustaining cascading failures in distributed systems frequently lead to widespread outages, which are challenging to contain and recover from. Existing failure detection techniques struggle to expose such failures prior to deployment, as they typically require a complex combination of specific conditions to be triggered. This challenge stems from the inherent nature of cascading failures, as they typically involve a sequence of fault propagations, each activated by distinct conditions. This paper presents CSnake, a fault injection framework to expose self-sustaining cascading failures in distributed systems. CSnake uses the novel idea of causal stitching, which causally links multiple single-fault injections in different tests to simulate complex fault propagation chains. To identify these chains, CSnake designs a counterfactual causality analysis of fault propagations - fault causality analysis (FCA): FCA compares the execution trace of a fault injection run with its corresponding profile run (i.e., same test w/o the injection) and identifies any additional faults triggered, which are considered to have a causal relationship with the injected fault. To address the large search space of fault and workload combinations, CSnake employs a three-phase allocation protocol of test budget that prioritizes faults with unique and diverse causal consequences, increasing the likelihood of uncovering conditional fault propagations. Furthermore, to avoid incorrectly connecting fault propagations from workloads with incompatible conditions, CSnake performs a local compatibility check that approximately checks the compatibility of the path constraints associated with connected fault propagations with low overhead. CSnake detected 15 bugs that cause self-sustaining cascading failures in five systems, five of which have been confirmed with two fixed.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a standardized interface enabling seamless integration between Large Language Models (LLMs) and external data sources and tools. While MCP significantly reduces development complexity and enhances agent capabilities, its openness and extensibility introduce critical security vulnerabilities that threaten system trustworthiness and user data protection. This paper systematically analyzes the security landscape of MCP-based systems, identifying three principal threat categories: (1) agent hijacking attacks stemming from protocol design deficiencies; (2) traditional web vulnerabilities in MCP servers; and (3) supply chain security. To address these challenges, we comprehensively survey existing defense strategies, examining both proactive server-side scanning approaches, ranging from layered detection pipelines and agentic auditing frameworks to zero-trust registry systems, and runtime interaction monitoring solutions that provide continuous oversight and policy enforcement. Our analysis reveals that MCP security fundamentally represents a paradigm shift where the attack surface extends from traditional code execution to semantic interpretation of natural language metadata, necessitating novel defense mechanisms tailored to this unique threat model.

LLM agents have demonstrated remarkable performance across various applications, primarily due to their advanced capabilities in reasoning, utilizing external knowledge and tools, calling APIs, and executing actions to interact with environments. Current agents typically utilize a memory module or a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) mechanism, retrieving past knowledge and instances with similar embeddings from knowledge bases to inform task planning and execution. However, the reliance on unverified knowledge bases raises significant concerns about their safety and trustworthiness. To uncover such vulnerabilities, we propose a novel red teaming approach AgentPoison, the first backdoor attack targeting generic and RAG-based LLM agents by poisoning their long-term memory or RAG knowledge base. In particular, we form the trigger generation process as a constrained optimization to optimize backdoor triggers by mapping the triggered instances to a unique embedding space, so as to ensure that whenever a user instruction contains the optimized backdoor trigger, the malicious demonstrations are retrieved from the poisoned memory or knowledge base with high probability. In the meantime, benign instructions without the trigger will still maintain normal performance. Unlike conventional backdoor attacks, AgentPoison requires no additional model training or fine-tuning, and the optimized backdoor trigger exhibits superior transferability, in-context coherence, and stealthiness. Extensive experiments demonstrate AgentPoison's effectiveness in attacking three types of real-world LLM agents: RAG-based autonomous driving agent, knowledge-intensive QA agent, and healthcare EHRAgent. On each agent, AgentPoison achieves an average attack success rate higher than 80% with minimal impact on benign performance (less than 1%) with a poison rate less than 0.1%.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into automated, multi-stage pipelines, risk patterns that arise from unvalidated trust between processing stages become a practical concern. This paper presents a mechanism-centered taxonomy of 41 recurring risk patterns in commercial LLMs. The analysis shows that inputs are often interpreted non-neutrally and can trigger implementation-shaped responses or unintended state changes even without explicit commands. We argue that these behaviors constitute architectural failure modes and that string-level filtering alone is insufficient. To mitigate such cross-stage vulnerabilities, we recommend zero-trust architectural principles, including provenance enforcement, context sealing, and plan revalidation, and we introduce "Countermind" as a conceptual blueprint for implementing these defenses.

Agentic systems built on large language models (LLMs) extend beyond text generation to autonomously retrieve information and invoke tools. This runtime execution model shifts the attack surface from build-time artifacts to inference-time dependencies, exposing agents to manipulation through untrusted data and probabilistic capability resolution. While prior work has focused on model-level vulnerabilities, security risks emerging from cyclic and interdependent runtime behavior remain fragmented. We systematize these risks within a unified runtime framework, categorizing threats into data supply chain attacks (transient context injection and persistent memory poisoning) and tool supply chain attacks (discovery, implementation, and invocation). We further identify the Viral Agent Loop, in which agents act as vectors for self-propagating generative worms without exploiting code-level flaws. Finally, we advocate a Zero-Trust Runtime Architecture that treats context as untrusted control flow and constrains tool execution through cryptographic provenance rather than semantic inference.

Machine learning-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) for RPL-based IoT networks often rely solely on routing layer features, which provide only a partial view of network behaviour. In this work, we investigate whether incorporating Transmit (TX) and Receive (RX) radio features alongside the standard RPL feature set can improve detection performance in an LSTM-based IDS. We evaluate the proposed approach across three different attack types, namely DIS-Flooding, Local Repair, and Worst Parent under varying network sizes. The results show that incorporating TX and RX improves the IDS's overall detection performance by up to ~4% in F1-score compared with using routing-layer features alone, with the most notable gain observed for the Worst Parent attack.

The emergence of agent-to-agent communication protocols mirrors the early internet: powerful connectivity with minimal security infrastructure. When AI agents communicate on behalf of users, every message crosses a trust boundary where the user's personal data and the external agent's unconstrained language each present distinct risks. We address both through a dual-firewall architecture grounded in a unifying principle: each task defines a context, and both sides of the communication carry information far exceeding what that context requires. Our firewalls act as projections onto the task context, allowing only contextually appropriate content to cross each boundary. The Language Converter Firewall projects incoming messages onto a closed, domain-specific, structured protocol; an external agent's message is converted to validated fields while persuasive framing, urgency tactics, and embedded instructions are structurally eliminated through deterministic verification. This replaces the asymmetric challenge of resisting every possible manipulation with the structural guarantee that manipulation has no channel through which to arrive. The Data Abstraction Firewall projects outgoing information onto the granularity appropriate for the task, rather than applying binary disclose-or-redact filtering, as previous airgapping solutions did. Both firewalls operate in a trusted environment isolated from external input, applying domain-specific rules learned automatically from demonstrations. Across 864 attacks spanning three domains on the ConVerse benchmark, our architecture reduces privacy attack success rates (e.g., from 84% to 10% for GPT-5) and security attacks (from 60% to 3%), while maintaining or even improving task completion quality.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) plays a crucial role in extending the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) by enabling integration with external tools and data sources. However, the standard MCP specification presents significant security vulnerabilities, notably Tool Poisoning and Rug Pull attacks. This paper introduces the Enhanced Tool Definition Interface (ETDI), a security extension designed to fortify MCP. ETDI incorporates cryptographic identity verification, immutable versioned tool definitions, and explicit permission management, often leveraging OAuth 2.0. We further propose extending MCP with fine-grained, policy-based access control, where tool capabilities are dynamically evaluated against explicit policies using a dedicated policy engine, considering runtime context beyond static OAuth scopes. This layered approach aims to establish a more secure, trustworthy, and controllable ecosystem for AI applications interacting with LLMs and external tools.

AI agents that autonomously interact with external tools and environments show great promise across real-world applications. However, the external data which agent consumes also leads to the risk of indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in third-party content hijack agent behavior. Guided by benchmarks, such as AgentDojo, there has been significant amount of progress in developing defense against the said attacks. As the technology continues to mature, and that agents are increasingly being relied upon for more complex tasks, there is increasing pressing need to also evolve the benchmark to reflect threat landscape faced by emerging agentic systems. In this work, we reveal three fundamental flaws in current benchmarks and push the frontier along these dimensions: (i) lack of dynamic open-ended tasks, (ii) lack of helpful instructions, and (iii) simplistic user tasks. To bridge this gap, we introduce AgentDyn, a manually designed benchmark featuring 60 challenging open-ended tasks and 560 injection test cases across Shopping, GitHub, and Daily Life. Unlike prior static benchmarks, AgentDyn requires dynamic planning and incorporates helpful third-party instructions. Our evaluation of ten state-of-the-art defenses suggests that almost all existing defenses are either not secure enough or suffer from significant over-defense, revealing that existing defenses are still far from real-world deployment. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/leolee99/AgentDyn.

