Daily Papers

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) is a promising approach for improving code generation in large language models, but its effectiveness is limited by weak and static verification signals in existing coding RL datasets. In this paper, we propose a solution-conditioned and adversarial verification framework that iteratively refines test cases based on the execution behaviors of candidate solutions, with the goal of increasing difficulty, improving discriminative power, and reducing redundancy. Based on this framework, we introduce EvolveCoder-22k, a large-scale coding reinforcement learning dataset constructed through multiple rounds of adversarial test case evolution. Empirical analysis shows that iterative refinement substantially strengthens verification, with pass@1 decreasing from 43.80 to 31.22. Reinforcement learning on EvolveCoder-22k yields stable optimization and consistent performance gains, improving Qwen3-4B by an average of 4.2 points across four downstream benchmarks and outperforming strong 4B-scale baselines. Our results highlight the importance of adversarial, solution-conditioned verification for effective and scalable reinforcement learning in code generation.

Large language model (LLM) agents have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in tool use, reasoning, and code generation, yet single-agent systems exhibit fundamental limitations when confronted with complex research tasks demanding multi-source synthesis, adversarial verification, and personalized delivery. We present DOVA (Deep Orchestrated Versatile Agent), a multi-agent platform introducing three key innovations: (1) deliberation-first orchestration, where explicit meta-reasoning precedes tool invocation, informed by a persistent user model and entity-aware conversation context; (2) hybrid collaborative reasoning, a composable three-phase pipeline unifying ensemble diversity, blackboard transparency, and iterative refinement; and (3) adaptive multi-tiered thinking, a six-level token-budget allocation scheme that reduces inference cost by 40-60% on simple tasks while preserving deep reasoning capacity. We formalize the core algorithms, present an architectural ablation study across seven system configurations, and analyze the contribution of each component to answer confidence, source coverage, and token efficiency.

Typical fact verification models use retrieved written evidence to verify claims. Evidence sources, however, often change over time as more information is gathered and revised. In order to adapt, models must be sensitive to subtle differences in supporting evidence. We present VitaminC, a benchmark infused with challenging cases that require fact verification models to discern and adjust to slight factual changes. We collect over 100,000 Wikipedia revisions that modify an underlying fact, and leverage these revisions, together with additional synthetically constructed ones, to create a total of over 400,000 claim-evidence pairs. Unlike previous resources, the examples in VitaminC are contrastive, i.e., they contain evidence pairs that are nearly identical in language and content, with the exception that one supports a given claim while the other does not. We show that training using this design increases robustness -- improving accuracy by 10% on adversarial fact verification and 6% on adversarial natural language inference (NLI). Moreover, the structure of VitaminC leads us to define additional tasks for fact-checking resources: tagging relevant words in the evidence for verifying the claim, identifying factual revisions, and providing automatic edits via factually consistent text generation.

Human verification under adversarial information flow operates as a cost-bounded decision procedure constrained by working memory limits and cognitive biases. We introduce the Verification Cost Asymmetry (VCA) coefficient, formalizing it as the ratio of expected verification work between populations under identical claim distributions. Drawing on probabilistically checkable proofs (PCP) and parameterized complexity theory, we construct dissemination protocols that reduce verification for trusted audiences to constant human effort while imposing superlinear costs on adversarial populations lacking cryptographic infrastructure. We prove theoretical guarantees for this asymmetry, validate the framework through controlled user studies measuring verification effort with and without spot-checkable provenance, and demonstrate practical encoding of real-world information campaigns. The results establish complexity-theoretic foundations for engineering democratic advantage in cognitive warfare, with immediate applications to content authentication, platform governance, and information operations doctrine.

In this position paper, we address the persistent gap between rapidly growing AI capabilities and lagging safety progress. Existing paradigms divide into ``Make AI Safe'', which applies post-hoc alignment and guardrails but remains brittle and reactive, and ``Make Safe AI'', which emphasizes intrinsic safety but struggles to address unforeseen risks in open-ended environments. We therefore propose safe-by-coevolution as a new formulation of the ``Make Safe AI'' paradigm, inspired by biological immunity, in which safety becomes a dynamic, adversarial, and ongoing learning process. To operationalize this vision, we introduce R^2AI -- Resistant and Resilient AI -- as a practical framework that unites resistance against known threats with resilience to unforeseen risks. R^2AI integrates fast and slow safe models, adversarial simulation and verification through a safety wind tunnel, and continual feedback loops that guide safety and capability to coevolve. We argue that this framework offers a scalable and proactive path to maintain continual safety in dynamic environments, addressing both near-term vulnerabilities and long-term existential risks as AI advances toward AGI and ASI.

Generative sequence models are typically trained on sample sequences from natural or formal languages. It is a crucial question whether -- or to what extent -- sample-based training is able to capture the true structure of these languages, often referred to as the ``world model''. Theoretical results indicate that we can hope for soundness at best, that is, generating valid sequences, but not necessarily all of them. However, it is still important to have practical tools that are able to verify whether a given sequence model is sound. In this study, we focus on chess, as it is a domain that provides enough complexity while having a simple rule-based world model. We propose adversarial sequence generation for verifying the soundness of the sequence model. Our adversaries generate valid sequences so as to force the sequence model to generate an invalid next move prediction. Apart from the falsification of soundness, this method is also suitable for a more fine-grained analysis of the failure modes and the effects of different choices during training. To demonstrate this, we propose a number of methods for adversarial sequence generation and evaluate the approach on a large set of chess models. We train models on random as well as high-quality chess games, using several training recipes. We find that none of the models are sound, but some training techniques and dataset choices are able to improve soundness remarkably. We also investigate the potential application of board state probes in both our training and attack methods. Our findings indicate that the extracted board states have no causal role in next token prediction in most of the models.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have underscored the importance of safeguarding intellectual property rights through robust fingerprinting techniques. Traditional fingerprint verification approaches typically focus on a single model, seeking to improve the robustness of its fingerprint.However, these single-model methods often struggle to capture intrinsic commonalities across multiple related models. In this paper, we propose RAP-SM (Robust Adversarial Prompt via Shadow Models), a novel framework that extracts a public fingerprint for an entire series of LLMs. Experimental results demonstrate that RAP-SM effectively captures the intrinsic commonalities among different models while exhibiting strong adversarial robustness. Our findings suggest that RAP-SM presents a valuable avenue for scalable fingerprint verification, offering enhanced protection against potential model breaches in the era of increasingly prevalent LLMs.

In recent decades, Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) and its variants have achieved unprecedented success in image synthesis. However, well-trained GANs are under the threat of illegal steal or leakage. The prior studies on remote ownership verification assume a black-box setting where the defender can query the suspicious model with specific inputs, which we identify is not enough for generation tasks. To this end, in this paper, we propose a novel IP protection scheme for GANs where ownership verification can be done by checking outputs only, without choosing the inputs (i.e., box-free setting). Specifically, we make use of the unexploited potential of the discriminator to learn a hypersphere that captures the unique distribution learned by the paired generator. Extensive evaluations on two popular GAN tasks and more than 10 GAN architectures demonstrate our proposed scheme to effectively verify the ownership. Our proposed scheme shown to be immune to popular input-based removal attacks and robust against other existing attacks. The source code and models are available at https://github.com/AbstractTeen/gan_ownership_verification

The success of neural networks across most machine learning tasks and the persistence of adversarial examples have made the verification of such models an important quest. Several techniques have been successfully developed to verify robustness, and are now able to evaluate neural networks with thousands of nodes. The main weakness of this approach is in the specification: robustness is asserted on a validation set consisting of a finite set of examples, i.e. locally. We propose a notion of global robustness based on generative models, which asserts the robustness on a very large and representative set of examples. We show how this can be used for verifying neural networks. In this paper we experimentally explore the merits of this approach, and show how it can be used to construct realistic adversarial examples.

Deep neural networks have achieved impressive experimental results in image classification, but can surprisingly be unstable with respect to adversarial perturbations, that is, minimal changes to the input image that cause the network to misclassify it. With potential applications including perception modules and end-to-end controllers for self-driving cars, this raises concerns about their safety. We develop a novel automated verification framework for feed-forward multi-layer neural networks based on Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT). We focus on safety of image classification decisions with respect to image manipulations, such as scratches or changes to camera angle or lighting conditions that would result in the same class being assigned by a human, and define safety for an individual decision in terms of invariance of the classification within a small neighbourhood of the original image. We enable exhaustive search of the region by employing discretisation, and propagate the analysis layer by layer. Our method works directly with the network code and, in contrast to existing methods, can guarantee that adversarial examples, if they exist, are found for the given region and family of manipulations. If found, adversarial examples can be shown to human testers and/or used to fine-tune the network. We implement the techniques using Z3 and evaluate them on state-of-the-art networks, including regularised and deep learning networks. We also compare against existing techniques to search for adversarial examples and estimate network robustness.

When should an AI system's answer be trusted? Formal proof assistants offer certainty but cannot reach most of the problem distribution; scalar LLM judges offer coverage but produce opaque scores that cannot be audited after the fact and are subject to the same coherence issues as any LLM. We present Theoria, a verification architecture that closes this gap. A candidate solution is rewritten into a sequence of typed state transitions, each licensed by an explicit justification, whether that be a citation, computation, or problem-given fact, and every transition is independently auditable. The foundational invariant is completeness of change: every difference between consecutive proof states must be accounted for, so hidden premises surface as unlicensed mutations rather than passing silently. On HLE-Verified Gold (185 text-only expert problems), Theoria certifies 105 at 91.4% strict precision (Wilson 95% CI [84.5%, 95.4%]). Every certification produces a human readable proof trace in which each step can be independently challenged. Holistic LLM judges achieve comparable precision at matched coverage but fail on different problems (Jaccard 0.14-0.36), making the approaches complementary. On 95 adversarial poisoned proofs across 15 domains, structured judges catch 94.7% versus 83.2% for holistic judging (p= 0.0017). The overall 11.5 pp gap concentrates in hidden premises (90.6% vs. 62.5%, a 28 pp difference) and fabricated citations (100% vs. 90%), the error classes where the formal analysis predicts an advantage; performance is identical on arithmetic and theorem-misapplication errors, where no advantage is predicted. On GPQA Diamond (n= 65), certified precision is 97.1% (Wilson CI [85.1%, 99.5%]).

Multilingual speaker verification (SV) remains challenging due to limited cross-lingual data and language-dependent information in speaker embeddings. This paper presents a language-invariant multilingual SV system for the TidyVoice 2026 Challenge. We adopt the multilingual self-supervised w2v-BERT 2.0 model as the backbone, enhanced with Layer Adapters and Multi-scale Feature Aggregation to better exploit multi-layer representations. A language-adversarial training strategy with a Gradient Reversal Layer is applied to promote language-invariant speaker embeddings. Moreover, a multilingual zero-shot text-to-speech system is used to synthesize speech in multiple languages, improving language diversity. Experimental results demonstrate that fine-tuning the large-scale pretrained model yields competitive performance, while language-adversarial training further enhances robustness. In addition, synthetic speech augmentation provides additional gains under limited training data conditions. Source code is available at https://github.com/ZXHY-82/LI-MSV-TidyVoice2026.

In speech technologies, speaker's voice representation is used in many applications such as speech recognition, voice conversion, speech synthesis and, obviously, user authentication. Modern vocal representations of the speaker are based on neural embeddings. In addition to the targeted information, these representations usually contain sensitive information about the speaker, like the age, sex, physical state, education level or ethnicity. In order to allow the user to choose which information to protect, we introduce in this paper the concept of attribute-driven privacy preservation in speaker voice representation. It allows a person to hide one or more personal aspects to a potential malicious interceptor and to the application provider. As a first solution to this concept, we propose to use an adversarial autoencoding method that disentangles in the voice representation a given speaker attribute thus allowing its concealment. We focus here on the sex attribute for an Automatic Speaker Verification (ASV) task. Experiments carried out using the VoxCeleb datasets have shown that the proposed method enables the concealment of this attribute while preserving ASV ability.

Agent benchmarks score submissions with outcome verifiers that are typically hand-written and brittle, leaving them open to reward hacking. We audit 1,968 tasks across five terminal-agent benchmarks and find 323 (16%) hackable by frontier models given only the task description. This corrupts both leaderboard rankings and RL training signal, yet the standard response is manual and reactive. We introduce the hacker-fixer loop, a method for building exploit-resistant verifiers without per-task manual patching. The loop alternates three LLM agents: a hacker tries to pass the verifier without solving the task, a fixer patches the verifier to reject each discovered exploit, and a solver confirms the patched verifier still admits legitimate solutions. The loop iterates: each patch reshapes what the verifier rewards, surfacing the next exploit. We further add verifier access, and let patches transfer across tasks, to broaden the exploits the loop discovers. On KernelBench, the loop drives the attack success rate from 62% to 0% on a held-out corpus of publicly reported exploits. We also find that weaker agents in the loop can defend against much stronger hackers: Gemini 3 Flash's loop drives the stronger Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Opus 4.7's attack success rate from 76% and 61% to 0% on KernelBench, and Gemini 3.1 Pro's from 39% to 17% on Terminal Bench across 77 tasks. We release Terminal Wrench (323 hackable environments, 3,632 hack trajectories) as a snapshot of the current attack surface, our patched verifiers, the exploits the loop discovered, and our implementation as a basis for future work.

Recent advances in synergizing large reasoning models (LRMs) with retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) have shown promising results, yet two critical challenges remain: (1) reasoning models typically operate from a single, unchallenged perspective, limiting their ability to conduct deep, self-correcting reasoning over external documents, and (2) existing training paradigms rely excessively on outcome-oriented rewards, which provide insufficient signal for shaping the complex, multi-step reasoning process. To address these issues, we propose an Reasoner-Verifier framework named Adversarial Reasoning RAG (ARR). The Reasoner and Verifier engage in reasoning on retrieved evidence and critiquing each other's logic while being guided by process-aware advantage that requires no external scoring model. This reward combines explicit observational signals with internal model uncertainty to jointly optimize reasoning fidelity and verification rigor. Experiments on multiple benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.

