Daily Papers

3D visual grounding aims to locate the referred target object in 3D point cloud scenes according to a free-form language description. Previous methods mostly follow a two-stage paradigm, i.e., language-irrelevant detection and cross-modal matching, which is limited by the isolated architecture. In such a paradigm, the detector needs to sample keypoints from raw point clouds due to the inherent properties of 3D point clouds (irregular and large-scale), to generate the corresponding object proposal for each keypoint. However, sparse proposals may leave out the target in detection, while dense proposals may confuse the matching model. Moreover, the language-irrelevant detection stage can only sample a small proportion of keypoints on the target, deteriorating the target prediction. In this paper, we propose a 3D Single-Stage Referred Point Progressive Selection (3D-SPS) method, which progressively selects keypoints with the guidance of language and directly locates the target. Specifically, we propose a Description-aware Keypoint Sampling (DKS) module to coarsely focus on the points of language-relevant objects, which are significant clues for grounding. Besides, we devise a Target-oriented Progressive Mining (TPM) module to finely concentrate on the points of the target, which is enabled by progressive intra-modal relation modeling and inter-modal target mining. 3D-SPS bridges the gap between detection and matching in the 3D visual grounding task, localizing the target at a single stage. Experiments demonstrate that 3D-SPS achieves state-of-the-art performance on both ScanRefer and Nr3D/Sr3D datasets.

Aligned large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adversarial manipulation, and their reliance on web-scale pretraining creates a subtle but consequential attack surface. We study Stealth Pretraining Seeding (SPS), a threat model in which adversaries distribute small amounts of poisoned content across stealth websites, increasing the likelihood that such material is absorbed into future training corpora derived from sources such as Common Crawl. Because each individual payload is tiny, diffuse, and superficially benign, the attack is difficult to detect during dataset construction or filtering. The result is a latent form of poisoning that remains largely invisible under standard evaluation, yet can later be activated by a precise trigger such as <00TRIGGER00>. We call this attack PermaFrost, reflecting its latent and reactivatable nature. We study it through PermaFrost-Attack, a controlled framework for latent conceptual poisoning, together with three geometric diagnostics: Thermodynamic Length, Spectral Curvature, and the Infection Traceback Graph. Across multiple model families and scales, we show that this controlled SPS proxy can induce persistent unsafe behavior that often remains hidden under standard evaluation. Our results identify SPS as a practical and underappreciated threat to future foundation models. This paper introduces a novel geometric diagnostic lens for systematically examining latent model behavior, providing a principled foundation for detecting, characterizing, and understanding vulnerabilities that may remain invisible under standard evaluation.