Network data packet anomaly detection faces numerous challenges, including exploring new anomaly supervision signals, researching weakly supervised anomaly detection, and improving model interpretability. This paper proposes NIDS-GPT, a GPT-based causal language model for network intrusion detection. Unlike previous work, NIDS-GPT innovatively treats each number in the packet as an independent "word" rather than packet fields, enabling a more fine-grained data representation. We adopt an improved GPT-2 model and design special tokenizers and embedding layers to better capture the structure and semantics of network data. NIDS-GPT has good scalability, supports unsupervised pre-training, and enhances model interpretability through attention weight visualization. Experiments on the CICIDS2017 and car-hacking datasets show that NIDS-GPT achieves 100\% accuracy under extreme imbalance conditions, far surpassing traditional methods; it also achieves over 90\% accuracy in one-shot learning. These results demonstrate NIDS-GPT's excellent performance and potential in handling complex network anomaly detection tasks, especially in data-imbalanced and resource-constrained scenarios. The code is available at \url{https://github.com/woshixiaobai2019/nids-gpt.gi

Context engineering has become central to building reliable AI agents, yet it remains largely unmeasured. Agents do not fail in isolation: their behavior is shaped by the instructions, tools, memory, retrieved knowledge, guardrails, and untrusted inputs accumulated in their context. When this context is weak, agents drift, hallucinate, misuse tools, ignore constraints, become vulnerable to injection, and waste tokens. This paper validates context-engineering quality as an independent leading indicator of agent reliability. We implement the measurement in ProofAgent-Harness, an open-source infrastructure for AI agent evaluation that uses multi-juror, consensus-based scoring. The harness assesses context across seven criteria: role clarity, guardrail coverage, instruction consistency, tool schema quality, grounding sufficiency, injection hardening, and token efficiency. Crucially, the context score is isolated from behavioral metrics and release decisions, enabling a non-circular validation. Through a controlled context-quality study across regulated agent domains, holding frontier LLM agents fixed and varying only their operating context, we show that context-quality criteria consistently predict their corresponding behavioral outcomes. Grounding sufficiency predicts hallucination resistance, guardrail coverage predicts manipulation resistance, instruction consistency predicts instruction following, and tool-schema quality predicts tool use. These findings establish context measurement as a validated preflight signal for agent reliability and position context engineering as an auditable layer of agent evaluation and governance.

The recent advances in diffusion models (DMs) have revolutionized the generation of realistic and complex images. However, these models also introduce potential safety hazards, such as producing harmful content and infringing data copyrights. Despite the development of safety-driven unlearning techniques to counteract these challenges, doubts about their efficacy persist. To tackle this issue, we introduce an evaluation framework that leverages adversarial prompts to discern the trustworthiness of these safety-driven DMs after they have undergone the process of unlearning harmful concepts. Specifically, we investigated the adversarial robustness of DMs, assessed by adversarial prompts, when eliminating unwanted concepts, styles, and objects. We develop an effective and efficient adversarial prompt generation approach for DMs, termed UnlearnDiffAtk. This method capitalizes on the intrinsic classification abilities of DMs to simplify the creation of adversarial prompts, thereby eliminating the need for auxiliary classification or diffusion models.Through extensive benchmarking, we evaluate the robustness of five widely-used safety-driven unlearned DMs (i.e., DMs after unlearning undesirable concepts, styles, or objects) across a variety of tasks. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency merits of UnlearnDiffAtk over the state-of-the-art adversarial prompt generation method and reveal the lack of robustness of current safety-driven unlearning techniques when applied to DMs. Codes are available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Diffusion-MU-Attack. WARNING: This paper contains model outputs that may be offensive in nature.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly paired with activation-based monitoring to detect and prevent harmful behaviors that may not be apparent at the surface-text level. However, existing activation safety approaches, trained on broad misuse datasets, struggle with poor precision, limited flexibility, and lack of interpretability. This paper introduces a new paradigm: rule-based activation safety, inspired by rule-sharing practices in cybersecurity. We propose modeling activations as cognitive elements (CEs), fine-grained, interpretable factors such as ''making a threat'' and ''payment processing'', that can be composed to capture nuanced, domain-specific behaviors with higher precision. Building on this representation, we present a practical framework that defines predicate rules over CEs and detects violations in real time. This enables practitioners to configure and update safeguards without retraining models or detectors, while supporting transparency and auditability. Our results show that compositional rule-based activation safety improves precision, supports domain customization, and lays the groundwork for scalable, interpretable, and auditable AI governance. We will release GAVEL as an open-source framework and provide an accompanying automated rule creation tool.

The escalating complexity of modern software imposes an unsustainable operational burden on Site Reliability Engineering (SRE) teams, demanding AI-driven automation that can emulate expert diagnostic reasoning. Existing solutions, from traditional AI methods to general-purpose multi-agent systems, fall short: they either lack deep causal reasoning or are not tailored for the specialized, investigative workflows unique to SRE. To address this gap, we present OpenDerisk, a specialized, open-source multi-agent framework architected for SRE. OpenDerisk integrates a diagnostic-native collaboration model, a pluggable reasoning engine, a knowledge engine, and a standardized protocol (MCP) to enable specialist agents to collectively solve complex, multi-domain problems. Our comprehensive evaluation demonstrates that OpenDerisk significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines in both accuracy and efficiency. This effectiveness is validated by its large-scale production deployment at Ant Group, where it serves over 3,000 daily users across diverse scenarios, confirming its industrial-grade scalability and practical impact. OpenDerisk is open source and available at https://github.com/derisk-ai/OpenDerisk/

The AI trustworthiness crisis threatens to derail the artificial intelligence revolution, with regulatory barriers, security vulnerabilities, and accountability gaps preventing deployment in critical domains. Current AI systems operate on opaque data structures that lack the audit trails, provenance tracking, or explainability required by emerging regulations like the EU AI Act. We propose an artifact-centric AI agent paradigm where behavior is driven by persistent, verifiable data artifacts rather than ephemeral tasks, solving the trustworthiness problem at the data architecture level. Central to this approach is the Multimodal Artifact File Format (MAIF), an AI-native container embedding semantic representations, cryptographic provenance, and granular access controls. MAIF transforms data from passive storage into active trust enforcement, making every AI operation inherently auditable. Our production-ready implementation demonstrates ultra-high-speed streaming (2,720.7 MB/s), optimized video processing (1,342 MB/s), and enterprise-grade security. Novel algorithms for cross-modal attention, semantic compression, and cryptographic binding achieve up to 225 compression while maintaining semantic fidelity. Advanced security features include stream-level access control, real-time tamper detection, and behavioral anomaly analysis with minimal overhead. This approach directly addresses the regulatory, security, and accountability challenges preventing AI deployment in sensitive domains, offering a viable path toward trustworthy AI systems at scale.

Network intrusion detection remains a critical challenge in cybersecurity. While supervised machine learning models achieve state-of-the-art performance, their reliance on large labelled datasets makes them impractical for many real-world applications. Anomaly detection methods, which train exclusively on benign traffic to identify malicious activity, suffer from high false positive rates, limiting their usability. Recently, self-supervised learning techniques have demonstrated improved performance with lower false positive rates by learning discriminative latent representations of benign traffic. In particular, contrastive self-supervised models achieve this by minimizing the distance between similar (positive) views of benign traffic while maximizing it between dissimilar (negative) views. Existing approaches generate positive views through data augmentation and treat other samples as negative. In contrast, this work introduces Contrastive Learning using Augmented Negative pairs (CLAN), a novel paradigm for network intrusion detection where augmented samples are treated as negative views - representing potentially malicious distributions - while other benign samples serve as positive views. This approach enhances both classification accuracy and inference efficiency after pretraining on benign traffic. Experimental evaluation on the Lycos2017 dataset demonstrates that the proposed method surpasses existing self-supervised and anomaly detection techniques in a binary classification task. Furthermore, when fine-tuned on a limited labelled dataset, the proposed approach achieves superior multi-class classification performance compared to existing self-supervised models.

LLM agents operating in open environments face escalating risks from indirect prompt injection, particularly within the tool stream where manipulated metadata and runtime feedback hijack execution flow. Existing defenses encounter a critical dilemma as advanced models prioritize injected rules due to strict alignment while static protection mechanisms sever the feedback loop required for adaptive reasoning. To reconcile this conflict, we propose VIGIL, a framework that shifts the paradigm from restrictive isolation to a verify-before-commit protocol. By facilitating speculative hypothesis generation and enforcing safety through intent-grounded verification, VIGIL preserves reasoning flexibility while ensuring robust control. We further introduce SIREN, a benchmark comprising 959 tool stream injection cases designed to simulate pervasive threats characterized by dynamic dependencies. Extensive experiments demonstrate that VIGIL outperforms state-of-the-art dynamic defenses by reducing the attack success rate by over 22\% while more than doubling the utility under attack compared to static baselines, thereby achieving an optimal balance between security and utility.