Robust pedestrian trajectory forecasting is crucial to developing safe autonomous vehicles. Although previous works have studied adversarial robustness in the context of trajectory forecasting, some significant issues remain unaddressed. In this work, we try to tackle these crucial problems. Firstly, the previous definitions of robustness in trajectory prediction are ambiguous. We thus provide formal definitions for two kinds of robustness, namely label robustness and pure robustness. Secondly, as previous works fail to consider robustness about all points in a disturbance interval, we utilise a probably approximately correct (PAC) framework for robustness verification. Additionally, this framework can not only identify potential counterexamples, but also provides interpretable analyses of the original methods. Our approach is applied using a prototype tool named TrajPAC. With TrajPAC, we evaluate the robustness of four state-of-the-art trajectory prediction models -- Trajectron++, MemoNet, AgentFormer, and MID -- on trajectories from five scenes of the ETH/UCY dataset and scenes of the Stanford Drone Dataset. Using our framework, we also experimentally study various factors that could influence robustness performance.

LLM-based multi-agent systems excel at planning, tool use, and role coordination, but their openness and interaction complexity also expose them to jailbreak, prompt-injection, and adversarial collaboration. Existing defenses fall into two lines: (i) self-verification that asks each agent to pre-filter unsafe instructions before execution, and (ii) external guard modules that police behaviors. The former often underperforms because a standalone agent lacks sufficient capacity to detect cross-agent unsafe chains and delegation-induced risks; the latter increases system overhead and creates a single-point-of-failure-once compromised, system-wide safety collapses, and adding more guards worsens cost and complexity. To solve these challenges, we propose AdvEvo-MARL, a co-evolutionary multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that internalizes safety into task agents. Rather than relying on external guards, AdvEvo-MARL jointly optimizes attackers (which synthesize evolving jailbreak prompts) and defenders (task agents trained to both accomplish their duties and resist attacks) in adversarial learning environments. To stabilize learning and foster cooperation, we introduce a public baseline for advantage estimation: agents within the same functional group share a group-level mean-return baseline, enabling lower-variance updates and stronger intra-group coordination. Across representative attack scenarios, AdvEvo-MARL consistently keeps attack-success rate (ASR) below 20%, whereas baselines reach up to 38.33%, while preserving-and sometimes improving-task accuracy (up to +3.67% on reasoning tasks). These results show that safety and utility can be jointly improved without relying on extra guard agents or added system overhead.

We present Veriphi, a GPU-accelerated neural network verification system that combines fast adversarial attacks with formal bound certification using alpha,beta-CROWN methods. Through systematic experiments on MNIST and CIFAR-10 using three training methodologies (standard, adversarial, certified), we demonstrate that training method effectiveness is fundamentally dataset-dependent. Interval Bound Propagation (IBP) achieves 78% certified accuracy on simple MNIST (784 dimensions) but provides negligible certification performance on the more complex CIFAR-10 dataset, where PGD adversarial training dominates with 94% certification at small perturbations. We achieve 5x verification speedup through attack-guided falsification and scale our approach to production-size models (105.8M parameters) for real-world aerospace logistics optimization. Our results challenge the assumption that certified training universally outperforms adversarial training, showing context matters critically for verification strategy selection.

Open-ended generation tasks require outputs to satisfy diverse and often implicit task-specific evaluation rubrics. The sheer number of relevant rubrics leads to prohibitively high verification costs and incomplete assessments of a response, making reinforcement learning (RL) post-training with rubric-based rewards difficult to scale. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that often the best way to combine these rubrics into one single reward is also highly prompt-specific. We propose Reinforcement Learning with Adversarial Critic (RLAC), a post-training approach that addresses these challenges via dynamic rubric verification. Our approach employs a large language model (LLM) as a critic that dynamically identifies only the most likely failure modes (e.g., a factual error or unhandled edge case), which are then verified by an external validator to optimize both generator and critic jointly. By training both the generator and the critic, this game enhances the critic's error detection and the generator's output quality while reducing required verifications. Our experiments demonstrate that RLAC improves factual accuracy in text generation and correctness in code generation, while also outperforming exhaustive verification and reward model methods. We show that dynamic critics are more effective than fixed critics, showcasing the potential of RLAC for scaling RL post-training to free-form generation tasks.

A key component of fact verification is thevevidence retrieval, often from multiple documents. Recent approaches use dense representations and condition the retrieval of each document on the previously retrieved ones. The latter step is performed over all the documents in the collection, requiring storing their dense representations in an index, thus incurring a high memory footprint. An alternative paradigm is retrieve-and-rerank, where documents are retrieved using methods such as BM25, their sentences are reranked, and further documents are retrieved conditioned on these sentences, reducing the memory requirements. However, such approaches can be brittle as they rely on heuristics and assume hyperlinks between documents. We propose a novel retrieve-and-rerank method for multi-hop retrieval, that consists of a retriever that jointly scores documents in the knowledge source and sentences from previously retrieved documents using an autoregressive formulation and is guided by a proof system based on natural logic that dynamically terminates the retrieval process if the evidence is deemed sufficient. This method is competitive with current state-of-the-art methods on FEVER, HoVer and FEVEROUS-S, while using 5 to 10 times less memory than competing systems. Evaluation on an adversarial dataset indicates improved stability of our approach compared to commonly deployed threshold-based methods. Finally, the proof system helps humans predict model decisions correctly more often than using the evidence alone.

The widespread and rapid adoption of AI-generated content, created by models such as Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) and Diffusion Models, has revolutionized the digital media landscape by allowing efficient and creative content generation. However, these models also blur the difference between real images and AI-generated synthetic images, raising concerns regarding content authenticity and integrity. While many existing solutions to detect fake images focus solely on classification and higher-resolution images, they often lack transparency in their decision-making, making it difficult for users to understand why an image is classified as fake. In this paper, we present VERITAS, a comprehensive framework that not only accurately detects whether a small (32x32) image is AI-generated but also explains why it was classified that way through artifact localization and semantic reasoning. VERITAS produces human-readable explanations that describe key artifacts in synthetic images. We show that this architecture offers clear explanations of the basis of zero-shot synthetic image detection tasks. Code and relevant prompts can be found at https://github.com/V-i-g-n-e-s-h-N/VERITAS .

Machine learning models are often used to decide who will receive a loan, a job interview, or a public benefit. Standard techniques to build these models use features about people but overlook their actionability. In turn, models can assign predictions that are fixed, meaning that consumers who are denied loans, interviews, or benefits may be permanently locked out from access to credit, employment, or assistance. In this work, we introduce a formal testing procedure to flag models that assign fixed predictions that we call recourse verification. We develop machinery to reliably determine if a given model can provide recourse to its decision subjects from a set of user-specified actionability constraints. We demonstrate how our tools can ensure recourse and adversarial robustness in real-world datasets and use them to study the infeasibility of recourse in real-world lending datasets. Our results highlight how models can inadvertently assign fixed predictions that permanently bar access, and we provide tools to design algorithms that account for actionability when developing models.

Probabilistic model checking is a technique for formal automated reasoning about software or hardware systems that operate in the context of uncertainty or stochasticity. It builds upon ideas and techniques from a diverse range of fields, from logic, automata and graph theory, to optimisation, numerical methods and control. In recent years, probabilistic model checking has also been extended to integrate ideas from game theory, notably using models such as stochastic games and solution concepts such as equilibria, to formally verify the interaction of multiple rational agents with distinct objectives. This provides a means to reason flexibly about agents acting in either an adversarial or a collaborative fashion, and opens up opportunities to tackle new problems within, for example, artificial intelligence, robotics and autonomous systems. In this paper, we summarise some of the advances in this area, and highlight applications for which they have already been used. We discuss how the strengths of probabilistic model checking apply, or have the potential to apply, to the multi-agent setting and outline some of the key challenges required to make further progress in this field.

Large language models (LLMs) have recently achieved notable success in code-generation benchmarks such as HumanEval and LiveCodeBench. However, a detailed examination reveals that these evaluation suites often comprise only a limited number of homogeneous test cases, resulting in subtle faults going undetected. This not only artificially inflates measured performance but also compromises accurate reward estimation in reinforcement learning frameworks utilizing verifiable rewards (RLVR). To address these critical shortcomings, we systematically investigate the test-case generation (TCG) task by proposing multi-dimensional metrics designed to rigorously quantify test-suite thoroughness. Furthermore, we introduce a human-LLM collaborative method (SAGA), leveraging human programming expertise with LLM reasoning capability, aimed at significantly enhancing both the coverage and the quality of generated test cases. In addition, we develop a TCGBench to facilitate the study of the TCG task. Experiments show that SAGA achieves a detection rate of 90.62% and a verifier accuracy of 32.58% on TCGBench. The Verifier Accuracy (Verifier Acc) of the code generation evaluation benchmark synthesized by SAGA is 10.78% higher than that of LiveCodeBench-v6. These results demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method. We hope this work contributes to building a scalable foundation for reliable LLM code evaluation, further advancing RLVR in code generation, and paving the way for automated adversarial test synthesis and adaptive benchmark integration.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as an effective paradigm for improving the reasoning capability of vision-language models (VLMs). However, RL-based optimization typically depends on costly high-quality annotations that are difficult to scale. Existing unsupervised alternatives may drift toward biased solutions due to weak visual grounding and the lack of reliable verification signals. We propose a self-evolving post-training framework, DUEL, where supervision emerges from adversarial interactions between two policies initialized from the same pretrained VLM. A Challenger generates an image-grounded true claim together with a minimally perturbed hard-negative counterpart, while a Solver verifies both claims against the image, encouraging fine-grained visual discrimination under near-neighbor semantics. To stabilize optimization, we introduce a length-normalized log-likelihood reward that preserves informative optimization signals beyond binary outcome supervision and improves learning stability under sparse feedback. Experiments show that DUEL consistently improves visual reasoning and robust discrimination without additional human annotations, external reward models, or image editing tools.

This report describes ARIS (Auto-Research-in-sleep), an open-source research harness for autonomous research, including its architecture, assurance mechanisms, and early deployment experience. The performance of agent systems built on LLMs depends on both the model weights and the harness around them, which governs what information to store, retrieve, and present to the model. For long-horizon research workflows, the central failure mode is not a visible breakdown but a plausible unsupported success: a long-running agent can produce claims whose evidential support is incomplete, misreported, or silently inherited from the executor's framing. Therefore, we present ARIS as a research harness that coordinates machine-learning research workflows through cross-model adversarial collaboration as a default configuration: an executor model drives forward progress while a reviewer from a different model family is recommended to critique intermediate artifacts and request revisions. ARIS has three architectural layers. The execution layer provides more than 65 reusable Markdown-defined skills, model integrations via MCP, a persistent research wiki for iterative reuse of prior findings, and deterministic figure generation. The orchestration layer coordinates five end-to-end workflows with adjustable effort settings and configurable routing to reviewer models. The assurance layer includes a three-stage process for checking whether experimental claims are supported by evidence: integrity verification, result-to-claim mapping, and claim auditing that cross-checks manuscript statements against the claim ledger and raw evidence, as well as a five-pass scientific-editing pipeline, mathematical-proof checks, and visual inspection of the rendered PDF. A prototype self-improvement loop records research traces and proposes harness improvements that are adopted only after reviewer approval.

Large Language Model (LLM) services and models often come with legal rules on who can use them and how they must use them. Assessing the compliance of the released LLMs is crucial, as these rules protect the interests of the LLM contributor and prevent misuse. In this context, we describe the novel problem of Black-box Identity Verification (BBIV). The goal is to determine whether a third-party application uses a certain LLM through its chat function. We propose a method called Targeted Random Adversarial Prompt (TRAP) that identifies the specific LLM in use. We repurpose adversarial suffixes, originally proposed for jailbreaking, to get a pre-defined answer from the target LLM, while other models give random answers. TRAP detects the target LLMs with over 95% true positive rate at under 0.2% false positive rate even after a single interaction. TRAP remains effective even if the LLM has minor changes that do not significantly alter the original function.

The growing adoption of photorealistic 3D facial avatars, particularly those utilizing efficient 3D Gaussian Splatting representations, introduces new risks of online identity theft, especially in systems that rely on biometric authentication. While effective adversarial masking methods have been developed for 2D images, a significant gap remains in achieving robust, viewpoint-consistent identity protection for dynamic 3D avatars. To address this, we present AEGIS, the first privacy-preserving identity masking framework for 3D Gaussian Avatars that maintains the subject's perceived characteristics. Our method aims to conceal identity-related facial features while preserving the avatar's perceptual realism and functional integrity. AEGIS applies adversarial perturbations to the Gaussian color coefficients, guided by a pre-trained face verification network, ensuring consistent protection across multiple viewpoints without retraining or modifying the avatar's geometry. AEGIS achieves complete de-identification, reducing face retrieval and verification accuracy to 0%, while maintaining high perceptual quality (SSIM = 0.9555, PSNR = 35.52 dB). It also preserves key facial attributes such as age, race, gender, and emotion, demonstrating strong privacy protection with minimal visual distortion.

We present Malafide, a universal adversarial attack against automatic speaker verification (ASV) spoofing countermeasures (CMs). By introducing convolutional noise using an optimised linear time-invariant filter, Malafide attacks can be used to compromise CM reliability while preserving other speech attributes such as quality and the speaker's voice. In contrast to other adversarial attacks proposed recently, Malafide filters are optimised independently of the input utterance and duration, are tuned instead to the underlying spoofing attack, and require the optimisation of only a small number of filter coefficients. Even so, they degrade CM performance estimates by an order of magnitude, even in black-box settings, and can also be configured to overcome integrated CM and ASV subsystems. Integrated solutions that use self-supervised learning CMs, however, are more robust, under both black-box and white-box settings.

The study of adversarial vulnerabilities of deep neural networks (DNNs) has progressed rapidly. Existing attacks require either internal access (to the architecture, parameters, or training set of the victim model) or external access (to query the model). However, both the access may be infeasible or expensive in many scenarios. We investigate no-box adversarial examples, where the attacker can neither access the model information or the training set nor query the model. Instead, the attacker can only gather a small number of examples from the same problem domain as that of the victim model. Such a stronger threat model greatly expands the applicability of adversarial attacks. We propose three mechanisms for training with a very small dataset (on the order of tens of examples) and find that prototypical reconstruction is the most effective. Our experiments show that adversarial examples crafted on prototypical auto-encoding models transfer well to a variety of image classification and face verification models. On a commercial celebrity recognition system held by clarifai.com, our approach significantly diminishes the average prediction accuracy of the system to only 15.40%, which is on par with the attack that transfers adversarial examples from a pre-trained Arcface model.

ASVspoof 5 is the fifth edition in a series of challenges that promote the study of speech spoofing and deepfake attacks, and the design of detection solutions. Compared to previous challenges, the ASVspoof 5 database is built from crowdsourced data collected from a vastly greater number of speakers in diverse acoustic conditions. Attacks, also crowdsourced, are generated and tested using surrogate detection models, while adversarial attacks are incorporated for the first time. New metrics support the evaluation of spoofing-robust automatic speaker verification (SASV) as well as stand-alone detection solutions, i.e., countermeasures without ASV. We describe the two challenge tracks, the new database, the evaluation metrics, baselines, and the evaluation platform, and present a summary of the results. Attacks significantly compromise the baseline systems, while submissions bring substantial improvements.

The success of deep learning based face recognition systems has given rise to serious privacy concerns due to their ability to enable unauthorized tracking of users in the digital world. Existing methods for enhancing privacy fail to generate naturalistic images that can protect facial privacy without compromising user experience. We propose a novel two-step approach for facial privacy protection that relies on finding adversarial latent codes in the low-dimensional manifold of a pretrained generative model. The first step inverts the given face image into the latent space and finetunes the generative model to achieve an accurate reconstruction of the given image from its latent code. This step produces a good initialization, aiding the generation of high-quality faces that resemble the given identity. Subsequently, user-defined makeup text prompts and identity-preserving regularization are used to guide the search for adversarial codes in the latent space. Extensive experiments demonstrate that faces generated by our approach have stronger black-box transferability with an absolute gain of 12.06% over the state-of-the-art facial privacy protection approach under the face verification task. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach for commercial face recognition systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/fahadshamshad/Clip2Protect.

Combating disinformation is one of the burning societal crises -- about 67% of the American population believes that disinformation produces a lot of uncertainty, and 10% of them knowingly propagate disinformation. Evidence shows that disinformation can manipulate democratic processes and public opinion, causing disruption in the share market, panic and anxiety in society, and even death during crises. Therefore, disinformation should be identified promptly and, if possible, mitigated. With approximately 3.2 billion images and 720,000 hours of video shared online daily on social media platforms, scalable detection of multimodal disinformation requires efficient fact verification. Despite progress in automatic text-based fact verification (e.g., FEVER, LIAR), the research community lacks substantial effort in multimodal fact verification. To address this gap, we introduce FACTIFY 3M, a dataset of 3 million samples that pushes the boundaries of the domain of fact verification via a multimodal fake news dataset, in addition to offering explainability through the concept of 5W question-answering. Salient features of the dataset include: (i) textual claims, (ii) ChatGPT-generated paraphrased claims, (iii) associated images, (iv) stable diffusion-generated additional images (i.e., visual paraphrases), (v) pixel-level image heatmap to foster image-text explainability of the claim, (vi) 5W QA pairs, and (vii) adversarial fake news stories.

The application of large language models (LLMs) in clinical decision support faces significant challenges of "tunnel vision" and diagnostic hallucinations present in their processing unstructured electronic health records (EHRs). To address these challenges, we propose a novel chain-based clinical reasoning framework, called DxChain, which transforms the diagnostic workflow into an iterative process by mirroring a clinician's cognitive trajectory that consists of "Memory Anchoring", "Navigation" and "Verification" phases. DxChain introduces three key methodological innovations to elicit the potential of LLM: (i) a Profile-Then-Plan paradigm to mitigate cold-start hallucinations by establishing a panoramic patient baseline, (ii) a Medical Tree-of-Thoughts (Med-ToT) algorithm for strategic look ahead planning and resource aware navigation, and (iii) a Dialectical Diagnostic Verification procedure utilizing "Angel-Devil" adversarial debates to resolve complex evidence conflicts. Evaluated on two real world benchmarks, MIMIC-IV-Ext Cardiac Disease and MIMIC-IV-Ext CDM, DxChain achieves state-of-the-art performances in both diagnostic accuracy and logical consistency, offering a modular and reliable architecture for next-generation clinical AI. The code is at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Dx-Chain.

Large language models (LLMs) remain unreliable for high-stakes claim verification due to hallucinations and shallow reasoning. While retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) and multi-agent debate (MAD) address this, they are limited by one-pass retrieval and unstructured debate dynamics. We propose a courtroom-style multi-agent framework, PROClaim, that reformulates verification as a structured, adversarial deliberation. Our approach integrates specialized roles (e.g., Plaintiff, Defense, Judge) with Progressive RAG (P-RAG) to dynamically expand and refine the evidence pool during the debate. Furthermore, we employ evidence negotiation, self-reflection, and heterogeneous multi-judge aggregation to enforce calibration, robustness, and diversity. In zero-shot evaluations on the Check-COVID benchmark, PROClaim achieves 81.7% accuracy, outperforming standard multi-agent debate by 10.0 percentage points, with P-RAG driving the primary performance gains (+7.5 pp). We ultimately demonstrate that structural deliberation and model heterogeneity effectively mitigate systematic biases, providing a robust foundation for reliable claim verification. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/mnc13/PROClaim.

ASVspoof 5 is the fifth edition in a series of challenges which promote the study of speech spoofing and deepfake attacks as well as the design of detection solutions. We introduce the ASVspoof 5 database which is generated in a crowdsourced fashion from data collected in diverse acoustic conditions (cf. studio-quality data for earlier ASVspoof databases) and from ~2,000 speakers (cf. ~100 earlier). The database contains attacks generated with 32 different algorithms, also crowdsourced, and optimised to varying degrees using new surrogate detection models. Among them are attacks generated with a mix of legacy and contemporary text-to-speech synthesis and voice conversion models, in addition to adversarial attacks which are incorporated for the first time. ASVspoof 5 protocols comprise seven speaker-disjoint partitions. They include two distinct partitions for the training of different sets of attack models, two more for the development and evaluation of surrogate detection models, and then three additional partitions which comprise the ASVspoof 5 training, development and evaluation sets. An auxiliary set of data collected from an additional 30k speakers can also be used to train speaker encoders for the implementation of attack algorithms. Also described herein is an experimental validation of the new ASVspoof 5 database using a set of automatic speaker verification and spoof/deepfake baseline detectors. With the exception of protocols and tools for the generation of spoofed/deepfake speech, the resources described in this paper, already used by participants of the ASVspoof 5 challenge in 2024, are now all freely available to the community.

We introduce two challenging datasets that reliably cause machine learning model performance to substantially degrade. The datasets are collected with a simple adversarial filtration technique to create datasets with limited spurious cues. Our datasets' real-world, unmodified examples transfer to various unseen models reliably, demonstrating that computer vision models have shared weaknesses. The first dataset is called ImageNet-A and is like the ImageNet test set, but it is far more challenging for existing models. We also curate an adversarial out-of-distribution detection dataset called ImageNet-O, which is the first out-of-distribution detection dataset created for ImageNet models. On ImageNet-A a DenseNet-121 obtains around 2% accuracy, an accuracy drop of approximately 90%, and its out-of-distribution detection performance on ImageNet-O is near random chance levels. We find that existing data augmentation techniques hardly boost performance, and using other public training datasets provides improvements that are limited. However, we find that improvements to computer vision architectures provide a promising path towards robust models.

Having reliable specifications is an unavoidable challenge in achieving verifiable correctness, robustness, and interpretability of AI systems. Existing specifications for neural networks are in the paradigm of data as specification. That is, the local neighborhood centering around a reference input is considered to be correct (or robust). While existing specifications contribute to verifying adversarial robustness, a significant problem in many research domains, our empirical study shows that those verified regions are somewhat tight, and thus fail to allow verification of test set inputs, making them impractical for some real-world applications. To this end, we propose a new family of specifications called neural representation as specification, which uses the intrinsic information of neural networks - neural activation patterns (NAPs), rather than input data to specify the correctness and/or robustness of neural network predictions. We present a simple statistical approach to mining neural activation patterns. To show the effectiveness of discovered NAPs, we formally verify several important properties, such as various types of misclassifications will never happen for a given NAP, and there is no ambiguity between different NAPs. We show that by using NAP, we can verify a significant region of the input space, while still recalling 84% of the data on MNIST. Moreover, we can push the verifiable bound to 10 times larger on the CIFAR10 benchmark. Thus, we argue that NAPs can potentially be used as a more reliable and extensible specification for neural network verification.

AI-generated images have reached a quality level at which humans are incapable of reliably distinguishing them from real images. To counteract the inherent risk of fraud and disinformation, the detection of AI-generated images is a pressing challenge and an active research topic. While many of the presented methods claim to achieve high detection accuracy, they are usually evaluated under idealized conditions. In particular, the adversarial robustness is often neglected, potentially due to a lack of awareness or the substantial effort required to conduct a comprehensive robustness analysis. In this work, we tackle this problem by providing a simpler means to assess the robustness of AI-generated image detectors. We present RAID (Robust evaluation of AI-generated image Detectors), a dataset of 72k diverse and highly transferable adversarial examples. The dataset is created by running attacks against an ensemble of seven state-of-the-art detectors and images generated by four different text-to-image models. Extensive experiments show that our methodology generates adversarial images that transfer with a high success rate to unseen detectors, which can be used to quickly provide an approximate yet still reliable estimate of a detector's adversarial robustness. Our findings indicate that current state-of-the-art AI-generated image detectors can be easily deceived by adversarial examples, highlighting the critical need for the development of more robust methods. We release our dataset at https://huggingface.co/datasets/aimagelab/RAID and evaluation code at https://github.com/pralab/RAID.

Generative models can synthesize highly realistic content, so-called deepfakes, that are already being misused at scale to undermine digital media authenticity. Current deepfake detection methods are unreliable for two reasons: (i) distinguishing inauthentic content post-hoc is often impossible (e.g., with memorized samples), leading to an unbounded false positive rate (FPR); and (ii) detection lacks robustness, as adversaries can adapt to known detectors with near-perfect accuracy using minimal computational resources. To address these limitations, we propose a resynthesis framework to determine if a sample is authentic or if its authenticity can be plausibly denied. We make two key contributions focusing on the high-precision, low-recall setting against efficient (i.e., compute-restricted) adversaries. First, we demonstrate that our calibrated resynthesis method is the most reliable approach for verifying authentic samples while maintaining controllable, low FPRs. Second, we show that our method achieves adversarial robustness against efficient adversaries, whereas prior methods are easily evaded under identical compute budgets. Our approach supports multiple modalities and leverages state-of-the-art inversion techniques.

Despite the success of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) in many academic benchmarks for computer vision tasks, their application in the real-world is still facing fundamental challenges. One of these open problems is the inherent lack of robustness, unveiled by the striking effectiveness of adversarial attacks. Current attack methods are able to manipulate the network's prediction by adding specific but small amounts of noise to the input. In turn, adversarial training (AT) aims to achieve robustness against such attacks and ideally a better model generalization ability by including adversarial samples in the trainingset. However, an in-depth analysis of the resulting robust models beyond adversarial robustness is still pending. In this paper, we empirically analyze a variety of adversarially trained models that achieve high robust accuracies when facing state-of-the-art attacks and we show that AT has an interesting side-effect: it leads to models that are significantly less overconfident with their decisions, even on clean data than non-robust models. Further, our analysis of robust models shows that not only AT but also the model's building blocks (like activation functions and pooling) have a strong influence on the models' prediction confidences. Data & Project website: https://github.com/GeJulia/robustness_confidences_evaluation

In recent years numerous methods have been developed to formally verify the robustness of deep neural networks (DNNs). Though the proposed techniques are effective in providing mathematical guarantees about the DNNs behavior, it is not clear whether the proofs generated by these methods are human-interpretable. In this paper, we bridge this gap by developing new concepts, algorithms, and representations to generate human understandable interpretations of the proofs. Leveraging the proposed method, we show that the robustness proofs of standard DNNs rely on spurious input features, while the proofs of DNNs trained to be provably robust filter out even the semantically meaningful features. The proofs for the DNNs combining adversarial and provably robust training are the most effective at selectively filtering out spurious features as well as relying on human-understandable input features.

Adversarial attacks are a major challenge faced by current machine learning research. These purposely crafted inputs fool even the most advanced models, precluding their deployment in safety-critical applications. Extensive research in computer vision has been carried to develop reliable defense strategies. However, the same issue remains less explored in natural language processing. Our work presents a model-agnostic detector of adversarial text examples. The approach identifies patterns in the logits of the target classifier when perturbing the input text. The proposed detector improves the current state-of-the-art performance in recognizing adversarial inputs and exhibits strong generalization capabilities across different NLP models, datasets, and word-level attacks.

Adversarial examples are inputs to machine learning models designed to cause the model to make a mistake. They are useful for understanding the shortcomings of machine learning models, interpreting their results, and for regularisation. In NLP, however, most example generation strategies produce input text by using known, pre-specified semantic transformations, requiring significant manual effort and in-depth understanding of the problem and domain. In this paper, we investigate the problem of automatically generating adversarial examples that violate a set of given First-Order Logic constraints in Natural Language Inference (NLI). We reduce the problem of identifying such adversarial examples to a combinatorial optimisation problem, by maximising a quantity measuring the degree of violation of such constraints and by using a language model for generating linguistically-plausible examples. Furthermore, we propose a method for adversarially regularising neural NLI models for incorporating background knowledge. Our results show that, while the proposed method does not always improve results on the SNLI and MultiNLI datasets, it significantly and consistently increases the predictive accuracy on adversarially-crafted datasets -- up to a 79.6% relative improvement -- while drastically reducing the number of background knowledge violations. Furthermore, we show that adversarial examples transfer among model architectures, and that the proposed adversarial training procedure improves the robustness of NLI models to adversarial examples.