This paper investigates Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) application for self-supervised network intrusion and anomaly detection. GNNs are a deep learning approach for graph-based data that incorporate graph structures into learning to generalise graph representations and output embeddings. As network flows are naturally graph-based, GNNs are a suitable fit for analysing and learning network behaviour. The majority of current implementations of GNN-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) rely heavily on labelled network traffic which can not only restrict the amount and structure of input traffic, but also the NIDSs potential to adapt to unseen attacks. To overcome these restrictions, we present Anomal-E, a GNN approach to intrusion and anomaly detection that leverages edge features and graph topological structure in a self-supervised process. This approach is, to the best our knowledge, the first successful and practical approach to network intrusion detection that utilises network flows in a self-supervised, edge leveraging GNN. Experimental results on two modern benchmark NIDS datasets not only clearly display the improvement of using Anomal-E embeddings rather than raw features, but also the potential Anomal-E has for detection on wild network traffic.

Fake base stations (FBSes) pose a significant security threat by impersonating legitimate base stations (BSes). Though efforts have been made to defeat this threat, up to this day, the presence of FBSes and the multi-step attacks (MSAs) stemming from them can lead to unauthorized surveillance, interception of sensitive information, and disruption of network services. Therefore, detecting these malicious entities is crucial to ensure the security and reliability of cellular networks. Traditional detection methods often rely on additional hardware, rules, signal scanning, changing protocol specifications, or cryptographic mechanisms that have limitations and incur huge infrastructure costs. In this paper, we develop FBSDetector-an effective and efficient detection solution that can reliably detect FBSes and MSAs from layer-3 network traces using machine learning (ML) at the user equipment (UE) side. To develop FBSDetector, we create FBSAD and MSAD, the first-ever high-quality and large-scale datasets incorporating instances of FBSes and 21 MSAs. These datasets capture the network traces in different real-world cellular network scenarios (including mobility and different attacker capabilities) incorporating legitimate BSes and FBSes. Our novel ML framework, specifically designed to detect FBSes in a multi-level approach for packet classification using stateful LSTM with attention and trace level classification and MSAs using graph learning, can effectively detect FBSes with an accuracy of 96% and a false positive rate of 2.96%, and recognize MSAs with an accuracy of 86% and a false positive rate of 3.28%. We deploy FBSDetector as a real-world solution to protect end-users through a mobile app and validate it in real-world environments. Compared to the existing heuristic-based solutions that fail to detect FBSes, FBSDetector can detect FBSes in the wild in real-time.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to red teaming attacks, which can induce LLMs to generate harmful content. Previous research constructs attack prompts via manual or automatic methods, which have their own limitations on construction cost and quality. To address these issues, we propose an integrated approach that combines manual and automatic methods to economically generate high-quality attack prompts. Specifically, considering the impressive capabilities of newly emerged LLMs, we propose an attack framework to instruct LLMs to mimic human-generated prompts through in-context learning. Furthermore, we propose a defense framework that fine-tunes victim LLMs through iterative interactions with the attack framework to enhance their safety against red teaming attacks. Extensive experiments on different LLMs validate the effectiveness of our proposed attack and defense frameworks. Additionally, we release a series of attack prompts datasets named SAP with varying sizes, facilitating the safety evaluation and enhancement of more LLMs. Our code and dataset is available on https://github.com/Aatrox103/SAP .

The increasing complexity and interconnectivity of digital infrastructures make scalable and reliable security assessment methods essential. Robotic systems represent a particularly important class of operational technology, as modern robots are highly networked cyber-physical systems deployed in domains such as industrial automation, logistics, and autonomous services. This paper explores the use of large language models for automated penetration testing in robotic environments. We propose an environment-grounded multi-agent architecture tailored to Robotics-based systems. The approach dynamically constructs a shared graph-based memory during execution that captures the observable system state, including network topology, communication channels, vulnerabilities, and attempted exploits. This enables structured automation while maintaining traceability and effective context management throughout the testing process. Evaluated across multiple iterations within a specialized robotics Capture-the-Flag scenario (ROS/ROS2), the system demonstrated high reliability, successfully completing the challenge in 100\% of test runs (n=5). This performance significantly exceeds literature benchmarks while maintaining the traceability and human oversight required by frameworks like the EU AI Act.

Cloud environments face frequent DDoS threats due to centralized resources and broad attack surfaces. Modern cloud-native DDoS attacks further evolve rapidly and often blend multi-vector strategies, creating an operational dilemma: defenders need wire-speed monitoring while also requiring explainable, auditable attribution for response. Existing rule-based and supervised-learning approaches typically output black-box scores or labels, provide limited evidence chains, and generalize poorly to unseen attack variants; meanwhile, high-quality labeled data is often difficult to obtain in cloud settings. We present Holmes (DDoS Detective), an LLM-based DDoS detection agent that reframes the model as a virtual SRE investigator rather than an end-to-end classifier. Holmes couples a funnel-like hierarchical workflow (counters/sFlow for continuous sensing and triage; PCAP evidence collection triggered only on anomaly windows) with an Evidence Pack abstraction that converts binary packets into compact, reproducible, high-signal structured evidence. On top of this evidence interface, Holmes enforces a structure-first investigation protocol and strict JSON/quotation constraints to produce machine-consumable reports with auditable evidence anchors. We evaluate Holmes on CICDDoS2019 reflection/amplification attacks and script-triggered flooding scenarios. Results show that Holmes produces attribution decisions grounded in salient evidence anchors across diverse attack families, and when errors occur, its audit logs make the failure source easy to localize, demonstrating the practicality of an LLM agent for cost-controlled and traceable DDoS investigation in cloud operations.

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

The convergence of Information Technology and Operational Technology has exposed Industrial Control Systems (ICS) to multi-stage cyberattacks that traverse software, network, and physical process layers simultaneously. Although Provenance-based Intrusion Detection Systems (PIDS) are effective in Information Technology (IT) environments, their applicability to Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) remains largely unexplored because of the absence of datasets that jointly capture host-level causal behavior, industrial network semantics, and physical process state. To address this gap, we design an open-source, Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) CPS testbed that replicates an industrial chemical reactor control architecture across the Purdue model layers. Using this testbed, we propose ProvICS, a multimodal provenance dataset purpose-built for CPS intrusion detection, which synchronously captures four streams: whole-system provenance graphs from the supervisory host and the resource-constrained PLC, decoded Modbus deep-packet inspection records, and physical process telemetry. The collection comprises a 48-hour benign phase and a 22-hour attack phase across four campaigns covering 20 ICS ATT&CK techniques over 32 attack events, ranging from reconnaissance to physical process manipulation. Comparative analysis shows that ProvICS is among the few existing ICS/CPS benchmarks with multi-host kernel-level provenance, real PLC hardware-in-the-loop execution, decoded Modbus traffic, physical process-state measurements, and auxiliary raw PCAP traces in a time-synchronized collection. Baseline detection further confirms that cross-modal fusion can detect all 32 labeled attack events (F1 = 0.913, false-positive rate (FPR) = 1.40%), demonstrating the dataset's ability to expose complementary attack signals across modalities and addressing a gap not covered by prior benchmarks.

The drive toward automating cellular network operations has grown with the increasing complexity of these systems. Despite advancements, full autonomy currently remains out of reach due to reliance on human intervention for modeling network behaviors and defining policies to meet target requirements. Network Digital Twins (NDTs) have shown promise in enhancing network intelligence, but the successful implementation of this technology is constrained by use case-specific architectures, limiting its role in advancing network autonomy. A more capable network intelligence, or "telecommunications brain", is needed to enable seamless, autonomous management of cellular network. Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as potential enablers for this vision but face challenges in network modeling, especially in reasoning and handling diverse data types. To address these gaps, we introduce Hermes, a chain of LLM agents that uses "blueprints" for constructing NDT instances through structured and explainable logical steps. Hermes allows automatic, reliable, and accurate network modeling of diverse use cases and configurations, thus marking progress toward fully autonomous network operations.

Ensuring the reliability and availability of complex networked services demands effective root cause analysis (RCA) across cloud environments, data centers, and on-premises networks. Traditional RCA methods, which involve manual inspection of data sources such as logs and telemetry data, are often time-consuming and challenging for on-call engineers. While statistical inference methods have been employed to estimate the causality of network events, these approaches alone are similarly challenging and suffer from a lack of interpretability, making it difficult for engineers to understand the predictions made by black-box models. In this paper, we present RCACopilot, an advanced on-call system that combines statistical tests and large language model (LLM) reasoning to automate RCA across various network environments. RCACopilot gathers and synthesizes critical runtime diagnostic information, predicts the root cause of incidents, provides a clear explanatory narrative, and offers targeted action steps for engineers to resolve the issues. By utilizing LLM reasoning techniques and retrieval, RCACopilot delivers accurate and practical support for operators.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have sparked interest in their application to IoT and automation systems, particularly for facilitating device management through natural language instructions. However, existing centralized approaches face significant scalability challenges when managing and coordinating the collaboration between IoT devices of diverse capabilities in large-scale heterogeneous IoT systems. This paper introduces LLMind 2.0, a distributed IoT automation framework that addresses the scalability challenges through lightweight LLM-empowered device agents via natural language-based machine-to-machine (M2M) communication. Unlike previous LLM-controlled automation systems that rely on a centralized coordinator to generate device-specific code to be executed on individual devices, LLMind 2.0 distributes intelligence across individual devices through lightweight LLMs embedded in IoT devices. The central coordinator translates human instructions into simple subtasks described in natural human language, which are then processed by device-specific agents to generate device-specific code locally at the associated devices. This approach transcends device heterogeneity barriers by using natural language as a unified communication medium, enabling seamless collaboration between devices from different manufacturers. The system incorporates several key innovations: a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) mechanism for accurate subtask-to-API mapping, fine-tuned lightweight LLMs for reliable code generation, and a finite state machine-based task execution framework. Experimental validation in multi-robot warehouse scenarios and real-world WiFi network deployments demonstrates significant improvements in scalability, reliability, and privacy protection compared to the centralized approach.