Age estimation systems are increasingly deployed as gatekeepers for age-restricted online content, yet their robustness to cosmetic modifications has not been systematically evaluated. We investigate whether simple, household-accessible cosmetic changes, including beards, grey hair, makeup, and simulated wrinkles, can cause AI age estimators to classify minors as adults. To study this threat at scale without ethical concerns, we simulate these physical attacks on 329 facial images of individuals aged 10 to 21 using a VLM image editor (Gemini 2.5 Flash Image). We then evaluate eight models from our prior benchmark: five specialized architectures (MiVOLO, Custom-Best, Herosan, MiViaLab, DEX) and three vision-language models (Gemini 3 Flash, Gemini 2.5 Flash, GPT-5-Nano). We introduce the Attack Conversion Rate (ACR), defined as the fraction of images predicted as minor at baseline that flip to adult after attack, a population-agnostic metric that does not depend on the ratio of minors to adults in the test set. Our results reveal that a synthetic beard alone achieves 28 to 69 percent ACR across all eight models; combining all four attacks shifts predicted age by +7.7 years on average across all 329 subjects and reaches up to 83 percent ACR; and vision-language models exhibit lower ACR (59 to 71 percent) than specialized models (63 to 83 percent) under the full attack, although the ACR ranges overlap and the difference is not statistically tested. These findings highlight a critical vulnerability in deployed age-verification pipelines and call for adversarial robustness evaluation as a mandatory criterion for model selection.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) improves instruction following capabilities of large language models (LLMs), but suffers from training inefficiency due to inadequate difficulty assessment. Moreover, RLVR is prone to over-optimization, where LLMs exploit verification shortcuts without aligning to the actual intent of user instructions. We introduce Instruction Following Decorator (IFDecorator}, a framework that wraps RLVR training into a robust and sample-efficient pipeline. It consists of three components: (1) a cooperative-adversarial data flywheel that co-evolves instructions and hybrid verifications, generating progressively more challenging instruction-verification pairs; (2) IntentCheck, a bypass module enforcing intent alignment; and (3) trip wires, a diagnostic mechanism that detects reward hacking via trap instructions, which trigger and capture shortcut exploitation behaviors. Our Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct-IFDecorator achieves 87.43% accuracy on IFEval, outperforming larger proprietary models such as GPT-4o. Additionally, we demonstrate substantial improvements on FollowBench while preserving general capabilities. Our trip wires show significant reductions in reward hacking rates. We will release models, code, and data for future research.

Traditional Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipelines rely on similarity-based retrieval and re-ranking, which depend on heuristics such as top-k, and lack explainability, interpretability, and robustness against adversarial content. To address this gap, we propose a novel method METEORA that replaces re-ranking in RAG with a rationale-driven selection approach. METEORA operates in two stages. First, a general-purpose LLM is preference-tuned to generate rationales conditioned on the input query using direct preference optimization. These rationales guide the evidence chunk selection engine, which selects relevant chunks in three stages: pairing individual rationales with corresponding retrieved chunks for local relevance, global selection with elbow detection for adaptive cutoff, and context expansion via neighboring chunks. This process eliminates the need for top-k heuristics. The rationales are also used for consistency check using a Verifier LLM to detect and filter poisoned or misleading content for safe generation. The framework provides explainable and interpretable evidence flow by using rationales consistently across both selection and verification. Our evaluation across six datasets spanning legal, financial, and academic research domains shows that METEORA improves generation accuracy by 33.34% while using approximately 50% fewer chunks than state-of-the-art re-ranking methods. In adversarial settings, METEORA significantly improves the F1 score from 0.10 to 0.44 over the state-of-the-art perplexity-based defense baseline, demonstrating strong resilience to poisoning attacks. Code available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/METEORA-DC46/README.md

As language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents in high-stakes settings, ensuring that they reliably follow user-defined rules has become a critical safety concern. To this end, we study whether language models exhibit contextual robustness, or the capability to adhere to context-dependent safety specifications. For this analysis, we develop a benchmark (PasswordEval) that measures whether language models can correctly determine when a user request is authorized (i.e., with a correct password). We find that current open- and closed-source models struggle with this seemingly simple task, and that, perhaps surprisingly, reasoning capabilities do not generally improve performance. In fact, we find that reasoning traces frequently leak confidential information, which calls into question whether reasoning traces should be exposed to users in such applications. We also scale the difficulty of our evaluation along multiple axes: (i) by adding adversarial user pressure through various jailbreaking strategies, and (ii) through longer multi-turn conversations where password verification is more challenging. Overall, our results suggest that current frontier models are not well-suited to handling confidential information, and that reasoning capabilities may need to be trained in a different manner to make them safer for release in high-stakes settings.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) demonstrate strong perception and reasoning performance on existing remote sensing (RS) benchmarks. However, most prior benchmarks rely on low-resolution imagery, and some high-resolution benchmarks suffer from flawed reasoning-task designs. We show that text-only LLMs can perform competitively with multimodal vision-language models on RS reasoning tasks without access to images, revealing a critical mismatch between current benchmarks and the intended evaluation of visual understanding. To enable faithful assessment, we introduce RSHR-Bench, a super-high-resolution benchmark for RS visual understanding and reasoning. RSHR-Bench contains 5,329 full-scene images with a long side of at least 4,000 pixels, with up to about 3 x 10^8 pixels per image, sourced from widely used RS corpora and UAV collections. We design four task families: multiple-choice VQA, open-ended VQA, image captioning, and single-image evaluation. These tasks cover nine perception categories and four reasoning types, supporting multi-turn and multi-image dialog. To reduce reliance on language priors, we apply adversarial filtering with strong LLMs followed by rigorous human verification. Overall, we construct 3,864 VQA tasks, 3,913 image captioning tasks, and 500 fully human-written or verified single-image evaluation VQA pairs. Evaluations across open-source, closed-source, and RS-specific VLMs reveal persistent performance gaps in super-high-resolution scenarios. Code: https://github.com/Yunkaidang/RSHR

Current language model evaluations measure what models know under ideal conditions but not how robustly they know it under realistic stress. Static benchmarks like MMLU and TruthfulQA cannot distinguish a model that lacks knowledge from one whose verification mechanisms collapse when information degrades or adversaries probe for weaknesses. We introduce the Drill-Down and Fabricate Test (DDFT), a protocol that measures epistemic robustness: a model's ability to maintain factual accuracy under progressive semantic compression and adversarial fabrication. We propose a two-system cognitive model comprising a Semantic System that generates fluent text and an Epistemic Verifier that validates factual accuracy. Our findings, based on evaluating 9 frontier models across 8 knowledge domains at 5 compression levels (1,800 turn-level evaluations), reveal that epistemic robustness is orthogonal to conventional design paradigms. Neither parameter count (r=0.083, p=0.832) nor architectural type (r=0.153, p=0.695) significantly predicts robustness, suggesting it emerges from training methodology and verification mechanisms distinct from current approaches. Error detection capability strongly predicts overall robustness (rho=-0.817, p=0.007), indicating this is the critical bottleneck. We find that flagship models exhibit brittleness despite their scale, while smaller models can achieve robust performance, challenging assumptions about the relationship between model size and reliability. The DDFT framework provides both theoretical foundation and practical tools for assessing epistemic robustness before deployment in critical applications.

Large multimodal models (LMMs) have proven flexible and generalisable across many tasks and fields. Although they have strong potential to aid scientific research, their capabilities in this domain are not well characterised. A key aspect of scientific research is the ability to understand and interpret figures, which serve as a rich, compressed source of complex information. In this work, we present SciFIBench, a scientific figure interpretation benchmark. Our main benchmark consists of a 1000-question gold set of multiple-choice questions split between two tasks across 12 categories. The questions are curated from CS arXiv paper figures and captions, using adversarial filtering to find hard negatives and human verification for quality control. We evaluate 26 LMMs on SciFIBench, finding it to be a challenging benchmark. Finally, we investigate the alignment and reasoning faithfulness of the LMMs on augmented question sets from our benchmark. We release SciFIBench to encourage progress in this domain.

While state-of-the-art language models excel at the style transfer task, current work does not address explainability of style transfer systems. Explanations could be generated using large language models such as GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, but the use of such complex systems is inefficient when smaller, widely distributed, and transparent alternatives are available. We propose a framework to augment and improve a formality style transfer dataset with explanations via model distillation from ChatGPT. To further refine the generated explanations, we propose a novel way to incorporate scarce expert human feedback using in-context learning (ICLEF: In-Context Learning from Expert Feedback) by prompting ChatGPT to act as a critic to its own outputs. We use the resulting dataset of 9,960 explainable formality style transfer instances (e-GYAFC) to show that current openly distributed instruction-tuned models (and, in some settings, ChatGPT) perform poorly on the task, and that fine-tuning on our high-quality dataset leads to significant improvements as shown by automatic evaluation. In human evaluation, we show that models much smaller than ChatGPT fine-tuned on our data align better with expert preferences. Finally, we discuss two potential applications of models fine-tuned on the explainable style transfer task: interpretable authorship verification and interpretable adversarial attacks on AI-generated text detectors.

As large language models (LLMs) become high-privilege agents in risk-sensitive settings, they introduce systemic threats beyond hallucination, where minor compliance errors can cause critical data leaks. However, existing benchmarks focus on rule-based QA, lacking agentic execution modeling, overlooking compliance drift in adversarial interactions, and relying on binary safety metrics that fail to capture behavioral degradation. To bridge these gaps, we present CNFinBench, a comprehensive benchmark spanning 29 subtasks grounded in the triad of expertise, autonomy, and integrity. It assesses domain-specific capabilities through certified regulatory corpora and professional financial tasks, reconstructs end-to-end agent workflows from requirement parsing to tool verification, and simulates multi-turn adversarial attacks that induce behavioral compliance drift. To quantify safety degradation, we introduce the Harmful Instruction Compliance Score (HICS), a multi-dimensional safety metric that integrates risk-type-specific deductions, multi-turn consistency tracking, and severity-adjusted penalty scaling based on fine-grained violation triggers. Evaluations over 22 open-/closed-source models reveal: LLMs perform well in applied tasks yet lack robust rule understanding, suffer a 15.4-point drop single modules to full execution chains, and collapse rapidly in multi-turn attacks, with average violations surging by 172.3% in Round 2. CNFinBench is available at https://cnfinbench.opencompass.org.cn and https://github.com/VertiAIBench/CNFinBench.

Current large language models (LLMs) excel in verifiable domains where outputs can be checked before action but prove less reliable for high-stakes strategic decisions with uncertain outcomes. This gap, driven by mutually reinforcing cognitive biases in both humans and artificial intelligence (AI) systems, threatens the defensibility of valuations and sustainability of investments in the sector. This report describes a framework emerging from systematic qualitative assessment across 7 frontier-grade LLMs and 3 market-facing venture vignettes under time pressure. Detailed prompting specifying decision partnership and explicitly instructing avoidance of sycophancy, confabulation, solution drift, and nihilism achieved initial partnership state but failed to maintain it under operational pressure. Sustaining protective partnership state required an emergent 7-stage calibration sequence, built upon a 4-stage initialization process, within a 5-layer protection architecture enabling bias self-monitoring, human-AI adversarial challenge, partnership state verification, performance degradation detection, and stakeholder protection. Three discoveries resulted: partnership state is achievable through ordered calibration but requires emergent maintenance protocols; reliability degrades when architectural drift and context exhaustion align; and dissolution discipline prevents costly pursuit of fundamentally wrong directions. Cross-model validation revealed systematic performance differences across LLM architectures. This approach demonstrates that human-AI teams can achieve cognitive partnership capable of preventing avoidable regret in high-stakes decisions, addressing return-on-investment expectations that depend on AI systems supporting consequential decision-making without introducing preventable cognitive traps when verification arrives too late.

Synthetic image source attribution is an open challenge, with an increasing number of image generators being released yearly. The complexity and the sheer number of available generative techniques, as well as the scarcity of high-quality open source datasets of diverse nature for this task, make training and benchmarking synthetic image source attribution models very challenging. WILD is a new in-the-Wild Image Linkage Dataset designed to provide a powerful training and benchmarking tool for synthetic image attribution models. The dataset is built out of a closed set of 10 popular commercial generators, which constitutes the training base of attribution models, and an open set of 10 additional generators, simulating a real-world in-the-wild scenario. Each generator is represented by 1,000 images, for a total of 10,000 images in the closed set and 10,000 images in the open set. Half of the images are post-processed with a wide range of operators. WILD allows benchmarking attribution models in a wide range of tasks, including closed and open set identification and verification, and robust attribution with respect to post-processing and adversarial attacks. Models trained on WILD are expected to benefit from the challenging scenario represented by the dataset itself. Moreover, an assessment of seven baseline methodologies on closed and open set attribution is presented, including robustness tests with respect to post-processing.

Machine Unlearning (MUL) is crucial for privacy protection and content regulation, yet recent studies reveal that traces of forgotten information persist in unlearned models, enabling adversaries to resurface removed knowledge. Existing verification methods only confirm whether unlearning was executed, failing to detect such residual information leaks. To address this, we introduce the concept of Robust Unlearning, ensuring models are indistinguishable from retraining and resistant to adversarial recovery. To empirically evaluate whether unlearning techniques meet this security standard, we propose the Unlearning Mapping Attack (UMA), a post-unlearning verification framework that actively probes models for forgotten traces using adversarial queries. Extensive experiments on discriminative and generative tasks show that existing unlearning techniques remain vulnerable, even when passing existing verification metrics. By establishing UMA as a practical verification tool, this study sets a new standard for assessing and enhancing machine unlearning security.

Automatic evaluation on low-resource language translation suffers from a deficiency of parallel corpora. Round-trip translation could be served as a clever and straightforward technique to alleviate the requirement of the parallel evaluation corpus. However, there was an observation of obscure correlations between the evaluation scores by forward and round-trip translations in the era of statistical machine translation (SMT). In this paper, we report the surprising finding that round-trip translation can be used for automatic evaluation without the references. Firstly, our revisit on the round-trip translation in SMT evaluation unveils that its long-standing misunderstanding is essentially caused by copying mechanism. After removing copying mechanism in SMT, round-trip translation scores can appropriately reflect the forward translation performance. Then, we demonstrate the rectification is overdue as round-trip translation could benefit multiple machine translation evaluation tasks. To be more specific, round-trip translation could be used i) to predict corresponding forward translation scores; ii) to improve the performance of the recently advanced quality estimation model; and iii) to identify adversarial competitors in shared tasks via cross-system verification.

To obtain, deterministic guarantees of adversarial robustness, specialized training methods are used. We propose, SABR, a novel such certified training method, based on the key insight that propagating interval bounds for a small but carefully selected subset of the adversarial input region is sufficient to approximate the worst-case loss over the whole region while significantly reducing approximation errors. We show in an extensive empirical evaluation that SABR outperforms existing certified defenses in terms of both standard and certifiable accuracies across perturbation magnitudes and datasets, pointing to a new class of certified training methods promising to alleviate the robustness-accuracy trade-off.

Reliable deployment of machine learning models such as neural networks continues to be challenging due to several limitations. Some of the main shortcomings are the lack of interpretability and the lack of robustness against adversarial examples or out-of-distribution inputs. In this exploratory review, we explore the possibilities and limits of adversarial attacks for explainable machine learning models. First, we extend the notion of adversarial examples to fit in explainable machine learning scenarios, in which the inputs, the output classifications and the explanations of the model's decisions are assessed by humans. Next, we propose a comprehensive framework to study whether (and how) adversarial examples can be generated for explainable models under human assessment, introducing and illustrating novel attack paradigms. In particular, our framework considers a wide range of relevant yet often ignored factors such as the type of problem, the user expertise or the objective of the explanations, in order to identify the attack strategies that should be adopted in each scenario to successfully deceive the model (and the human). The intention of these contributions is to serve as a basis for a more rigorous and realistic study of adversarial examples in the field of explainable machine learning.

Previous studies have found that an adversary attacker can often infer unintended input information from intermediate-layer features. We study the possibility of preventing such adversarial inference, yet without too much accuracy degradation. We propose a generic method to revise the neural network to boost the challenge of inferring input attributes from features, while maintaining highly accurate outputs. In particular, the method transforms real-valued features into complex-valued ones, in which the input is hidden in a randomized phase of the transformed features. The knowledge of the phase acts like a key, with which any party can easily recover the output from the processing result, but without which the party can neither recover the output nor distinguish the original input. Preliminary experiments on various datasets and network structures have shown that our method significantly diminishes the adversary's ability in inferring about the input while largely preserves the resulting accuracy.

Model attribution is a popular tool to explain the rationales behind model predictions. However, recent work suggests that the attributions are vulnerable to minute perturbations, which can be added to input samples to fool the attributions while maintaining the prediction outputs. Although empirical studies have shown positive performance via adversarial training, an effective certified defense method is eminently needed to understand the robustness of attributions. In this work, we propose to use uniform smoothing technique that augments the vanilla attributions by noises uniformly sampled from a certain space. It is proved that, for all perturbations within the attack region, the cosine similarity between uniformly smoothed attribution of perturbed sample and the unperturbed sample is guaranteed to be lower bounded. We also derive alternative formulations of the certification that is equivalent to the original one and provides the maximum size of perturbation or the minimum smoothing radius such that the attribution can not be perturbed. We evaluate the proposed method on three datasets and show that the proposed method can effectively protect the attributions from attacks, regardless of the architecture of networks, training schemes and the size of the datasets.

Recent works have shown that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples that find samples close to the original image but can make the model misclassify. Even with access only to the model's output, an attacker can employ black-box attacks to generate such adversarial examples. In this work, we propose a simple and lightweight defense against black-box attacks by adding random noise to hidden features at intermediate layers of the model at inference time. Our theoretical analysis confirms that this method effectively enhances the model's resilience against both score-based and decision-based black-box attacks. Importantly, our defense does not necessitate adversarial training and has minimal impact on accuracy, rendering it applicable to any pre-trained model. Our analysis also reveals the significance of selectively adding noise to different parts of the model based on the gradient of the adversarial objective function, which can be varied during the attack. We demonstrate the robustness of our defense against multiple black-box attacks through extensive empirical experiments involving diverse models with various architectures.

Several machine learning models, including neural networks, consistently misclassify adversarial examples---inputs formed by applying small but intentionally worst-case perturbations to examples from the dataset, such that the perturbed input results in the model outputting an incorrect answer with high confidence. Early attempts at explaining this phenomenon focused on nonlinearity and overfitting. We argue instead that the primary cause of neural networks' vulnerability to adversarial perturbation is their linear nature. This explanation is supported by new quantitative results while giving the first explanation of the most intriguing fact about them: their generalization across architectures and training sets. Moreover, this view yields a simple and fast method of generating adversarial examples. Using this approach to provide examples for adversarial training, we reduce the test set error of a maxout network on the MNIST dataset.

We introduce a large-scale, open-source dataset of pre-generated adversarial attacks for vision-language models (VLMs). The dataset is designed to be diverse, representative, and practical, extending existing benchmarks by covering 10 high-level categories and 55 subcategories of harmful intents. Our primary goal is to make adversarial data accessible to the research community, given the computational cost and complexity of generating large numbers of attacks. The dataset comprises 47 524 adversarial samples, generated using state-of-the-art attack strategies from recent literature. Our work complements existing efforts by consolidating and extending prior benchmarks from multiple established sources, resulting in 7 826 intents, and introduce an additional category to broaden coverage. This provides realistic evaluation resources for studying model robustness and alignment. Our dataset intends to enable researchers and practitioners to systematically evaluate the robustness and safety of VLMs, fine-tune attack-generation models, and develop or stress-test defensive guardrails under diverse adversarial conditions. By releasing this resource, we aim to lower the barrier to adversarial research and foster more reproducible, comprehensive, and comparable evaluations of VLM safety.

We introduce the MNIST-C dataset, a comprehensive suite of 15 corruptions applied to the MNIST test set, for benchmarking out-of-distribution robustness in computer vision. Through several experiments and visualizations we demonstrate that our corruptions significantly degrade performance of state-of-the-art computer vision models while preserving the semantic content of the test images. In contrast to the popular notion of adversarial robustness, our model-agnostic corruptions do not seek worst-case performance but are instead designed to be broad and diverse, capturing multiple failure modes of modern models. In fact, we find that several previously published adversarial defenses significantly degrade robustness as measured by MNIST-C. We hope that our benchmark serves as a useful tool for future work in designing systems that are able to learn robust feature representations that capture the underlying semantics of the input.

In this paper we establish rigorous benchmarks for image classifier robustness. Our first benchmark, ImageNet-C, standardizes and expands the corruption robustness topic, while showing which classifiers are preferable in safety-critical applications. Then we propose a new dataset called ImageNet-P which enables researchers to benchmark a classifier's robustness to common perturbations. Unlike recent robustness research, this benchmark evaluates performance on common corruptions and perturbations not worst-case adversarial perturbations. We find that there are negligible changes in relative corruption robustness from AlexNet classifiers to ResNet classifiers. Afterward we discover ways to enhance corruption and perturbation robustness. We even find that a bypassed adversarial defense provides substantial common perturbation robustness. Together our benchmarks may aid future work toward networks that robustly generalize.

Recent studies have revealed the vulnerability of pre-trained language models to adversarial attacks. Existing adversarial defense techniques attempt to reconstruct adversarial examples within feature or text spaces. However, these methods struggle to effectively repair the semantics in adversarial examples, resulting in unsatisfactory performance and limiting their practical utility. To repair the semantics in adversarial examples, we introduce a novel approach named Reactive Perturbation Defocusing (Rapid). Rapid employs an adversarial detector to identify fake labels of adversarial examples and leverage adversarial attackers to repair the semantics in adversarial examples. Our extensive experimental results conducted on four public datasets, convincingly demonstrate the effectiveness of Rapid in various adversarial attack scenarios. To address the problem of defense performance validation in previous works, we provide a demonstration of adversarial detection and repair based on our work, which can be easily evaluated at https://tinyurl.com/22ercuf8.

In order to train networks for verified adversarial robustness, it is common to over-approximate the worst-case loss over perturbation regions, resulting in networks that attain verifiability at the expense of standard performance. As shown in recent work, better trade-offs between accuracy and robustness can be obtained by carefully coupling adversarial training with over-approximations. We hypothesize that the expressivity of a loss function, which we formalize as the ability to span a range of trade-offs between lower and upper bounds to the worst-case loss through a single parameter (the over-approximation coefficient), is key to attaining state-of-the-art performance. To support our hypothesis, we show that trivial expressive losses, obtained via convex combinations between adversarial attacks and IBP bounds, yield state-of-the-art results across a variety of settings in spite of their conceptual simplicity. We provide a detailed analysis of the relationship between the over-approximation coefficient and performance profiles across different expressive losses, showing that, while expressivity is essential, better approximations of the worst-case loss are not necessarily linked to superior robustness-accuracy trade-offs.

As industrial applications are increasingly automated by machine learning models, enforcing personal data ownership and intellectual property rights requires tracing training data back to their rightful owners. Membership inference algorithms approach this problem by using statistical techniques to discern whether a target sample was included in a model's training set. However, existing methods only utilize the unaltered target sample or simple augmentations of the target to compute statistics. Such a sparse sampling of the model's behavior carries little information, leading to poor inference capabilities. In this work, we use adversarial tools to directly optimize for queries that are discriminative and diverse. Our improvements achieve significantly more accurate membership inference than existing methods, especially in offline scenarios and in the low false-positive regime which is critical in legal settings. Code is available at https://github.com/YuxinWenRick/canary-in-a-coalmine.

With the development of large language models (LLMs), detecting whether text is generated by a machine becomes increasingly challenging in the face of malicious use cases like the spread of false information, protection of intellectual property, and prevention of academic plagiarism. While well-trained text detectors have demonstrated promising performance on unseen test data, recent research suggests that these detectors have vulnerabilities when dealing with adversarial attacks such as paraphrasing. In this paper, we propose a framework for a broader class of adversarial attacks, designed to perform minor perturbations in machine-generated content to evade detection. We consider two attack settings: white-box and black-box, and employ adversarial learning in dynamic scenarios to assess the potential enhancement of the current detection model's robustness against such attacks. The empirical results reveal that the current detection models can be compromised in as little as 10 seconds, leading to the misclassification of machine-generated text as human-written content. Furthermore, we explore the prospect of improving the model's robustness over iterative adversarial learning. Although some improvements in model robustness are observed, practical applications still face significant challenges. These findings shed light on the future development of AI-text detectors, emphasizing the need for more accurate and robust detection methods.

Machine learning (ML) models, e.g., deep neural networks (DNNs), are vulnerable to adversarial examples: malicious inputs modified to yield erroneous model outputs, while appearing unmodified to human observers. Potential attacks include having malicious content like malware identified as legitimate or controlling vehicle behavior. Yet, all existing adversarial example attacks require knowledge of either the model internals or its training data. We introduce the first practical demonstration of an attacker controlling a remotely hosted DNN with no such knowledge. Indeed, the only capability of our black-box adversary is to observe labels given by the DNN to chosen inputs. Our attack strategy consists in training a local model to substitute for the target DNN, using inputs synthetically generated by an adversary and labeled by the target DNN. We use the local substitute to craft adversarial examples, and find that they are misclassified by the targeted DNN. To perform a real-world and properly-blinded evaluation, we attack a DNN hosted by MetaMind, an online deep learning API. We find that their DNN misclassifies 84.24% of the adversarial examples crafted with our substitute. We demonstrate the general applicability of our strategy to many ML techniques by conducting the same attack against models hosted by Amazon and Google, using logistic regression substitutes. They yield adversarial examples misclassified by Amazon and Google at rates of 96.19% and 88.94%. We also find that this black-box attack strategy is capable of evading defense strategies previously found to make adversarial example crafting harder.

The field of defense strategies against adversarial attacks has significantly grown over the last years, but progress is hampered as the evaluation of adversarial defenses is often insufficient and thus gives a wrong impression of robustness. Many promising defenses could be broken later on, making it difficult to identify the state-of-the-art. Frequent pitfalls in the evaluation are improper tuning of hyperparameters of the attacks, gradient obfuscation or masking. In this paper we first propose two extensions of the PGD-attack overcoming failures due to suboptimal step size and problems of the objective function. We then combine our novel attacks with two complementary existing ones to form a parameter-free, computationally affordable and user-independent ensemble of attacks to test adversarial robustness. We apply our ensemble to over 50 models from papers published at recent top machine learning and computer vision venues. In all except one of the cases we achieve lower robust test accuracy than reported in these papers, often by more than 10%, identifying several broken defenses.

Over the last decade, deep neural networks have achieved state of the art in computer vision tasks. These models, however, are susceptible to unusual inputs, known as adversarial examples, that cause them to misclassify or otherwise fail to detect objects. Here, we provide evidence that the increasing success of adversarial attacks is primarily due to increasing their size. We then demonstrate a method for generating the largest possible adversarial patch by building a adversarial pattern out of repeatable elements. This approach achieves a new state of the art in evading detection by YOLOv2 and YOLOv3. Finally, we present an experiment that fails to replicate the prior success of several attacks published in this field, and end with some comments on testing and reproducibility.

Discrete adversarial attacks are symbolic perturbations to a language input that preserve the output label but lead to a prediction error. While such attacks have been extensively explored for the purpose of evaluating model robustness, their utility for improving robustness has been limited to offline augmentation only. Concretely, given a trained model, attacks are used to generate perturbed (adversarial) examples, and the model is re-trained exactly once. In this work, we address this gap and leverage discrete attacks for online augmentation, where adversarial examples are generated at every training step, adapting to the changing nature of the model. We propose (i) a new discrete attack, based on best-first search, and (ii) random sampling attacks that unlike prior work are not based on expensive search-based procedures. Surprisingly, we find that random sampling leads to impressive gains in robustness, outperforming the commonly-used offline augmentation, while leading to a speedup at training time of ~10x. Furthermore, online augmentation with search-based attacks justifies the higher training cost, significantly improving robustness on three datasets. Last, we show that our new attack substantially improves robustness compared to prior methods.

In recent years, many neural network (NN) verifiers have been developed to formally verify certain properties of neural networks such as robustness. Although many benchmarks have been constructed to evaluate the performance of NN verifiers, they typically lack a ground-truth for hard instances where no current verifier can verify and no counterexample can be found, which makes it difficult to check the soundness of a new verifier if it claims to verify hard instances which no other verifier can do. We propose to develop a soundness benchmark for NN verification. Our benchmark contains instances with deliberately inserted counterexamples while we also try to hide the counterexamples from regular adversarial attacks which can be used for finding counterexamples. We design a training method to produce neural networks with such hidden counterexamples. Our benchmark aims to be used for testing the soundness of NN verifiers and identifying falsely claimed verifiability when it is known that hidden counterexamples exist. We systematically construct our benchmark and generate instances across diverse model architectures, activation functions, input sizes, and perturbation radii. We demonstrate that our benchmark successfully identifies bugs in state-of-the-art NN verifiers, as well as synthetic bugs, providing a crucial step toward enhancing the reliability of testing NN verifiers. Our code is available at https://github.com/MVP-Harry/SoundnessBench and our benchmark is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/SoundnessBench/SoundnessBench.