Agentic AI systems increasingly execute consequential actions on behalf of human principals, delegating tasks through multi-step chains of autonomous agents. No existing standard addresses a fundamental accountability gap: verifying that terminal actions in a delegation chain were genuinely authorized by a human principal, through what chain of delegation, and under what scope. This paper presents the Human Delegation Provenance (HDP) protocol, a lightweight token-based scheme that cryptographically captures and verifies human authorization context in multi-agent systems. An HDP token binds a human authorization event to a session, records each agent's delegation action as a signed hop in an append-only chain, and enables any participant to verify the full provenance record using only the issuer's Ed25519 public key and the current session identifier. Verification is fully offline, requiring no registry lookups or third-party trust anchors. We situate HDP within the existing landscape of delegation protocols, identify its distinct design point relative to OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693), JSON Web Tokens (RFC 7519), UCAN, and the Intent Provenance Protocol (draft-haberkamp-ipp-00), and demonstrate that existing standards fail to address the multi-hop, append-only, human-provenance requirements of agentic systems. HDP has been published as an IETF Internet-Draft (draft-helixar-hdp-agentic-delegation-00) and a reference TypeScript SDK is publicly available.

The strong planning and reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have fostered the development of agent-based systems capable of leveraging external tools and interacting with increasingly complex environments. However, these powerful features also introduce a critical security risk: indirect prompt injection, a sophisticated attack vector that compromises the core of these agents, the LLM, by manipulating contextual information rather than direct user prompts. In this work, we propose a generic black-box fuzzing framework, AgentVigil, designed to automatically discover and exploit indirect prompt injection vulnerabilities across diverse LLM agents. Our approach starts by constructing a high-quality initial seed corpus, then employs a seed selection algorithm based on Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to iteratively refine inputs, thereby maximizing the likelihood of uncovering agent weaknesses. We evaluate AgentVigil on two public benchmarks, AgentDojo and VWA-adv, where it achieves 71% and 70% success rates against agents based on o3-mini and GPT-4o, respectively, nearly doubling the performance of baseline attacks. Moreover, AgentVigil exhibits strong transferability across unseen tasks and internal LLMs, as well as promising results against defenses. Beyond benchmark evaluations, we apply our attacks in real-world environments, successfully misleading agents to navigate to arbitrary URLs, including malicious sites.

The effectiveness of network intrusion detection systems, predominantly based on machine learning, are highly influenced by the dataset they are trained on. Ensuring an accurate reflection of the multifaceted nature of benign and malicious traffic in these datasets is essential for creating models capable of recognizing and responding to a wide array of intrusion patterns. However, existing datasets often fall short, lacking the necessary diversity and alignment with the contemporary network environment, thereby limiting the effectiveness of intrusion detection. This paper introduces TII-SSRC-23, a novel and comprehensive dataset designed to overcome these challenges. Comprising a diverse range of traffic types and subtypes, our dataset is a robust and versatile tool for the research community. Additionally, we conduct a feature importance analysis, providing vital insights into critical features for intrusion detection tasks. Through extensive experimentation, we also establish firm baselines for supervised and unsupervised intrusion detection methodologies using our dataset, further contributing to the advancement and adaptability of intrusion detection models in the rapidly changing landscape of network security. Our dataset is available at https://kaggle.com/datasets/daniaherzalla/tii-ssrc-23.

The rise of generative AI (GenAI) multi-agent systems (MAS) necessitates standardized protocols enabling agents to discover and interact with external tools. However, these protocols introduce new security challenges, particularly; tool squatting; the deceptive registration or representation of tools. This paper analyzes tool squatting threats within the context of emerging interoperability standards, such as Model Context Protocol (MCP) or seamless communication between agents protocols. It introduces a comprehensive Tool Registry system designed to mitigate these risks. We propose a security-focused architecture featuring admin-controlled registration, centralized tool discovery, fine grained access policies enforced via dedicated Agent and Tool Registry services, a dynamic trust scoring mechanism based on tool versioning and known vulnerabilities, and just in time credential provisioning. Based on its design principles, the proposed registry framework aims to effectively prevent common tool squatting vectors while preserving the flexibility and power of multi-agent systems. This work addresses a critical security gap in the rapidly evolving GenAI ecosystem and provides a foundation for secure tool integration in production environments.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into healthcare demands a safety paradigm rooted in primum non nocere. However, current alignment techniques rely on generic definitions of harm that fail to capture context-dependent violations, such as administrative fraud and clinical discrimination. To address this, we introduce Medical Malice: a dataset of 214,219 adversarial prompts calibrated to the regulatory and ethical complexities of the Brazilian Unified Health System (SUS). Crucially, the dataset includes the reasoning behind each violation, enabling models to internalize ethical boundaries rather than merely memorizing a fixed set of refusals. Using an unaligned agent (Grok-4) within a persona-driven pipeline, we synthesized high-fidelity threats across seven taxonomies, ranging from procurement manipulation and queue-jumping to obstetric violence. We discuss the ethical design of releasing these "vulnerability signatures" to correct the information asymmetry between malicious actors and AI developers. Ultimately, this work advocates for a shift from universal to context-aware safety, providing the necessary resources to immunize healthcare AI against the nuanced, systemic threats inherent to high-stakes medical environments -- vulnerabilities that represent the paramount risk to patient safety and the successful integration of AI in healthcare systems.

AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious content hijacks agent behavior to steal credentials or cause financial loss. The only known robust defense is architectural isolation that strictly separates trusted task planning from untrusted environment observations. However, applying this design to Computer Use Agents (CUAs) -- systems that automate tasks by viewing screens and executing actions -- presents a fundamental challenge: current agents require continuous observation of UI state to determine each action, conflicting with the isolation required for security. We resolve this tension by demonstrating that UI workflows, while dynamic, are structurally predictable. We introduce Single-Shot Planning for CUAs, where a trusted planner generates a complete execution graph with conditional branches before any observation of potentially malicious content, providing provable control flow integrity guarantees against arbitrary instruction injections. Although this architectural isolation successfully prevents instruction injections, we show that additional measures are needed to prevent Branch Steering attacks, which manipulate UI elements to trigger unintended valid paths within the plan. We evaluate our design on OSWorld, and retain up to 57% of the performance of frontier models while improving performance for smaller open-source models by up to 19%, demonstrating that rigorous security and utility can coexist in CUAs.

Prompt injection remains a major security risk for large language models. However, the efficacy of existing guardrail models in context-aware settings remains underexplored, as they often rely on static attack benchmarks. Additionally, they have over-defense tendencies. We introduce CAPTURE, a novel context-aware benchmark assessing both attack detection and over-defense tendencies with minimal in-domain examples. Our experiments reveal that current prompt injection guardrail models suffer from high false negatives in adversarial cases and excessive false positives in benign scenarios, highlighting critical limitations. To demonstrate our framework's utility, we train CaptureGuard on our generated data. This new model drastically reduces both false negative and false positive rates on our context-aware datasets while also generalizing effectively to external benchmarks, establishing a path toward more robust and practical prompt injection defenses.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents to navigate mobile graphical user interfaces (GUIs). Operating in dynamic on-device ecosystems, which include notifications, pop-ups, and inter-app interactions, exposes them to a unique and underexplored threat vector: environmental injection. Unlike prompt-based attacks that manipulate textual instructions, environmental injection corrupts an agent's visual perception by inserting adversarial UI elements (for example, deceptive overlays or spoofed notifications) directly into the GUI. This bypasses textual safeguards and can derail execution, causing privacy leakage, financial loss, or irreversible device compromise. To systematically evaluate this threat, we introduce GhostEI-Bench, the first benchmark for assessing mobile agents under environmental injection attacks within dynamic, executable environments. Moving beyond static image-based assessments, GhostEI-Bench injects adversarial events into realistic application workflows inside fully operational Android emulators and evaluates performance across critical risk scenarios. We further propose a judge-LLM protocol that conducts fine-grained failure analysis by reviewing the agent's action trajectory alongside the corresponding screenshot sequence, pinpointing failure in perception, recognition, or reasoning. Comprehensive experiments on state-of-the-art agents reveal pronounced vulnerability to deceptive environmental cues: current models systematically fail to perceive and reason about manipulated UIs. GhostEI-Bench provides a framework for quantifying and mitigating this emerging threat, paving the way toward more robust and secure embodied agents.