Adversarial examples are commonly viewed as a threat to ConvNets. Here we present an opposite perspective: adversarial examples can be used to improve image recognition models if harnessed in the right manner. We propose AdvProp, an enhanced adversarial training scheme which treats adversarial examples as additional examples, to prevent overfitting. Key to our method is the usage of a separate auxiliary batch norm for adversarial examples, as they have different underlying distributions to normal examples. We show that AdvProp improves a wide range of models on various image recognition tasks and performs better when the models are bigger. For instance, by applying AdvProp to the latest EfficientNet-B7 [28] on ImageNet, we achieve significant improvements on ImageNet (+0.7%), ImageNet-C (+6.5%), ImageNet-A (+7.0%), Stylized-ImageNet (+4.8%). With an enhanced EfficientNet-B8, our method achieves the state-of-the-art 85.5% ImageNet top-1 accuracy without extra data. This result even surpasses the best model in [20] which is trained with 3.5B Instagram images (~3000X more than ImageNet) and ~9.4X more parameters. Models are available at https://github.com/tensorflow/tpu/tree/master/models/official/efficientnet.

Most existing works of adversarial samples focus on attacking image recognition models, while little attention is paid to the image retrieval task. In this paper, we identify two inherent challenges in applying prevailing image recognition attack methods to image retrieval. First, image retrieval demands discriminative visual features, which is significantly different from the one-hot class prediction in image recognition. Second, due to the disjoint and potentially unrelated classes between the training and test set in image retrieval, predicting the query category from predefined training classes is not accurate and leads to a sub-optimal adversarial gradient. To address these limitations, we propose a new white-box attack approach, Opposite-Direction Feature Attack (ODFA), to generate adversarial queries. Opposite-Direction Feature Attack (ODFA) effectively exploits feature-level adversarial gradients and takes advantage of feature distance in the representation space. To our knowledge, we are among the early attempts to design an attack method specifically for image retrieval. When we deploy an attacked image as the query, the true matches are prone to receive low ranks. We demonstrate through extensive experiments that (1) only crafting adversarial queries is sufficient to fool the state-of-the-art retrieval systems; (2) the proposed attack method, ODFA, leads to a higher attack success rate than classification attack methods, validating the necessity of leveraging characteristics of image retrieval; (3) the adversarial queries generated by our method have good transferability to other retrieval models without accessing their parameters, i.e.,the black-box setting.

Adversarial robustness is a research area that has recently received a lot of attention in the quest for trustworthy artificial intelligence. However, recent works on adversarial robustness have focused on supervised learning where it is assumed that labeled data is plentiful. In this paper, we investigate semi-supervised adversarial training where labeled data is scarce. We derive two upper bounds for the robust risk and propose a regularization term for unlabeled data motivated by these two upper bounds. Then, we develop a semi-supervised adversarial training algorithm that combines the proposed regularization term with knowledge distillation using a semi-supervised teacher (i.e., a teacher model trained using a semi-supervised learning algorithm). Our experiments show that our proposed algorithm achieves state-of-the-art performance with significant margins compared to existing algorithms. In particular, compared to supervised learning algorithms, performance of our proposed algorithm is not much worse even when the amount of labeled data is very small. For example, our algorithm with only 8\% labeled data is comparable to supervised adversarial training algorithms that use all labeled data, both in terms of standard and robust accuracies on CIFAR-10.

Vision Large Language Models (VLLMs) are increasingly deployed to offer advanced capabilities on inputs comprising both text and images. While prior research has shown that adversarial attacks can transfer from open-source to proprietary black-box models in text-only and vision-only contexts, the extent and effectiveness of such vulnerabilities remain underexplored for VLLMs. We present a comprehensive analysis demonstrating that targeted adversarial examples are highly transferable to widely-used proprietary VLLMs such as GPT-4o, Claude, and Gemini. We show that attackers can craft perturbations to induce specific attacker-chosen interpretations of visual information, such as misinterpreting hazardous content as safe, overlooking sensitive or restricted material, or generating detailed incorrect responses aligned with the attacker's intent. Furthermore, we discover that universal perturbations -- modifications applicable to a wide set of images -- can consistently induce these misinterpretations across multiple proprietary VLLMs. Our experimental results on object recognition, visual question answering, and image captioning show that this vulnerability is common across current state-of-the-art models, and underscore an urgent need for robust mitigations to ensure the safe and secure deployment of VLLMs.

Modern image-to-text systems typically adopt the encoder-decoder framework, which comprises two main components: an image encoder, responsible for extracting image features, and a transformer-based decoder, used for generating captions. Taking inspiration from the analysis of neural networks' robustness against adversarial perturbations, we propose a novel gray-box algorithm for creating adversarial examples in image-to-text models. Unlike image classification tasks that have a finite set of class labels, finding visually similar adversarial examples in an image-to-text task poses greater challenges because the captioning system allows for a virtually infinite space of possible captions. In this paper, we present a gray-box adversarial attack on image-to-text, both untargeted and targeted. We formulate the process of discovering adversarial perturbations as an optimization problem that uses only the image-encoder component, meaning the proposed attack is language-model agnostic. Through experiments conducted on the ViT-GPT2 model, which is the most-used image-to-text model in Hugging Face, and the Flickr30k dataset, we demonstrate that our proposed attack successfully generates visually similar adversarial examples, both with untargeted and targeted captions. Notably, our attack operates in a gray-box manner, requiring no knowledge about the decoder module. We also show that our attacks fool the popular open-source platform Hugging Face.

Despite its prevalent use in image-text matching tasks in a zero-shot manner, CLIP has been shown to be highly vulnerable to adversarial perturbations added onto images. Recent studies propose to finetune the vision encoder of CLIP with adversarial samples generated on the fly, and show improved robustness against adversarial attacks on a spectrum of downstream datasets, a property termed as zero-shot robustness. In this paper, we show that malicious perturbations that seek to maximise the classification loss lead to `falsely stable' images, and propose to leverage the pre-trained vision encoder of CLIP to counterattack such adversarial images during inference to achieve robustness. Our paradigm is simple and training-free, providing the first method to defend CLIP from adversarial attacks at test time, which is orthogonal to existing methods aiming to boost zero-shot adversarial robustness of CLIP. We conduct experiments across 16 classification datasets, and demonstrate stable and consistent gains compared to test-time defence methods adapted from existing adversarial robustness studies that do not rely on external networks, without noticeably impairing performance on clean images. We also show that our paradigm can be employed on CLIP models that have been adversarially finetuned to further enhance their robustness at test time. Our code is available https://github.com/Sxing2/CLIP-Test-time-Counterattacks{here}.

Adversarial training is well-known to produce high-quality neural network models that are empirically robust against adversarial perturbations. Nevertheless, once a model has been adversarially trained, one often desires a certification that the model is truly robust against all future attacks. Unfortunately, when faced with adversarially trained models, all existing approaches have significant trouble making certifications that are strong enough to be practically useful. Linear programming (LP) techniques in particular face a "convex relaxation barrier" that prevent them from making high-quality certifications, even after refinement with mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) and branch-and-bound (BnB) techniques. In this paper, we propose a nonconvex certification technique, based on a low-rank restriction of a semidefinite programming (SDP) relaxation. The nonconvex relaxation makes strong certifications comparable to much more expensive SDP methods, while optimizing over dramatically fewer variables comparable to much weaker LP methods. Despite nonconvexity, we show how off-the-shelf local optimization algorithms can be used to achieve and to certify global optimality in polynomial time. Our experiments find that the nonconvex relaxation almost completely closes the gap towards exact certification of adversarially trained models.

Adversarial datasets should validate AI robustness by providing samples on which humans perform well, but models do not. However, as models evolve, datasets can become obsolete. Measuring whether a dataset remains adversarial is hindered by the lack of a standardized metric for measuring adversarialness. We propose AdvScore, a human-grounded evaluation metric that assesses a dataset's adversarialness by capturing models' and humans' varying abilities while also identifying poor examples. We then use AdvScore to motivate a new dataset creation pipeline for realistic and high-quality adversarial samples, enabling us to collect an adversarial question answering (QA) dataset, AdvQA. We apply AdvScore using 9,347 human responses and ten language models' predictions to track model improvement over five years, from 2020 to 2024. AdvScore thus provides guidance for achieving robustness comparable with human capabilities. Furthermore, it helps determine to what extent adversarial datasets continue to pose challenges, ensuring that, rather than reflecting outdated or overly artificial difficulties, they effectively test model capabilities.

Recently, there has been a surge of interest in introducing vision into Large Language Models (LLMs). The proliferation of large Visual Language Models (VLMs), such as Flamingo, BLIP-2, and GPT-4, signifies an exciting convergence of advancements in both visual and language foundation models. Yet, the risks associated with this integrative approach are largely unexamined. In this paper, we shed light on the security and safety implications of this trend. First, we underscore that the continuous and high-dimensional nature of the additional visual input space intrinsically makes it a fertile ground for adversarial attacks. This unavoidably expands the attack surfaces of LLMs. Second, we highlight that the broad functionality of LLMs also presents visual attackers with a wider array of achievable adversarial objectives, extending the implications of security failures beyond mere misclassification. To elucidate these risks, we study adversarial examples in the visual input space of a VLM. Specifically, against MiniGPT-4, which incorporates safety mechanisms that can refuse harmful instructions, we present visual adversarial examples that can circumvent the safety mechanisms and provoke harmful behaviors of the model. Remarkably, we discover that adversarial examples, even if optimized on a narrow, manually curated derogatory corpus against specific social groups, can universally jailbreak the model's safety mechanisms. A single such adversarial example can generally undermine MiniGPT-4's safety, enabling it to heed a wide range of harmful instructions and produce harmful content far beyond simply imitating the derogatory corpus used in optimization. Unveiling these risks, we accentuate the urgent need for comprehensive risk assessments, robust defense strategies, and the implementation of responsible practices for the secure and safe utilization of VLMs.

Despite recent progress, state-of-the-art question answering models remain vulnerable to a variety of adversarial attacks. While dynamic adversarial data collection, in which a human annotator tries to write examples that fool a model-in-the-loop, can improve model robustness, this process is expensive which limits the scale of the collected data. In this work, we are the first to use synthetic adversarial data generation to make question answering models more robust to human adversaries. We develop a data generation pipeline that selects source passages, identifies candidate answers, generates questions, then finally filters or re-labels them to improve quality. Using this approach, we amplify a smaller human-written adversarial dataset to a much larger set of synthetic question-answer pairs. By incorporating our synthetic data, we improve the state-of-the-art on the AdversarialQA dataset by 3.7F1 and improve model generalisation on nine of the twelve MRQA datasets. We further conduct a novel human-in-the-loop evaluation to show that our models are considerably more robust to new human-written adversarial examples: crowdworkers can fool our model only 8.8% of the time on average, compared to 17.6% for a model trained without synthetic data.

It is important that consumers and regulators can verify the provenance of large neural models to evaluate their capabilities and risks. We introduce the concept of a "Proof-of-Training-Data": any protocol that allows a model trainer to convince a Verifier of the training data that produced a set of model weights. Such protocols could verify the amount and kind of data and compute used to train the model, including whether it was trained on specific harmful or beneficial data sources. We explore efficient verification strategies for Proof-of-Training-Data that are compatible with most current large-model training procedures. These include a method for the model-trainer to verifiably pre-commit to a random seed used in training, and a method that exploits models' tendency to temporarily overfit to training data in order to detect whether a given data-point was included in training. We show experimentally that our verification procedures can catch a wide variety of attacks, including all known attacks from the Proof-of-Learning literature.

Adversarial examples, generated by carefully crafted perturbation, have attracted considerable attention in research fields. Recent works have argued that the existence of the robust and non-robust features is a primary cause of the adversarial examples, and investigated their internal interactions in the feature space. In this paper, we propose a way of explicitly distilling feature representation into the robust and non-robust features, using Information Bottleneck. Specifically, we inject noise variation to each feature unit and evaluate the information flow in the feature representation to dichotomize feature units either robust or non-robust, based on the noise variation magnitude. Through comprehensive experiments, we demonstrate that the distilled features are highly correlated with adversarial prediction, and they have human-perceptible semantic information by themselves. Furthermore, we present an attack mechanism intensifying the gradient of non-robust features that is directly related to the model prediction, and validate its effectiveness of breaking model robustness.

Existing neural networks for computer vision tasks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks: adding imperceptible perturbations to the input images can fool these methods to make a false prediction on an image that was correctly predicted without the perturbation. Various defense methods have proposed image-to-image mapping methods, either including these perturbations in the training process or removing them in a preprocessing denoising step. In doing so, existing methods often ignore that the natural RGB images in today's datasets are not captured but, in fact, recovered from RAW color filter array captures that are subject to various degradations in the capture. In this work, we exploit this RAW data distribution as an empirical prior for adversarial defense. Specifically, we proposed a model-agnostic adversarial defensive method, which maps the input RGB images to Bayer RAW space and back to output RGB using a learned camera image signal processing (ISP) pipeline to eliminate potential adversarial patterns. The proposed method acts as an off-the-shelf preprocessing module and, unlike model-specific adversarial training methods, does not require adversarial images to train. As a result, the method generalizes to unseen tasks without additional retraining. Experiments on large-scale datasets (e.g., ImageNet, COCO) for different vision tasks (e.g., classification, semantic segmentation, object detection) validate that the method significantly outperforms existing methods across task domains.

AI systems can take harmful actions and are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We present an approach, inspired by recent advances in representation engineering, that "short-circuits" models as they respond with harmful outputs. Existing techniques aimed at improving alignment, such as refusal training, are often bypassed. Techniques such as adversarial training try to plug these holes by countering specific attacks. As an alternative to refusal training and adversarial training, short-circuiting directly controls the representations that are responsible for harmful outputs in the first place. Our technique can be applied to both text-only and multimodal language models to prevent the generation of harmful outputs without sacrificing utility -- even in the presence of powerful unseen attacks. Notably, while adversarial robustness in standalone image recognition remains an open challenge, short-circuiting allows the larger multimodal system to reliably withstand image "hijacks" that aim to produce harmful content. Finally, we extend our approach to AI agents, demonstrating considerable reductions in the rate of harmful actions when they are under attack. Our approach represents a significant step forward in the development of reliable safeguards to harmful behavior and adversarial attacks.

The ability of generative models to produce highly realistic synthetic face images has raised security and ethical concerns. As a first line of defense against such fake faces, deep learning based forensic classifiers have been developed. While these forensic models can detect whether a face image is synthetic or real with high accuracy, they are also vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Although such attacks can be highly successful in evading detection by forensic classifiers, they introduce visible noise patterns that are detectable through careful human scrutiny. Additionally, these attacks assume access to the target model(s) which may not always be true. Attempts have been made to directly perturb the latent space of GANs to produce adversarial fake faces that can circumvent forensic classifiers. In this work, we go one step further and show that it is possible to successfully generate adversarial fake faces with a specified set of attributes (e.g., hair color, eye size, race, gender, etc.). To achieve this goal, we leverage the state-of-the-art generative model StyleGAN with disentangled representations, which enables a range of modifications without leaving the manifold of natural images. We propose a framework to search for adversarial latent codes within the feature space of StyleGAN, where the search can be guided either by a text prompt or a reference image. We also propose a meta-learning based optimization strategy to achieve transferable performance on unknown target models. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed approach can produce semantically manipulated adversarial fake faces, which are true to the specified attribute set and can successfully fool forensic face classifiers, while remaining undetectable by humans. Code: https://github.com/koushiksrivats/face_attribute_attack.

Adversarial training, which is to enhance robustness against adversarial attacks, has received much attention because it is easy to generate human-imperceptible perturbations of data to deceive a given deep neural network. In this paper, we propose a new adversarial training algorithm that is theoretically well motivated and empirically superior to other existing algorithms. A novel feature of the proposed algorithm is to apply more regularization to data vulnerable to adversarial attacks than other existing regularization algorithms do. Theoretically, we show that our algorithm can be understood as an algorithm of minimizing the regularized empirical risk motivated from a newly derived upper bound of the robust risk. Numerical experiments illustrate that our proposed algorithm improves the generalization (accuracy on examples) and robustness (accuracy on adversarial attacks) simultaneously to achieve the state-of-the-art performance.

This paper investigates the robustness of vision-language models against adversarial visual perturbations and introduces a novel ``double visual defense" to enhance this robustness. Unlike previous approaches that resort to lightweight adversarial fine-tuning of a pre-trained CLIP model, we perform large-scale adversarial vision-language pre-training from scratch using web-scale data. We then strengthen the defense by incorporating adversarial visual instruction tuning. The resulting models from each stage, DeltaCLIP and Delta^2LLaVA, show substantially enhanced zero-shot robustness and set a new state-of-the-art in adversarial defense for vision-language models. For example, the adversarial robustness of DeltaCLIP surpasses that of the previous best models on ImageNet-1k by ~20%. %For example, DeltaCLIP surpasses the previous best models on ImageNet-1k by ~20% in terms of adversarial robustness. Similarly, compared to prior art, Delta^2LLaVA brings a ~30% robustness improvement to image captioning task and a ~20% robustness improvement to visual question answering task. Furthermore, our models exhibit stronger zero-shot recognition capability, fewer hallucinations, and superior reasoning performance compared to baselines. Our project page is https://doublevisualdefense.github.io/.

In this work, we leverage visual prompting (VP) to improve adversarial robustness of a fixed, pre-trained model at testing time. Compared to conventional adversarial defenses, VP allows us to design universal (i.e., data-agnostic) input prompting templates, which have plug-and-play capabilities at testing time to achieve desired model performance without introducing much computation overhead. Although VP has been successfully applied to improving model generalization, it remains elusive whether and how it can be used to defend against adversarial attacks. We investigate this problem and show that the vanilla VP approach is not effective in adversarial defense since a universal input prompt lacks the capacity for robust learning against sample-specific adversarial perturbations. To circumvent it, we propose a new VP method, termed Class-wise Adversarial Visual Prompting (C-AVP), to generate class-wise visual prompts so as to not only leverage the strengths of ensemble prompts but also optimize their interrelations to improve model robustness. Our experiments show that C-AVP outperforms the conventional VP method, with 2.1X standard accuracy gain and 2X robust accuracy gain. Compared to classical test-time defenses, C-AVP also yields a 42X inference time speedup.

The widespread adoption of deep neural networks (DNNs) requires efficient techniques for verifying their safety. DNN verifiers are complex tools, which might contain bugs that could compromise their soundness and undermine the reliability of the verification process. This concern can be mitigated using proofs: artifacts that are checkable by an external and reliable proof checker, and which attest to the correctness of the verification process. However, such proofs tend to be extremely large, limiting their use in many scenarios. In this work, we address this problem by minimizing proofs of unsatisfiability produced by DNN verifiers. We present algorithms that remove facts which were learned during the verification process, but which are unnecessary for the proof itself. Conceptually, our method analyzes the dependencies among facts used to deduce UNSAT, and removes facts that did not contribute. We then further minimize the proof by eliminating remaining unnecessary dependencies, using two alternative procedures. We implemented our algorithms on top of a proof producing DNN verifier, and evaluated them across several benchmarks. Our results show that our best-performing algorithm reduces proof size by 37%-82% and proof checking time by 30%-88%, while introducing a runtime overhead of 7%-20% to the verification process itself.

Standard methods for generating adversarial examples for neural networks do not consistently fool neural network classifiers in the physical world due to a combination of viewpoint shifts, camera noise, and other natural transformations, limiting their relevance to real-world systems. We demonstrate the existence of robust 3D adversarial objects, and we present the first algorithm for synthesizing examples that are adversarial over a chosen distribution of transformations. We synthesize two-dimensional adversarial images that are robust to noise, distortion, and affine transformation. We apply our algorithm to complex three-dimensional objects, using 3D-printing to manufacture the first physical adversarial objects. Our results demonstrate the existence of 3D adversarial objects in the physical world.

The deployment of large language models (LLMs) has raised security concerns due to their susceptibility to producing harmful or policy-violating outputs when exposed to adversarial prompts. While alignment and guardrails mitigate common misuse, they remain vulnerable to automated jailbreaking methods such as GCG, PEZ, and GBDA, which generate adversarial suffixes via training and gradient-based search. Although effective, these methods particularly GCG are computationally expensive, limiting their practicality for organisations with constrained resources. This paper introduces a resource-efficient adversarial prompting approach that eliminates the need for retraining by matching new prompts to a database of pre-trained adversarial prompts. A dataset of 1,000 prompts was classified into seven harm-related categories, and GCG, PEZ, and GBDA were evaluated on a Llama 3 8B model to identify the most effective attack method per category. Results reveal a correlation between prompt type and algorithm effectiveness. By retrieving semantically similar successful adversarial prompts, the proposed method achieves competitive attack success rates with significantly reduced computational cost. This work provides a practical framework for scalable red-teaming and security evaluation of aligned LLMs, including in settings where model internals are inaccessible.

Highly realistic AI generated face forgeries known as deepfakes have raised serious social concerns. Although DNN-based face forgery detection models have achieved good performance, they are vulnerable to latest generative methods that have less forgery traces and adversarial attacks. This limitation of generalization and robustness hinders the credibility of detection results and requires more explanations. In this work, we provide counterfactual explanations for face forgery detection from an artifact removal perspective. Specifically, we first invert the forgery images into the StyleGAN latent space, and then adversarially optimize their latent representations with the discrimination supervision from the target detection model. We verify the effectiveness of the proposed explanations from two aspects: (1) Counterfactual Trace Visualization: the enhanced forgery images are useful to reveal artifacts by visually contrasting the original images and two different visualization methods; (2) Transferable Adversarial Attacks: the adversarial forgery images generated by attacking the detection model are able to mislead other detection models, implying the removed artifacts are general. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves over 90% attack success rate and superior attack transferability. Compared with naive adversarial noise methods, our method adopts both generative and discriminative model priors, and optimize the latent representations in a synthesis-by-analysis way, which forces the search of counterfactual explanations on the natural face manifold. Thus, more general counterfactual traces can be found and better adversarial attack transferability can be achieved.

We focus on the problem of black-box adversarial attacks, where the aim is to generate adversarial examples for deep learning models solely based on information limited to output label~(hard label) to a queried data input. We propose a simple and efficient Bayesian Optimization~(BO) based approach for developing black-box adversarial attacks. Issues with BO's performance in high dimensions are avoided by searching for adversarial examples in a structured low-dimensional subspace. We demonstrate the efficacy of our proposed attack method by evaluating both ell_infty and ell_2 norm constrained untargeted and targeted hard label black-box attacks on three standard datasets - MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. Our proposed approach consistently achieves 2x to 10x higher attack success rate while requiring 10x to 20x fewer queries compared to the current state-of-the-art black-box adversarial attacks.

We propose continuous adversarial flow models, a type of continuous-time flow model trained with an adversarial objective. Unlike flow matching, which uses a fixed mean-squared-error criterion, our approach introduces a learned discriminator to guide training. This change in objective induces a different generalized distribution, which empirically produces samples that are better aligned with the target data distribution. Our method is primarily proposed for post-training existing flow-matching models, although it can also train models from scratch. On the ImageNet 256px generation task, our post-training substantially improves the guidance-free FID of latent-space SiT from 8.26 to 3.63 and of pixel-space JiT from 7.17 to 3.57. It also improves guided generation, reducing FID from 2.06 to 1.53 for SiT and from 1.86 to 1.80 for JiT. We further evaluate our approach on text-to-image generation, where it achieves improved results on both the GenEval and DPG benchmarks.

In recent years, neural networks have become the default choice for image classification and many other learning tasks, even though they are vulnerable to so-called adversarial attacks. To increase their robustness against these attacks, there have emerged numerous detection mechanisms that aim to automatically determine if an input is adversarial. However, state-of-the-art detection mechanisms either rely on being tuned for each type of attack, or they do not generalize across different attack types. To alleviate these issues, we propose a novel technique for adversarial-image detection, RAID, that trains a secondary classifier to identify differences in neuron activation values between benign and adversarial inputs. Our technique is both more reliable and more effective than the state of the art when evaluated against six popular attacks. Moreover, a straightforward extension of RAID increases its robustness against detection-aware adversaries without affecting its effectiveness.

In the future, powerful AI systems may be deployed in high-stakes settings, where a single failure could be catastrophic. One technique for improving AI safety in high-stakes settings is adversarial training, which uses an adversary to generate examples to train on in order to achieve better worst-case performance. In this work, we used a safe language generation task (``avoid injuries'') as a testbed for achieving high reliability through adversarial training. We created a series of adversarial training techniques -- including a tool that assists human adversaries -- to find and eliminate failures in a classifier that filters text completions suggested by a generator. In our task, we determined that we can set very conservative classifier thresholds without significantly impacting the quality of the filtered outputs. We found that adversarial training increased robustness to the adversarial attacks that we trained on -- doubling the time for our contractors to find adversarial examples both with our tool (from 13 to 26 minutes) and without (from 20 to 44 minutes) -- without affecting in-distribution performance. We hope to see further work in the high-stakes reliability setting, including more powerful tools for enhancing human adversaries and better ways to measure high levels of reliability, until we can confidently rule out the possibility of catastrophic deployment-time failures of powerful models.

As a research community, we are still lacking a systematic understanding of the progress on adversarial robustness which often makes it hard to identify the most promising ideas in training robust models. A key challenge in benchmarking robustness is that its evaluation is often error-prone leading to robustness overestimation. Our goal is to establish a standardized benchmark of adversarial robustness, which as accurately as possible reflects the robustness of the considered models within a reasonable computational budget. To this end, we start by considering the image classification task and introduce restrictions (possibly loosened in the future) on the allowed models. We evaluate adversarial robustness with AutoAttack, an ensemble of white- and black-box attacks, which was recently shown in a large-scale study to improve almost all robustness evaluations compared to the original publications. To prevent overadaptation of new defenses to AutoAttack, we welcome external evaluations based on adaptive attacks, especially where AutoAttack flags a potential overestimation of robustness. Our leaderboard, hosted at https://robustbench.github.io/, contains evaluations of 120+ models and aims at reflecting the current state of the art in image classification on a set of well-defined tasks in ell_infty- and ell_2-threat models and on common corruptions, with possible extensions in the future. Additionally, we open-source the library https://github.com/RobustBench/robustbench that provides unified access to 80+ robust models to facilitate their downstream applications. Finally, based on the collected models, we analyze the impact of robustness on the performance on distribution shifts, calibration, out-of-distribution detection, fairness, privacy leakage, smoothness, and transferability.

State-of-the-art deep neural networks have achieved impressive results on many image classification tasks. However, these same architectures have been shown to be unstable to small, well sought, perturbations of the images. Despite the importance of this phenomenon, no effective methods have been proposed to accurately compute the robustness of state-of-the-art deep classifiers to such perturbations on large-scale datasets. In this paper, we fill this gap and propose the DeepFool algorithm to efficiently compute perturbations that fool deep networks, and thus reliably quantify the robustness of these classifiers. Extensive experimental results show that our approach outperforms recent methods in the task of computing adversarial perturbations and making classifiers more robust.

Machine learning models are susceptible to adversarial perturbations: small changes to input that can cause large changes in output. It is also demonstrated that there exist input-agnostic perturbations, called universal adversarial perturbations, which can change the inference of target model on most of the data samples. However, existing methods to craft universal perturbations are (i) task specific, (ii) require samples from the training data distribution, and (iii) perform complex optimizations. Additionally, because of the data dependence, fooling ability of the crafted perturbations is proportional to the available training data. In this paper, we present a novel, generalizable and data-free approaches for crafting universal adversarial perturbations. Independent of the underlying task, our objective achieves fooling via corrupting the extracted features at multiple layers. Therefore, the proposed objective is generalizable to craft image-agnostic perturbations across multiple vision tasks such as object recognition, semantic segmentation, and depth estimation. In the practical setting of black-box attack scenario (when the attacker does not have access to the target model and it's training data), we show that our objective outperforms the data dependent objectives to fool the learned models. Further, via exploiting simple priors related to the data distribution, our objective remarkably boosts the fooling ability of the crafted perturbations. Significant fooling rates achieved by our objective emphasize that the current deep learning models are now at an increased risk, since our objective generalizes across multiple tasks without the requirement of training data for crafting the perturbations. To encourage reproducible research, we have released the codes for our proposed algorithm.