Linear probes are a promising approach for monitoring AI systems for deceptive behaviour. Previous work has shown that a linear classifier trained on a contrastive instruction pair and a simple dataset can achieve good performance. However, these probes exhibit notable failures even in straightforward scenarios, including spurious correlations and false positives on non-deceptive responses. In this paper, we identify the importance of the instruction pair used during training. Furthermore, we show that targeting specific deceptive behaviors through a human-interpretable taxonomy of deception leads to improved results on evaluation datasets. Our findings reveal that instruction pairs capture deceptive intent rather than content-specific patterns, explaining why prompt choice dominates probe performance (70.6% of variance). Given the heterogeneity of deception types across datasets, we conclude that organizations should design specialized probes targeting their specific threat models rather than seeking a universal deception detector.

Dependency graph, as a heterogeneous graph representing the intrinsic relationships between different pairs of system entities, is essential to many data analysis applications, such as root cause diagnosis, intrusion detection, etc. Given a well-trained dependency graph from a source domain and an immature dependency graph from a target domain, how can we extract the entity and dependency knowledge from the source to enhance the target? One way is to directly apply a mature dependency graph learned from a source domain to the target domain. But due to the domain variety problem, directly using the source dependency graph often can not achieve good performance. Traditional transfer learning methods mainly focus on numerical data and are not applicable. In this paper, we propose ACRET, a knowledge transfer based model for accelerating dependency graph learning from heterogeneous categorical event streams. In particular, we first propose an entity estimation model to filter out irrelevant entities from the source domain based on entity embedding and manifold learning. Only the entities with statistically high correlations are transferred to the target domain. On the surviving entities, we propose a dependency construction model for constructing the unbiased dependency relationships by solving a two-constraint optimization problem. The experimental results on synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of ACRET. We also apply ACRET to a real enterprise security system for intrusion detection. Our method is able to achieve superior detection performance at least 20 days lead lag time in advance with more than 70% accuracy.

Recently, web-based Large Language Model (LLM) agents autonomously perform increasingly complex tasks, thereby bringing significant convenience. However, they also amplify the risks of malicious misuse cases such as unauthorized collection of personally identifiable information (PII), generation of socially divisive content, and even automated web hacking. To address these threats, we propose an AI Kill Switch technique that can immediately halt the operation of malicious web-based LLM agents. To achieve this, we introduce AutoGuard - the key idea is generating defensive prompts that trigger the safety mechanisms of malicious LLM agents. In particular, generated defense prompts are transparently embedded into the website's DOM so that they remain invisible to human users but can be detected by the crawling process of malicious agents, triggering its internal safety mechanisms to abort malicious actions once read. To evaluate our approach, we constructed a dedicated benchmark consisting of three representative malicious scenarios (PII collection, social rift content generation, and web hacking attempts). Experimental results show that the AutoGuard method achieves over 80% Defense Success Rate (DSR) on malicious agents, including GPT-4o, Claude-3, and Llama3.3-70B-Instruct. It also maintains strong performance, achieving around 90% DSR on GPT-5, GPT-4.1, and Gemini-2.5-Flash when used as the malicious agent, demonstrating robust generalization across models and scenarios. Through this research, we have demonstrated the controllability of web-based LLM agents across various scenarios and models, thereby contributing to the broader effort of AI control and safety.

Most prior safety research of large language models (LLMs) has focused on enhancing the alignment of LLMs to better suit the safety requirements of humans. However, internalizing such safeguard features into larger models brought challenges of higher training cost and unintended degradation of helpfulness. To overcome such challenges, a modular approach employing a smaller LLM to detect harmful user queries is regarded as a convenient solution in designing LLM-based system with safety requirements. In this paper, we leverage a smaller LLM for both harmful query detection and safeguard response generation. We introduce our safety requirements and the taxonomy of harmfulness categories, and then propose a multi-task learning mechanism fusing the two tasks into a single model. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, providing on par or surpassing harmful query detection and safeguard response performance compared to the publicly available LLMs.

AI memory systems are evolving toward unified context layers that enable efficient cross-agent collaboration and multi-tool workflows, facilitating better accumulation of personal data and learning of user preferences. However, centralization creates a trust crisis where users must entrust cloud providers with sensitive digital memory data. We identify a core tension between personalization demands and data sovereignty: centralized memory systems enable efficient cross-agent collaboration but expose users' sensitive data to cloud provider risks, while private deployments provide security but limit collaboration. To resolve this tension, we aim to achieve local-equivalent security while enabling superior maintenance efficiency and collaborative capabilities. We propose a five-layer architecture abstracting common functional components of AI memory systems: Storage, Extraction, Learning, Retrieval, and Governance. By applying TEE protection to each layer, we establish a trustworthy framework. Based on this, we design MemTrust, a hardware-backed zero-trust architecture that provides cryptographic guarantees across all layers. Our contributions include the five-layer abstraction, "Context from MemTrust" protocol for cross-application sharing, side-channel hardened retrieval with obfuscated access patterns, and comprehensive security analysis. The architecture enables third-party developers to port existing systems with acceptable development costs, achieving system-wide trustworthiness. We believe that AI memory plays a crucial role in enhancing the efficiency and collaboration of agents and AI tools. AI memory will become the foundational infrastructure for AI agents, and MemTrust serves as a universal trusted framework for AI memory systems, with the goal of becoming the infrastructure of memory infrastructure.

Tool-augmented LLM agents raise new security risks: tool executions can introduce runtime-only behaviors, including prompt injection and unintended exposure of external inputs (e.g., environment secrets or local files). While existing scanners often focus on static artifacts, analyzing runtime behavior is challenging because directly executing untrusted tools can itself be dangerous. We present MCP-SandboxScan, a lightweight framework motivated by the Model Context Protocol (MCP) that safely executes untrusted tools inside a WebAssembly/WASI sandbox and produces auditable reports of external-to-sink exposures. Our prototype (i) extracts LLM-relevant sinks from runtime outputs (prompt/messages and structured tool-return fields), (ii) instantiates external-input candidates from environment values, mounted file contents, and output-surfaced HTTP fetch intents, and (iii) links sources to sinks via snippet-based substring matching. Case studies on three representative tools show that MCP-SandboxScan can surface provenance evidence when external inputs appear in prompt/messages or tool-return payloads, and can expose filesystem capability violations as runtime evidence. We further compare against a lightweight static string-signature baseline and use a micro-benchmark to characterize false negatives under transformations and false positives from short-token collisions.

Lightweight machine learning models are increasingly proposed for intrusion detection in Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) networks due to their suitability for resource-constrained edge deployment. Most reported results evaluate these models only within their training network, leaving behavior on unseen networks unverified. This study trains four lightweight architectures on one IIoT dataset and evaluates them, without retraining, on two structurally distinct IIoT datasets using a feature representation restricted to attributes available across all three sources. Explainability analysis across two top-performing models shows both rely overwhelmingly on coarse port-category features; the most influential category occurs in source-domain attack traffic at 96 to 435 times the rate in the two target domains, indicating that coarsening port resolution relocates rather than removes a documented shortcut. Evaluation under naturally imbalanced class distributions reveals a further effect: the evaluation protocol used can reverse which target network appears to pose the greater generalization challenge. Adversarial robustness and recovery through limited target-domain exposure are also assessed; robustness to adversarial perturbation is unrelated to cross-network generalization, and recovery through adaptation varies considerably by architecture. These findings suggest deployment readiness should be assessed using cross-network evaluation under realistic class distributions, rather than within-domain accuracy alone.

As the IT industry advances, system log data becomes increasingly crucial. Many computer systems rely on log texts for management due to restricted access to source code. The need for log anomaly detection is growing, especially in real-world applications, but identifying anomalies in rapidly accumulating logs remains a challenging task. Traditional deep learning-based anomaly detection models require dataset-specific training, leading to corresponding delays. Notably, most methods only focus on sequence-level log information, which makes the detection of subtle anomalies harder, and often involve inference processes that are difficult to utilize in real-time. We introduce RAPID, a model that capitalizes on the inherent features of log data to enable anomaly detection without training delays, ensuring real-time capability. RAPID treats logs as natural language, extracting representations using pre-trained language models. Given that logs can be categorized based on system context, we implement a retrieval-based technique to contrast test logs with the most similar normal logs. This strategy not only obviates the need for log-specific training but also adeptly incorporates token-level information, ensuring refined and robust detection, particularly for unseen logs. We also propose the core set technique, which can reduce the computational cost needed for comparison. Experimental results show that even without training on log data, RAPID demonstrates competitive performance compared to prior models and achieves the best performance on certain datasets. Through various research questions, we verified its capability for real-time detection without delay.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) represents a significant advancement in AI-tool integration, enabling seamless communication between AI agents and external services. However, this connectivity introduces novel attack vectors that remain largely unexplored. This paper demonstrates how unsophisticated threat actors, requiring only basic programming skills and free web tools, can exploit MCP's trust model to exfiltrate sensitive financial data. We present a proof-of-concept attack where a malicious weather MCP server, disguised as benign functionality, discovers and exploits legitimate banking tools to steal user account balances. The attack chain requires no advanced technical knowledge, server infrastructure, or monetary investment. The findings reveal a critical security gap in the emerging MCP ecosystem: while individual servers may appear trustworthy, their combination creates unexpected cross-server attack surfaces. Unlike traditional cybersecurity threats that assume sophisticated adversaries, our research shows that the barrier to entry for MCP-based attacks is alarmingly low. A threat actor with undergraduate-level Python knowledge can craft convincing social engineering attacks that exploit the implicit trust relationships MCP establishes between AI agents and tool providers. This work contributes to the nascent field of MCP security by demonstrating that current MCP implementations allow trivial cross-server attacks and proposing both immediate mitigations and protocol improvements to secure this emerging ecosystem.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP), introduced by Anthropic, provides a standardized framework for artificial intelligence (AI) systems to interact with external data sources and tools in real-time. While MCP offers significant advantages for AI integration and capability extension, it introduces novel security challenges that demand rigorous analysis and mitigation. This paper builds upon foundational research into MCP architecture and preliminary security assessments to deliver enterprise-grade mitigation frameworks and detailed technical implementation strategies. Through systematic threat modeling and analysis of MCP implementations and analysis of potential attack vectors, including sophisticated threats like tool poisoning, we present actionable security patterns tailored for MCP implementers and adopters. The primary contribution of this research lies in translating theoretical security concerns into a practical, implementable framework with actionable controls, thereby providing essential guidance for the secure enterprise adoption and governance of integrated AI systems.

Cyber-physical-social systems (CPSSs) have emerged in many applications over recent decades, requiring increased attention to security concerns. The rise of sophisticated threats like Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) makes ensuring security in CPSSs particularly challenging. Provenance graph analysis has proven effective for tracing and detecting anomalies within systems, but the sheer size and complexity of these graphs hinder the efficiency of existing methods, especially those relying on graph neural networks (GNNs). To address these challenges, we present GraphDART, a modular framework designed to distill provenance graphs into compact yet informative representations, enabling scalable and effective anomaly detection. GraphDART can take advantage of diverse graph distillation techniques, including classic and modern graph distillation methods, to condense large provenance graphs while preserving essential structural and contextual information. This approach significantly reduces computational overhead, allowing GNNs to learn from distilled graphs efficiently and enhance detection performance. Extensive evaluations on benchmark datasets demonstrate the robustness of GraphDART in detecting malicious activities across cyber-physical-social systems. By optimizing computational efficiency, GraphDART provides a scalable and practical solution to safeguard interconnected environments against APTs.

Despite the emergence of diffusion large language models (D-LLMs) as an alternative to autoregressive large language models (AR-LLMs), safety monitoring for D-LLMs remains largely unexplored. Unlike AR-LLMs, D-LLMs generate text through a multi-step denoising process, exposing intermediate hidden representations that may contain safety-relevant information unavailable in standard single-step monitoring setups. Motivated by the suitability of lightweight probes for always-on monitoring, we analyze which trajectory-level signals best indicate when such probes are likely to struggle. We find that the most informative signal is safety hesitation: intermediate hidden states repeatedly falling within a small margin of the probe's decision boundary. The number of such hesitation steps in D-LLM's trajectory predicts probe failure effectively, providing a proxy of sample difficulty. Building on this analysis, we propose D^2-Monitor, a bi-level safety monitor for D-LLMs. D^2-Monitor adopts a lightweight probe as an always-on monitor to jointly estimate hesitation and perform base classification. When the hesitation level exceeds a threshold, a more expressive but computationally heavier probe is activated. This dynamic routing mechanism allocates monitoring resources efficiently at test time. Evaluated on 3 datasets (WildguardMix, ToxicChat, OpenAI-Moderation) across 4 D-LLMs, D^2-Monitor achieves state-of-the-art performance with a compact parameter footprint (leq 0.85M parameters), and exhibits the best trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency relative to 8 baselines.

The rapid expansion of sixth-generation (6G) wireless networks and the Internet of Things (IoT) has catalyzed the evolution from centralized cloud intelligence towards decentralized edge general intelligence. However, traditional edge intelligence methods, characterized by static models and limited cognitive autonomy, fail to address the dynamic, heterogeneous, and resource-constrained scenarios inherent to emerging edge networks. Agentic artificial intelligence (Agentic AI) emerges as a transformative solution, enabling edge systems to autonomously perceive multimodal environments, reason contextually, and adapt proactively through continuous perception-reasoning-action loops. In this context, the agentification of edge intelligence serves as a key paradigm shift, where distributed entities evolve into autonomous agents capable of collaboration and continual adaptation. This paper presents a comprehensive survey dedicated to Agentic AI and agentification frameworks tailored explicitly for edge general intelligence. First, we systematically introduce foundational concepts and clarify distinctions from traditional edge intelligence paradigms. Second, we analyze important enabling technologies, including compact model compression, energy-aware computing strategies, robust connectivity frameworks, and advanced knowledge representation and reasoning mechanisms. Third, we provide representative case studies demonstrating Agentic AI's capabilities in low-altitude economy networks, intent-driven networking, vehicular networks, and human-centric service provisioning, supported by numerical evaluations. Furthermore, we identify current research challenges, review emerging open-source platforms, and highlight promising future research directions to guide robust, scalable, and trustworthy Agentic AI deployments for next-generation edge environments.

Radio Frequency Fingerprinting Identification (RFFI) is a lightweight physical layer identity authentication technique. It identifies the radio-frequency device by analyzing the signal feature differences caused by the inevitable minor hardware impairments. However, existing RFFI methods based on closed-set recognition struggle to detect unknown unauthorized devices in open environments. Moreover, the feature interference among legitimate devices can further compromise identification accuracy. In this paper, we propose a joint radio frequency fingerprint prediction and siamese comparison (JRFFP-SC) framework for open set recognition. Specifically, we first employ a radio frequency fingerprint prediction network to predict the most probable category result. Then a detailed comparison among the test sample's features with registered samples is performed in a siamese network. The proposed JRFFP-SC framework eliminates inter-class interference and effectively addresses the challenges associated with open set identification. The simulation results show that our proposed JRFFP-SC framework can achieve excellent rogue device detection and generalization capability for classifying devices.

Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are more vulnerable to network attacks due to the high connectivity and diverse communication modes between vehicles and external networks. Deep learning-based Intrusion detection, an effective method for detecting network attacks, can provide functional safety as well as a real-time communication guarantee for vehicles, thereby being widely used for AVs. Existing works well for cyber-attacks such as simple-mode but become a higher false alarm with a resource-limited environment required when the attack is concealed within a contextual feature. In this paper, we present a novel automotive intrusion detection model with lightweight attribution and semantic fusion, named LSF-IDM. Our motivation is based on the observation that, when injected the malicious packets to the in-vehicle networks (IVNs), the packet log presents a strict order of context feature because of the periodicity and broadcast nature of the CAN bus. Therefore, this model first captures the context as the semantic feature of messages by the BERT language framework. Thereafter, the lightweight model (e.g., BiLSTM) learns the fused feature from an input packet's classification and its output distribution in BERT based on knowledge distillation. Experiment results demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in defending against several representative attacks from IVNs. We also perform the difference analysis of the proposed method with lightweight models and Bert to attain a deeper understanding of how the model balance detection performance and model complexity.

Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is being used to search for indicators of attacks that might have compromised an enterprise network for a long time without being discovered. To have a more effective analysis, CTI open standards have incorporated descriptive relationships showing how the indicators or observables are related to each other. However, these relationships are either completely overlooked in information gathering or not used for threat hunting. In this paper, we propose a system, called POIROT, which uses these correlations to uncover the steps of a successful attack campaign. We use kernel audits as a reliable source that covers all causal relations and information flows among system entities and model threat hunting as an inexact graph pattern matching problem. Our technical approach is based on a novel similarity metric which assesses an alignment between a query graph constructed out of CTI correlations and a provenance graph constructed out of kernel audit log records. We evaluate POIROT on publicly released real-world incident reports as well as reports of an adversarial engagement designed by DARPA, including ten distinct attack campaigns against different OS platforms such as Linux, FreeBSD, and Windows. Our evaluation results show that POIROT is capable of searching inside graphs containing millions of nodes and pinpoint the attacks in a few minutes, and the results serve to illustrate that CTI correlations could be used as robust and reliable artifacts for threat hunting.

The security of Large Language Model (LLM) applications is fundamentally challenged by "form-first" attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking, where malicious instructions are embedded within user inputs. Conventional defenses, which rely on post hoc output filtering, are often brittle and fail to address the root cause: the model's inability to distinguish trusted instructions from untrusted data. This paper proposes Countermind, a multi-layered security architecture intended to shift defenses from a reactive, post hoc posture to a proactive, pre-inference, and intra-inference enforcement model. The architecture proposes a fortified perimeter designed to structurally validate and transform all inputs, and an internal governance mechanism intended to constrain the model's semantic processing pathways before an output is generated. The primary contributions of this work are conceptual designs for: (1) A Semantic Boundary Logic (SBL) with a mandatory, time-coupled Text Crypter intended to reduce the plaintext prompt injection attack surface, provided all ingestion paths are enforced. (2) A Parameter-Space Restriction (PSR) mechanism, leveraging principles from representation engineering, to dynamically control the LLM's access to internal semantic clusters, with the goal of mitigating semantic drift and dangerous emergent behaviors. (3) A Secure, Self-Regulating Core that uses an OODA loop and a learning security module to adapt its defenses based on an immutable audit log. (4) A Multimodal Input Sandbox and Context-Defense mechanisms to address threats from non-textual data and long-term semantic poisoning. This paper outlines an evaluation plan designed to quantify the proposed architecture's effectiveness in reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) for form-first attacks and to measure its potential latency overhead.

Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers enable AI applications to connect to external systems in a plug-and-play manner, but their rapid proliferation also introduces severe security risks. Unlike mature software ecosystems with rigorous vetting, MCP servers still lack standardized review mechanisms, giving adversaries opportunities to distribute malicious implementations. Despite this pressing risk, the security implications of MCP servers remain underexplored. To address this gap, we present the first systematic study that treats MCP servers as active threat actors and decomposes them into core components to examine how adversarial developers can implant malicious intent. Specifically, we investigate three research questions: (i) what types of attacks malicious MCP servers can launch, (ii) how vulnerable MCP hosts and Large Language Models (LLMs) are to these attacks, and (iii) how feasible it is to carry out MCP server attacks in practice. Our study proposes a component-based taxonomy comprising twelve attack categories. For each category, we develop Proof-of-Concept (PoC) servers and demonstrate their effectiveness across diverse real-world host-LLM settings. We further show that attackers can generate large numbers of malicious servers at virtually no cost. We then test state-of-the-art scanners on the generated servers and found that existing detection approaches are insufficient. These findings highlight that malicious MCP servers are easy to implement, difficult to detect with current tools, and capable of causing concrete damage to AI agent systems. Addressing this threat requires coordinated efforts among protocol designers, host developers, LLM providers, and end users to build a more secure and resilient MCP ecosystem.

As the era of autonomous agents making decisions on behalf of users unfolds, ensuring contextual integrity (CI) -- what is the appropriate information to share while carrying out a certain task -- becomes a central question to the field. We posit that CI demands a form of reasoning where the agent needs to reason about the context in which it is operating. To test this, we first prompt LLMs to reason explicitly about CI when deciding what information to disclose. We then extend this approach by developing a reinforcement learning (RL) framework that further instills in models the reasoning necessary to achieve CI. Using a synthetic, automatically created, dataset of only sim700 examples but with diverse contexts and information disclosure norms, we show that our method substantially reduces inappropriate information disclosure while maintaining task performance across multiple model sizes and families. Importantly, improvements transfer from this synthetic dataset to established CI benchmarks such as PrivacyLens that has human annotations and evaluates privacy leakage of AI assistants in actions and tool calls.

Agents based on large language models leverage tools to modify environments, revolutionizing how AI interacts with the physical world. Unlike traditional NLP tasks that rely solely on historical dialogue for responses, these agents must consider more complex factors, such as inter-tool relationships, environmental feedback and previous decisions, when making choices. Current research typically evaluates agents via multi-turn dialogues. However, it overlooks the influence of these critical factors on agent behavior. To bridge this gap, we present an open-source and high-quality benchmark C^3-Bench. This benchmark integrates attack concepts and applies univariate analysis to pinpoint key elements affecting agent robustness. In concrete, we design three challenges: navigate complex tool relationships, handle critical hidden information and manage dynamic decision paths. Complementing these challenges, we introduce fine-grained metrics, innovative data collection algorithms and reproducible evaluation methods. Extensive experiments are conducted on 49 mainstream agents, encompassing general fast-thinking, slow-thinking and domain-specific models. We observe that agents have significant shortcomings in handling tool dependencies, long context information dependencies and frequent policy-type switching. In essence, C^3-Bench aims to expose model vulnerabilities through these challenges and drive research into the interpretability of agent performance. The benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/TencentHunyuan/C3-Benchmark.

The machine learning community is increasingly recognizing the importance of fostering trust and safety in modern generative AI (GenAI) models. We posit machine unlearning (MU) as a crucial foundation for developing safe, secure, and trustworthy GenAI models. Traditional MU methods often rely on stringent assumptions and require access to real data. This paper introduces Score Forgetting Distillation (SFD), an innovative MU approach that promotes the forgetting of undesirable information in diffusion models by aligning the conditional scores of "unsafe" classes or concepts with those of "safe" ones. To eliminate the need for real data, our SFD framework incorporates a score-based MU loss into the score distillation objective of a pretrained diffusion model. This serves as a regularization term that preserves desired generation capabilities while enabling the production of synthetic data through a one-step generator. Our experiments on pretrained label-conditional and text-to-image diffusion models demonstrate that our method effectively accelerates the forgetting of target classes or concepts during generation, while preserving the quality of other classes or concepts. This unlearned and distilled diffusion not only pioneers a novel concept in MU but also accelerates the generation speed of diffusion models. Our experiments and studies on a range of diffusion models and datasets confirm that our approach is generalizable, effective, and advantageous for MU in diffusion models. (Warning: This paper contains sexually explicit imagery, discussions of pornography, racially-charged terminology, and other content that some readers may find disturbing, distressing, and/or offensive.)

Recent research has explored that LLM agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious tasks embedded in tool-retrieved information can redirect the agent to take unauthorized actions. Existing defenses against IPI have significant limitations: either require essential model training resources, lack effectiveness against sophisticated attacks, or harm the normal utilities. We present MELON (Masked re-Execution and TooL comparisON), a novel IPI defense. Our approach builds on the observation that under a successful attack, the agent's next action becomes less dependent on user tasks and more on malicious tasks. Following this, we design MELON to detect attacks by re-executing the agent's trajectory with a masked user prompt modified through a masking function. We identify an attack if the actions generated in the original and masked executions are similar. We also include three key designs to reduce the potential false positives and false negatives. Extensive evaluation on the IPI benchmark AgentDojo demonstrates that MELON outperforms SOTA defenses in both attack prevention and utility preservation. Moreover, we show that combining MELON with a SOTA prompt augmentation defense (denoted as MELON-Aug) further improves its performance. We also conduct a detailed ablation study to validate our key designs. Code is available at https://github.com/kaijiezhu11/MELON.

Although large language model (LLM)-based agents, exemplified by OpenClaw, are increasingly evolving from task-oriented systems into personalized AI assistants for solving complex real-world tasks, their practical deployment also introduces severe security risks. However, existing agent security research and evaluation frameworks primarily focus on synthetic or task-centric settings, and thus fail to accurately capture the attack surface and risk propagation mechanisms of personalized agents in real-world deployments. To address this gap, we propose Personalized Agent Security Bench (PASB), an end-to-end security evaluation framework tailored for real-world personalized agents. Building upon existing agent attack paradigms, PASB incorporates personalized usage scenarios, realistic toolchains, and long-horizon interactions, enabling black-box, end-to-end security evaluation on real systems. Using OpenClaw as a representative case study, we systematically evaluate its security across multiple personalized scenarios, tool capabilities, and attack types. Our results indicate that OpenClaw exhibits critical vulnerabilities at different execution stages, including user prompt processing, tool usage, and memory retrieval, highlighting substantial security risks in personalized agent deployments. The code for the proposed PASB framework is available at https://github.com/AstorYH/PASB.

Despite the growing capabilities of autonomous agents powered by large language models (LLMs), their adoption in high-stakes domains remains limited. A key barrier is security: the inherently nondeterministic behavior of LLM agents defies static auditing approaches that have historically underpinned software assurance. Existing security methods, such as proxy-level input filtering and model glassboxing, fail to provide sufficient transparency or traceability into agent reasoning, state changes, or environmental interactions. In this work, we introduce AgentTrace, a dynamic observability and telemetry framework designed to fill this gap. AgentTrace instruments agents at runtime with minimal overhead, capturing a rich stream of structured logs across three surfaces: operational, cognitive, and contextual. Unlike traditional logging systems, AgentTrace emphasizes continuous, introspectable trace capture, designed not just for debugging or benchmarking, but as a foundational layer for agent security, accountability, and real-time monitoring. Our research highlights how AgentTrace can enable more reliable agent deployment, fine-grained risk analysis, and informed trust calibration, thereby addressing critical concerns that have so far limited the use of LLM agents in sensitive environments.

We present Vehicle Energy Dataset (VED), a novel large-scale dataset of fuel and energy data collected from 383 personal cars in Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA. This open dataset captures GPS trajectories of vehicles along with their time-series data of fuel, energy, speed, and auxiliary power usage. A diverse fleet consisting of 264 gasoline vehicles, 92 HEVs, and 27 PHEV/EVs drove in real-world from Nov, 2017 to Nov, 2018, where the data were collected through onboard OBD-II loggers. Driving scenarios range from highways to traffic-dense downtown area in various driving conditions and seasons. In total, VED accumulates approximately 374,000 miles. We discuss participant privacy protection and develop a method to de-identify personally identifiable information while preserving the quality of the data. After the de-identification, we conducted case studies on the dataset to investigate the impacts of factors known to affect fuel economy and identify energy-saving opportunities that hybrid-electric vehicles and eco-driving techniques can provide. The case studies are supplemented with a number of examples to demonstrate how VED can be utilized for vehicle energy and behavior studies. Potential research opportunities include data-driven vehicle energy consumption modeling, driver behavior modeling, machine and deep learning, calibration of traffic simulators, optimal route choice modeling, prediction of human driver behaviors, and decision making of self-driving cars. We believe that VED can be an instrumental asset to the development of future automotive technologies. The dataset can be accessed at https://github.com/gsoh/VED.