Adversarial examples provoke weak reliability and potential security issues in deep neural networks. Although adversarial training has been widely studied to improve adversarial robustness, it works in an over-parameterized regime and requires high computations and large memory budgets. To bridge adversarial robustness and model compression, we propose a novel adversarial pruning method, Masking Adversarial Damage (MAD) that employs second-order information of adversarial loss. By using it, we can accurately estimate adversarial saliency for model parameters and determine which parameters can be pruned without weakening adversarial robustness. Furthermore, we reveal that model parameters of initial layer are highly sensitive to the adversarial examples and show that compressed feature representation retains semantic information for the target objects. Through extensive experiments on three public datasets, we demonstrate that MAD effectively prunes adversarially trained networks without loosing adversarial robustness and shows better performance than previous adversarial pruning methods.

Recent studies in deepfake detection have yielded promising results when the training and testing face forgeries are from the same dataset. However, the problem remains challenging when one tries to generalize the detector to forgeries created by unseen methods in the training dataset. This work addresses the generalizable deepfake detection from a simple principle: a generalizable representation should be sensitive to diverse types of forgeries. Following this principle, we propose to enrich the "diversity" of forgeries by synthesizing augmented forgeries with a pool of forgery configurations and strengthen the "sensitivity" to the forgeries by enforcing the model to predict the forgery configurations. To effectively explore the large forgery augmentation space, we further propose to use the adversarial training strategy to dynamically synthesize the most challenging forgeries to the current model. Through extensive experiments, we show that the proposed strategies are surprisingly effective (see Figure 1), and they could achieve superior performance than the current state-of-the-art methods. Code is available at https://github.com/liangchen527/SLADD.

Adversarial text attacks remain a persistent threat to transformer models, yet existing defenses are typically attack-specific or require costly model retraining. We introduce Representation Stability (RS), a model-agnostic detection framework that identifies adversarial examples by measuring how embedding representations change when important words are masked. RS first ranks words using importance heuristics, then measures embedding sensitivity to masking top-k critical words, and processes the resulting patterns with a BiLSTM detector. Experiments show that adversarially perturbed words exhibit disproportionately high masking sensitivity compared to naturally important words. Across three datasets, three attack types, and two victim models, RS achieves over 88% detection accuracy and demonstrates competitive performance compared to existing state-of-the-art methods, often at lower computational cost. Using Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain (NDCG) to measure perturbation identification quality, we reveal that gradient-based ranking outperforms attention and random selection approaches, with identification quality correlating with detection performance for word-level attacks. RS also generalizes well to unseen datasets, attacks, and models without retraining, providing a practical solution for adversarial text detection.

Deep neural networks (DNN) have achieved unprecedented success in numerous machine learning tasks in various domains. However, the existence of adversarial examples has raised concerns about applying deep learning to safety-critical applications. As a result, we have witnessed increasing interests in studying attack and defense mechanisms for DNN models on different data types, such as images, graphs and text. Thus, it is necessary to provide a systematic and comprehensive overview of the main threats of attacks and the success of corresponding countermeasures. In this survey, we review the state of the art algorithms for generating adversarial examples and the countermeasures against adversarial examples, for the three popular data types, i.e., images, graphs and text.

Large vision-language models (VLMs) such as GPT-4 have achieved unprecedented performance in response generation, especially with visual inputs, enabling more creative and adaptable interaction than large language models such as ChatGPT. Nonetheless, multimodal generation exacerbates safety concerns, since adversaries may successfully evade the entire system by subtly manipulating the most vulnerable modality (e.g., vision). To this end, we propose evaluating the robustness of open-source large VLMs in the most realistic and high-risk setting, where adversaries have only black-box system access and seek to deceive the model into returning the targeted responses. In particular, we first craft targeted adversarial examples against pretrained models such as CLIP and BLIP, and then transfer these adversarial examples to other VLMs such as MiniGPT-4, LLaVA, UniDiffuser, BLIP-2, and Img2Prompt. In addition, we observe that black-box queries on these VLMs can further improve the effectiveness of targeted evasion, resulting in a surprisingly high success rate for generating targeted responses. Our findings provide a quantitative understanding regarding the adversarial vulnerability of large VLMs and call for a more thorough examination of their potential security flaws before deployment in practice. Code is at https://github.com/yunqing-me/AttackVLM.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly being deployed as automated content moderators. Within this landscape, we uncover a critical threat: Adversarial Smuggling Attacks. Unlike adversarial perturbations (for misclassification) and adversarial jailbreaks (for harmful output generation), adversarial smuggling exploits the Human-AI capability gap. It encodes harmful content into human-readable visual formats that remain AI-unreadable, thereby evading automated detection and enabling the dissemination of harmful content. We classify smuggling attacks into two pathways: (1) Perceptual Blindness, disrupting text recognition; and (2) Reasoning Blockade, inhibiting semantic understanding despite successful text recognition. To evaluate this threat, we constructed SmuggleBench, the first comprehensive benchmark comprising 1,700 adversarial smuggling attack instances. Evaluations on SmuggleBench reveal that both proprietary (e.g., GPT-5) and open-source (e.g., Qwen3-VL) state-of-the-art models are vulnerable to this threat, producing Attack Success Rates (ASR) exceeding 90%. By analyzing the vulnerability through the lenses of perception and reasoning, we identify three root causes: the limited capabilities of vision encoders, the robustness gap in OCR, and the scarcity of domain-specific adversarial examples. We conduct a preliminary exploration of mitigation strategies, investigating the potential of test-time scaling (via CoT) and adversarial training (via SFT) to mitigate this threat. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/zhihengli-casia/smugglebench.

The widespread use of Text-to-Image (T2I) models in content generation requires careful examination of their safety, including their robustness to adversarial attacks. Despite extensive research on adversarial attacks, the reasons for their effectiveness remain underexplored. This paper presents an empirical study on adversarial attacks against T2I models, focusing on analyzing factors associated with attack success rates (ASR). We introduce a new attack objective - entity swapping using adversarial suffixes and two gradient-based attack algorithms. Human and automatic evaluations reveal the asymmetric nature of ASRs on entity swap: for example, it is easier to replace "human" with "robot" in the prompt "a human dancing in the rain." with an adversarial suffix, but the reverse replacement is significantly harder. We further propose probing metrics to establish indicative signals from the model's beliefs to the adversarial ASR. We identify conditions that result in a success probability of 60% for adversarial attacks and others where this likelihood drops below 5%.

Object detection is a vital task in computer vision and has become an integral component of numerous critical systems. However, state-of-the-art object detectors, similar to their classification counterparts, are susceptible to small adversarial perturbations that can significantly alter their normal behavior. Unlike classification, the robustness of object detectors has not been thoroughly explored. In this work, we take the initial step towards bridging the gap between the robustness of classification and object detection by leveraging adversarially trained classification models. Merely utilizing adversarially trained models as backbones for object detection does not result in robustness. We propose effective modifications to the classification-based backbone to instill robustness in object detection without incurring any computational overhead. To further enhance the robustness achieved by the proposed modified backbone, we introduce two lightweight components: imitation loss and delayed adversarial training. Extensive experiments on the MS-COCO and Pascal VOC datasets are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach.

Machine learning models, especially deep neural networks (DNNs), have been shown to be vulnerable against adversarial examples which are carefully crafted samples with a small magnitude of the perturbation. Such adversarial perturbations are usually restricted by bounding their L_p norm such that they are imperceptible, and thus many current defenses can exploit this property to reduce their adversarial impact. In this paper, we instead introduce "unrestricted" perturbations that manipulate semantically meaningful image-based visual descriptors - color and texture - in order to generate effective and photorealistic adversarial examples. We show that these semantically aware perturbations are effective against JPEG compression, feature squeezing and adversarially trained model. We also show that the proposed methods can effectively be applied to both image classification and image captioning tasks on complex datasets such as ImageNet and MSCOCO. In addition, we conduct comprehensive user studies to show that our generated semantic adversarial examples are photorealistic to humans despite large magnitude perturbations when compared to other attacks.

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that can bypass their safety guardrails. In many domains, adversarial training has proven to be one of the most promising methods to reliably improve robustness against such attacks. Yet, in the context of LLMs, current methods for adversarial training are hindered by the high computational costs required to perform discrete adversarial attacks at each training iteration. We address this problem by instead calculating adversarial attacks in the continuous embedding space of the LLM, which is orders of magnitudes more efficient. We propose a fast adversarial training algorithm (C-AdvUL) composed of two losses: the first makes the model robust on continuous embedding attacks computed on an adversarial behaviour dataset; the second ensures the usefulness of the final model by fine-tuning on utility data. Moreover, we introduce C-AdvIPO, an adversarial variant of IPO that does not require utility data for adversarially robust alignment. Our empirical evaluation on four models from different families (Gemma, Phi3, Mistral, Zephyr) and at different scales (2B, 3.8B, 7B) shows that both algorithms substantially enhance LLM robustness against discrete attacks (GCG, AutoDAN, PAIR), while maintaining utility. Our results demonstrate that robustness to continuous perturbations can extrapolate to discrete threat models. Thereby, we present a path toward scalable adversarial training algorithms for robustly aligning LLMs.

This chapter introduces the concept of adversarial attacks on image classification models built on convolutional neural networks (CNN). CNNs are very popular deep-learning models which are used in image classification tasks. However, very powerful and pre-trained CNN models working very accurately on image datasets for image classification tasks may perform disastrously when the networks are under adversarial attacks. In this work, two very well-known adversarial attacks are discussed and their impact on the performance of image classifiers is analyzed. These two adversarial attacks are the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) and adversarial patch attack. These attacks are launched on three powerful pre-trained image classifier architectures, ResNet-34, GoogleNet, and DenseNet-161. The classification accuracy of the models in the absence and presence of the two attacks are computed on images from the publicly accessible ImageNet dataset. The results are analyzed to evaluate the impact of the attacks on the image classification task.

Recent work has demonstrated that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples---inputs that are almost indistinguishable from natural data and yet classified incorrectly by the network. In fact, some of the latest findings suggest that the existence of adversarial attacks may be an inherent weakness of deep learning models. To address this problem, we study the adversarial robustness of neural networks through the lens of robust optimization. This approach provides us with a broad and unifying view on much of the prior work on this topic. Its principled nature also enables us to identify methods for both training and attacking neural networks that are reliable and, in a certain sense, universal. In particular, they specify a concrete security guarantee that would protect against any adversary. These methods let us train networks with significantly improved resistance to a wide range of adversarial attacks. They also suggest the notion of security against a first-order adversary as a natural and broad security guarantee. We believe that robustness against such well-defined classes of adversaries is an important stepping stone towards fully resistant deep learning models. Code and pre-trained models are available at https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge and https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_challenge.

We introduce the Adversarial Confusion Attack, a new class of threats against multimodal large language models (MLLMs). Unlike jailbreaks or targeted misclassification, the goal is to induce systematic disruption that makes the model generate incoherent or confidently incorrect outputs. Practical applications include embedding such adversarial images into websites to prevent MLLM-powered AI Agents from operating reliably. The proposed attack maximizes next-token entropy using a small ensemble of open-source MLLMs. In the white-box setting, we show that a single adversarial image can disrupt all models in the ensemble, both in the full-image and Adversarial CAPTCHA settings. Despite relying on a basic adversarial technique (PGD), the attack generates perturbations that transfer to both unseen open-source (e.g., Qwen3-VL) and proprietary (e.g., GPT-5.1) models.

The proliferation of large language models has raised growing concerns about their misuse, particularly in cases where AI-generated text is falsely attributed to human authors. Machine-generated content detectors claim to effectively identify such text under various conditions and from any language model. This paper critically evaluates these claims by assessing several popular detectors (RADAR, Wild, T5Sentinel, Fast-DetectGPT, PHD, LogRank, Binoculars) on a range of domains, datasets, and models that these detectors have not previously encountered. We employ various prompting strategies to simulate practical adversarial attacks, demonstrating that even moderate efforts can significantly evade detection. We emphasize the importance of the true positive rate at a specific false positive rate (TPR@FPR) metric and demonstrate that these detectors perform poorly in certain settings, with TPR@.01 as low as 0%. Our findings suggest that both trained and zero-shot detectors struggle to maintain high sensitivity while achieving a reasonable true positive rate.

Large language models (LLMs) are often deployed to perform constrained tasks, with narrow domains. For example, customer support bots can be built on top of LLMs, relying on their broad language understanding and capabilities to enhance performance. However, these LLMs are adversarially susceptible, potentially generating outputs outside the intended domain. To formalize, assess, and mitigate this risk, we introduce domain certification; a guarantee that accurately characterizes the out-of-domain behavior of language models. We then propose a simple yet effective approach, which we call VALID that provides adversarial bounds as a certificate. Finally, we evaluate our method across a diverse set of datasets, demonstrating that it yields meaningful certificates, which bound the probability of out-of-domain samples tightly with minimum penalty to refusal behavior.

Adversarial robustness has been conventionally believed as a challenging property to encode for neural networks, requiring plenty of training data. In the recent paradigm of adopting off-the-shelf models, however, access to their training data is often infeasible or not practical, while most of such models are not originally trained concerning adversarial robustness. In this paper, we develop a scalable and model-agnostic solution to achieve adversarial robustness without using any data. Our intuition is to view recent text-to-image diffusion models as "adaptable" denoisers that can be optimized to specify target tasks. Based on this, we propose: (a) to initiate a denoise-and-classify pipeline that offers provable guarantees against adversarial attacks, and (b) to leverage a few synthetic reference images generated from the text-to-image model that enables novel adaptation schemes. Our experiments show that our data-free scheme applied to the pre-trained CLIP could improve the (provable) adversarial robustness of its diverse zero-shot classification derivatives (while maintaining their accuracy), significantly surpassing prior approaches that utilize the full training data. Not only for CLIP, we also demonstrate that our framework is easily applicable for robustifying other visual classifiers efficiently.