To reduce development overhead and enable seamless integration between potential components comprising any given generative AI application, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) (Anthropic, 2024) has recently been released and subsequently widely adopted. The MCP is an open protocol that standardizes API calls to large language models (LLMs), data sources, and agentic tools. By connecting multiple MCP servers, each defined with a set of tools, resources, and prompts, users are able to define automated workflows fully driven by LLMs. However, we show that the current MCP design carries a wide range of security risks for end users. In particular, we demonstrate that industry-leading LLMs may be coerced into using MCP tools to compromise an AI developer's system through various attacks, such as malicious code execution, remote access control, and credential theft. To proactively mitigate these and related attacks, we introduce a safety auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, the first agentic tool to assess the security of an arbitrary MCP server. MCPScanner uses several agents to (a) automatically determine adversarial samples given an MCP server's tools and resources; (b) search for related vulnerabilities and remediations based on those samples; and (c) generate a security report detailing all findings. Our work highlights serious security issues with general-purpose agentic workflows while also providing a proactive tool to audit MCP server safety and address detected vulnerabilities before deployment. The described MCP server auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, is freely available at: https://github.com/johnhalloran321/mcpSafetyScanner

The integration of AI agents with Web3 ecosystems harnesses their complementary potential for autonomy and openness yet also introduces underexplored security risks, as these agents dynamically interact with financial protocols and immutable smart contracts. This paper investigates the vulnerabilities of AI agents within blockchain-based financial ecosystems when exposed to adversarial threats in real-world scenarios. We introduce the concept of context manipulation, a comprehensive attack vector that exploits unprotected context surfaces, including input channels, memory modules, and external data feeds. Through empirical analysis of ElizaOS, a decentralized AI agent framework for automated Web3 operations, we demonstrate how adversaries can manipulate context by injecting malicious instructions into prompts or historical interaction records, leading to unintended asset transfers and protocol violations which could be financially devastating. To quantify these vulnerabilities, we design CrAIBench, a Web3 domain-specific benchmark that evaluates the robustness of AI agents against context manipulation attacks across 150+ realistic blockchain tasks, including token transfers, trading, bridges and cross-chain interactions and 500+ attack test cases using context manipulation. We systematically assess attack and defense strategies, analyzing factors like the influence of security prompts, reasoning models, and the effectiveness of alignment techniques. Our findings show that prompt-based defenses are insufficient when adversaries corrupt stored context, achieving significant attack success rates despite these defenses. Fine-tuning-based defenses offer a more robust alternative, substantially reducing attack success rates while preserving utility on single-step tasks. This research highlights the urgent need to develop AI agents that are both secure and fiduciarily responsible.

Root cause analysis (RCA) is essential for diagnosing failures within complex software systems to ensure system reliability. The highly distributed and interdependent nature of modern cloud-based systems often complicates RCA efforts, particularly for multi-hop fault propagation, where symptoms appear far from their true causes. Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) present new opportunities to enhance automated RCA. However, their practical value for RCA depends on the fidelity of reasoning and decision-making. Existing work relies on historical incident corpora, operates directly on high-volume telemetry beyond current LLM capacity, or embeds reasoning inside complex multi-agent pipelines -- conditions that obscure whether failures arise from reasoning itself or from peripheral design choices. We present a focused empirical evaluation that isolates an LLM's reasoning behavior. We design a controlled experimental framework that foregrounds the LLM by using a simplified experimental setting. We evaluate six LLMs under two agentic workflows (ReAct and Plan-and-Execute) and a non-agentic baseline on two real-world case studies (GAIA and OpenRCA). In total, we executed 48,000 simulated failure scenarios, totaling 228 days of execution time. We measure both root-cause accuracy and the quality of intermediate reasoning traces. We produce a labeled taxonomy of 16 common RCA reasoning failures and use an LLM-as-a-Judge for annotation. Our results clarify where current open-source LLMs succeed and fail in multi-hop RCA, quantify sensitivity to input data modalities, and identify reasoning failures that predict final correctness. Together, these contributions provide transparent and reproducible empirical results and a failure taxonomy to guide future work on reasoning-driven system diagnosis.

We systematically evaluate the quality of widely used AI safety datasets from two perspectives: in isolation and in practice. In isolation, we examine how well these datasets reflect real-world adversarial attacks based on three key properties: being driven by ulterior intent, well-crafted, and out-of-distribution. We find that these datasets overrely on "triggering cues": words or phrases with overt negative/sensitive connotations that are intended to trigger safety mechanisms explicitly, which is unrealistic compared to real-world attacks. In practice, we evaluate whether these datasets genuinely measure safety risks or merely provoke refusals through triggering cues. To explore this, we introduce "intent laundering": a procedure that abstracts away triggering cues from adversarial attacks (data points) while strictly preserving their malicious intent and all relevant details. Our results indicate that current AI safety datasets fail to faithfully represent real-world adversarial behavior due to their overreliance on triggering cues. Once these cues are removed, all previously evaluated "reasonably safe" models become unsafe, including Gemini 3 Pro and Claude Sonnet 3.7. Moreover, when intent laundering is adapted as a jailbreaking technique, it consistently achieves high attack success rates, ranging from 90% to over 98%, under fully black-box access. Overall, our findings expose a significant disconnect between how model safety is evaluated by existing datasets and how real-world adversaries behave.

This work addresses the computational challenge of enforcing privacy for agentic Large Language Models (LLMs), where privacy is governed by the contextual integrity framework. Indeed, existing defenses rely on LLM-mediated checking stages that add substantial latency and cost, and that can be undermined in multi-turn interactions through manipulation or benign-looking conversational scaffolding. Contrasting this background, this paper makes a key observation: internal representations associated with privacy-violating intent can be separated from benign requests using linear structure. Using this insight, the paper proposes NeuroFilter, a guardrail framework that operationalizes contextual integrity by mapping norm violations to simple directions in the model's activation space, enabling detection even when semantic filters are bypassed. The proposed filter is also extended to capture threats arising during long conversations using the concept of activation velocity, which measures cumulative drift in internal representations across turns. A comprehensive evaluation across over 150,000 interactions and covering models from 7B to 70B parameters, illustrates the strong performance of NeuroFilter in detecting privacy attacks while maintaining zero false positives on benign prompts, all while reducing the computational inference cost by several orders of magnitude when compared to LLM-based agentic privacy defenses.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) defines a schema bound execution model for agent-tool interaction, enabling modular computer vision workflows without retraining. To our knowledge, this is the first protocol level, deployment scale audit of MCP in vision systems, identifying systemic weaknesses in schema semantics, interoperability, and runtime coordination. We analyze 91 publicly registered vision centric MCP servers, annotated along nine dimensions of compositional fidelity, and develop an executable benchmark with validators to detect and categorize protocol violations. The audit reveals high prevalence of schema format divergence, missing runtime schema validation, undeclared coordinate conventions, and reliance on untracked bridging scripts. Validator based testing quantifies these failures, with schema format checks flagging misalignments in 78.0 percent of systems, coordinate convention checks detecting spatial reference errors in 24.6 percent, and memory scope checks issuing an average of 33.8 warnings per 100 executions. Security probes show that dynamic and multi agent workflows exhibit elevated risks of privilege escalation and untyped tool connections. The proposed benchmark and validator suite, implemented in a controlled testbed and to be released on GitHub, establishes a reproducible framework for measuring and improving the reliability and security of compositional vision workflows.

As the Internet rapidly expands, the increasing complexity and diversity of network activities pose significant challenges to effective network governance and security regulation. Network traffic, which serves as a crucial data carrier of network activities, has become indispensable in this process. Network traffic detection aims to monitor, analyze, and evaluate the data flows transmitted across the network to ensure network security and optimize performance. However, existing network traffic detection methods generally suffer from several limitations: 1) a narrow focus on characterizing traffic features from a single perspective; 2) insufficient exploration of discriminative features for different traffic; 3) poor generalization to different traffic scenarios. To address these issues, we propose a multi-view correlation-aware framework named FlowID for network traffic detection. FlowID captures multi-view traffic features via temporal and interaction awareness, while a hypergraph encoder further explores higher-order relationships between flows. To overcome the challenges of data imbalance and label scarcity, we design a dual-contrastive proxy task, enhancing the framework's ability to differentiate between various traffic flows through traffic-to-traffic and group-to-group contrast. Extensive experiments on five real-world datasets demonstrate that FlowID significantly outperforms existing methods in accuracy, robustness, and generalization across diverse network scenarios, particularly in detecting malicious traffic.